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Abstract 
 
Modernization in Edo Japan and Qajar Iran  
(Structural and Cultural Preconditions) 
 
In the mid nineteenth century and early twentieth century two pre-modern societies, Edo 
Japan and Qajar Iran transitioned into modern societies with two very distinct outcomes. 
Despite having relatively similar pre-modern structures, Japan became a developed 
society while Iran remained underdeveloped. By focusing on issues of development and 
by applying a comparative-historical method, this paper answers the question, “why did 
social change in these two societies lead to development in modern Japan and 
underdevelopment in modern Iran?” 
  This extensive research is based on the most recent theoretical developments within 
the Modernization School and focuses on the organizational structure and some of its 
practices and institutions in each society as the unit of analysis. The original hypothesis 
that the organizational structures and the consequent cultural factors have an important 
role in development and underdevelopment of these two societies is supported. While 
the organizational structures often appeared to be similar at first glance, indeed there 
were distinct differences which created divergent cultures.    
The study focuses on the pre-modern periods of Edo Japan (1603-1868) and Qajar Iran 
(1785-1925) in general and the reigns of the eighth shogun of Tokugawa, Yoshimune 
Tokugawa and the fourth king of Qajar, Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh. These periods preceded the 
formation of modern states in Japan (Meiji 1868) and Iran (Reza Shah 1925). 
This study is comprised of three sections: 
1. Methodology and theories 
2. Organizational structure and sale of offices 
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3. Functions and cultural impact of the petition box 
In the second section, the organizational structures of Japanese and Iranian societies 
are studied. Japanese clan (uji) and household (ie) societies and Iranian tribal society as 
the dominant structure are reviewed throughout their respective histories. The main 
focus is on comparing social units that placed importance on blood relations (uji) and 
those units that emphasized goals of preserving and continuing the family business as a 
way to serve the emperor, which allowed for the recruitment and adoption of people 
outside the kinship network (ie). Japanese uji society, which was based on blood 
relations, had more similarities with Iranian tribal societies.  
The main organizational characteristics of ie included family related unilineal descent, 
and direct succession and inheritance to preserve and transfer the family wealth as well 
as the corporate related emphasis on maintaining the family business in service to others. 
Breaking the blood relation by adoption of a non-kin member to preserve the 
organization (ie) was the most distinctive feature because of its ability to adapt, which 
led to the development of a meritocracy based structure and culture that fostered 
modernization and development. This occurred both in the private business world as 
well as in the public bureaucratic sphere, although to a lesser extent in the latter after the 
Meiji Restoration. This unique socio-political structure differentiated ie from societies 
characterized by horizontal relations and complex family systems based on kinship such 
as uji and tribal systems. These systems often promoted and rewarded nepotism at the 
expense of service to others and led to weak bureaucracies. Nepotism thrived under the 
socio-political structures of Iranian tribal society, and developed a culture that proved to 
be a formidable obstacle against modernization and development.    
At first glance, both pre-modern Japan and Iran had strict hierarchical societies with 
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limited social mobility. Qajar Iran with a more patrimonial society was assumed to have 
a somewhat higher degree of social mobility, however Edo Japan instituted several 
reforms that actually opened up social mobility routes including: the ability to adopt 
talented non-blood relations into the family unit even when there was an existing heir; 
the supplemental salary (tashidaka) system which funded the promotion of talented 
people; and the sale of status (gokenin kabu). These three reforms contributed to Japan’s 
development as it transitioned into the modern era and will be studied in depth. Of the 
three reforms, only a version of the sale of status was implemented in Iran and thus can 
be compared in order to study its affect on development in Iran.  
In addition to the three reforms, other measures in Edo Japan were implemented, 
including oshikome (“forced retirement” or “house arrest”) which gave authority to the 
lower domain elders to control the higher lord’s behaviour; and ringi (circulation of 
documents) which allowed lower-ranking samurai in the government’s administration to 
take part in decisions and show their abilities through a bottom-up system of 
decision-making. This suggests a certain level of individual autonomy and structural 
accountability within Japanese pre-modern society and are important to study their 
contribution to Japan’s development. None of these measures had an equivalent in Qajar 
Iran. 
The last section of this study focuses on the petition box system which was an 
indigenous and traditional institution which was established, albeit not coincidentally in 
Edo Japan and Qajar Iran, for functional reasons that included establishing direct 
contact with the public during periods of crises. While both had similar functional goals, 
their actual practice was radically different and produced divergent functional outcomes.   
The actual adoption of the suggestion and critiques in meyasubako was its distinctive 
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characteristic which differentiated it from Iranian sanduq-i adȃlat (Justice Box).  
Many factors contributed to the divergent functioning of the petition boxes in Japan and 
Iran and will be studied. In Japan, petitioners usually had higher literacy rates, rulers 
had different structures of legitimacy, officials had different problem solving approaches 
and developed a different approach to receiving and responding to suggestions and 
critiques than in Iran. In Japan, these differences led to more social mobility as people 
were rewarded and promoted for their talent and ideas. More importantly the system 
developed a public civic identity and sense of responsibility where commoners were 
incorporated into decision-making and problem solving. This created a public political 
arena for discussion that eventually would be the foundation for its modern version of 
representative (parliamentary) government. The absence of similar performance of this 
system in Iran became an obstacle to the importation of parliamentary institutions.  
One simple pre-modern practice illustrates very well why Iran and Japan have had two 
very different outcomes with their transition to a modern society. While both countries 
instituted the petition box for similar reasons, it was in their functioning that we see the 
distinct socio-political structures and resulting cultures’ influence that created two 
separate histories: Japan today is a developed country while Iran remains 
underdeveloped.   
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近世日本とイラン・ガージャールの近代化 
（社会制度的及び文化的前提条件） 
Modernization in Edo Japan and Qajar Iran  
(Structural and Cultural Preconditions) 
 
要旨 
本稿の主要なテーマは、日本の江戸時代とイランのガージャール朝について比
較史的方法を用いて検討を展開することである。 
前近代において発展した日本と発展途上にあったイランは相対的な類似の構造
を持っており、上記の 2 つの社会の比較は、「この 2 つの社会における変化は、
近代日本の発展と、近代イランにおける発展途上状態を導いたのか」という問
いに答えるものである。 
社会制度とその結果としての文化的要因は、2つの社会の発展と発展途上状態に
おいて重要な役割を果たすと考えられる。 
本研究は、歴史的過程としての発展と発展途上状態を認識することで、比較史
的手法を取り入れるものであり、2つの社会を分析単位とみなす。 
社会制度と構造を研究の仮説の基礎とするため、近代化論を分析の理論的基礎
とする。 
本研究では、日本の江戸時代（1603-1868）とイランのガージャール朝（1785-1925）
を概説的に、また、八代将軍徳川吉宗とガージャール朝の第四代ナーセロッデ
ィーン・シャーを特に取り上げる。すなわち、日本の近代国家成立（明治 1868）
以前と、イランのレザ・シャーによるパフラヴィー朝成立（1925）以前の前近
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代社会が研究の対象となる。 
本研究は以下の各章により構成される。 
1.方法論と理論 
2.社会制度と公職の売買 
3.請願箱：イラン・ガージャールと日本・江戸の効率化と近代化への移行 
第 2 章において、日本とイランの社会制度を分析し、支配的な構造、すなわち
日本の「氏」と「家」社会と、イランの部族社会を、歴史的に見直す。 
本章における主要な視点は、「氏」すなわち血縁関係の重要性と、「家」すなわ
ち親族ネットワークにおいて強調される、家職の保護と維持を比較することに
ある。家職は、親族以外の人々を募集し取り込むことで成立した。日本の「氏」
社会は血縁関係によって成立し、イランの部族社会と相似すると言われる。な
ぜなら、「氏」集団は、他の社会においても存在する一般的な組織的形態であり、
「家」制度とは違い、日本に限定されるものではなかったためである。 
組織としての「家」の主な特徴は、血統、直系による、家の財産を保持し譲渡
するための相続、結合的性質、そして独立性である。しかし、血縁関係の破壊
である、「家」組織を保持するための親族以外からの採用は、その最も特徴的な
要素である。この特徴は、水平的な関係性あるいは「氏」や部族制度のような
親族関係に基づく複雑な家族を内包する社会から「家」を差別化するものであ
る。 
日本の「家」制度の特異性は、日本の近代化において重要な役割を果たしたと
言われている。もしそうでなければ、「氏」制度の維持によって朝鮮半島や中国
のように日本は発展途上段階にあったであろう。これはイランが発展途上状態
にあったことの要因であろう。 
社会制度は社会政治学的な文化と「家」の支配に大きな影響を与えると仮定す
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れば、江戸時代とガージャール朝の部族文化は、社会政治学的な文化や結果的
にこの 2つの社会の近代化に影響したのである。 
明治維新以降、「家」社会は完全には廃止されなかったが、絶頂期を迎えた徳川
時代までのように強大な要素とはなれなかった。その原則は機能しつづけたが、
全体的・政治的な機能は失われた。この原則は主に近代化の原動力となった日
本の企業に受け入れられ、その文化は社会のなかで再生産され続ける結果とな
った。 
日本社会の組織としての「家」においては、厳格な階級制度にもかかわらず、
領主によって様々な改革が企図され、危機的状況や必要な際に、日本の社会制
度は有能な人材の雇用と昇進によって新たな状況に適応してきたことが明らか
となった。 
このような「家」社会における試みの一つに、給与を補う制度（足高制）があ
る。足高制に相当するような制度は、ガージャールには見られないが、日本に
おける近代への移行を促進した。 
人材登用は「家」制度の慣習であったが、江戸時代における地位の売買（御家
人株）は、有能な人材の登用と昇進を行う二次的な慣例として、イランのガー
ジャールの公職の売買に比較される。この慣例について、それぞれの社会にお
ける歴史的事例を検証することで比較研究していく。 
日本社会全体と同様に、「家」制度は厳格な階級構造を包括していたにもかかわ
らず、親族関係以外から必要とされる職位に就くに値する人物の登用が、高度
に浸透していた。これについて、イランのガージャールと日本の江戸を比較し
た結果、日本は高度な社会的動員を行っていたことが明らかとなった。しかし
ながら、理論的にはこの度合いはイランのような世襲制の政権ではより高いと
いわれている。 
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この 3 つの慣例に加え、江戸時代における「押込」（「強制隠居」または「家内
押込」）は、家老職たちによって行使され、主君の行動を統制した。他に、地位
の低い武士の統治決定への関与が許され、人材登用制度と書類の回覧（稟議）
制度のなかでその能力を発揮した。 
これによって領主への絶対的な服従と異なる、一定レベルの個人の自主性が指
摘される。これらのうち、イランのガージャールに比較できる慣例は存在しな
い。 
もし、イランの社会制度が近代化との互換性のある制度に変換することができ
たなら、イランにおける伝統社会から近代社会への移行は、日本と同様に、迅
速に成し得たであろう。 
第 3 章では、徳川吉宗が設置した目安箱を、固有の伝統的制度とみなして議論
していく。日本の江戸とイランのカジャールは同時期にあったものではないが、
目安箱は、危機に直面した統治者が自らの統治の下で公衆と直接的に接触する
ために設けられたものである。 
目安箱に投じられた提案と批判が、将軍によって受理されることは、イランに
おける「正義の箱；sanduq-i adȃlat」とは異なる特性を端的に示している。 
日本の江戸とイランのカジャールにおける意見箱制度は、封権制と世襲制、為
政者の正当性の獲得方法、問題解決方法などの点で異なるが、日本の目安箱の
持つ意義申立人の種類、彼らの読み書き能力、主張や批判の受理方法に見られ
る特質は、一般人の意思決定への参加と下位の武士の昇進や社会的流動性に貢
献していたのである。 
目安箱は、議論のための政治的な場を開放したが、その結果、近代固有の代表
議会制度が作られるに至る。その一方、イランにおけるこうした制度の機能不
全は、輸入された議会制度にいくつかの問題を発生させた。 
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全体としてみれば、イランのものと比較される日本の様々な社会構造とその制
度下に発生する文化は、近代と合致し、制度作りに寄与する価値を備えていた
のである。 
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Part One: Theoretical Discussion 
 
Chapter One: Methodology and Theories Review 
 
Introduction 
The main theme of the research is development which will be explored by applying 
comparative-historical method to compare pre-modern societies of Edo Japan and Qajar 
Iran. 
Based on the Dependency School two kinds of development are defined. The first is 
a kind of development with an internal dynamic process; and the second is a kind of 
development where the dynamic process is external and outside of the political borders 
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of society. The Modernization School argues for the former whereas other schools argue 
for the latter. 
According to both of these definitions, the formation of a development process 
entails a long term social change which affects cultural, political and economic systems. 
Therefore social actors, the interests of groups and classes and their attitudes towards 
change or resistance have an important role in the formation of this process. Hence the 
formation of development and/or underdevelopment in each society has its own unique 
history. This is the reason for applying historical–comparative method (Rajabzadeh 
1378/1999: 1-2). 
Based on development parameters, in present modern times Japan is developed while 
Iran remains underdeveloped, despite having relatively similar internal structures within 
their respective pre-modern societies. 
Considering the effective role of historical factors in development, those factors can 
be studied by comparing both societies. This study is an attempt in both theory and 
methodology, and historical studies, to explore the historical preconditions of 
underdevelopment in Iran and development in Japan by applying the methods of John 
Stuart Mill, by utilizing development schools theories, by reviewing the literature, and 
by analyzing the historical background of Iran and Japan during Qajar and Edo eras. 
 
Methodology and Theory  
The main question to be explored is: “Despite some relative similarities between 
Japanese and Iranian pre-modern societies, why did social change in these two 
societies lead to development in modern Japan and underdevelopment in modern 
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Iran?”  
I hypothesize that among the various economic, social, political, educational, cultural 
and structural factors, two are of primary importance in explaining the divergent 
outcomes. They are organizational structure and its consequent culture that includes 
customs such as the promotion and priority of talent, and the level of effectiveness of 
institutions as reflected in the household and tribal structure, and some practices such as 
sale of status and offices and the institution of the petition box.    
With regard to the first part of aforementioned question, a brief explanation about 
some similarities of both societies and the reasons for selecting them for comparison is 
necessary. John Stuart Mill’s Methods of Comparison have been reviewed and are 
applied here. Considering the previous conditions of a phenomenon and the consequent 
situation, two methods of comparison can be singled out. In one method, various cases 
are compared who do have overall differences but crucial similarity before a certain 
phenomenon (modernization) takes place which leads to a similar result. The other 
method is comparing various or two cases with overall similarities but crucial 
differences before the phenomenon takes place which generates different results (Mill 
1973: 247-260 Vol. VII). 
Based on the main theme of the research, the proper case for comparison can be 
selected from two groups of societies: developed societies and underdeveloped societies. 
We can apply one of Mill’s two methods based on which comparison we wish to make. 
If two underdeveloped societies are selected for comparison, it is given that their 
previous crucial similarity is related to the similar result and Mill's Method of 
Agreement can be applied. If an underdeveloped society and a developed one are 
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selected for comparison, it is given that their crucial differences in the past are related to 
their different result in future. In this case, Mill's Method of Difference will be suitable 
for methodological application. 
THE METHOD OF AGREEMENT 
  
  overall          
differences   
    
   crucial  
  similarity 
 
 
THE METHOD OF DIFFERENCE 
 
    overall                       
  similarities 
 
  crucial   
 difference 
Case 1 Case 2  Case 3 
A 
B 
C 
X 
D 
E 
F 
X 
G 
H 
I 
X 
Y Y Y 
Positive case [Edo Japan] Negative case [Qajar Iran] 
A 
B 
C 
X 
A 
B 
C 
Not X 
Y Not Y 
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Key: 
X = causal variable  
Y = phenomenon to be explained 
Figure 3.1.Two designs for macro–analytic comparative history (from John Stuart Mill) 
(Skocpol, Theda and Margaret Somers. 1994: 80). 
According to the second method, the selected societies should share overall 
similarities concerning the phenomenon to be explained. Based on the method of 
difference as the preferred method of analysis, a society from the developed group must 
be selected which had similar conditions as Iran before starting development. 
John Stuart Mill’s old method of difference was recently criticized by some scholars 
such as political scientists Peter A. Hall. He argues that: 
 "Because they advance new ontologies … theories of path dependence ... 
are also shifting conventional conceptions of what constitutes adequate 
explanation in the field of comparative politics ... If contemporary outcomes 
reflect the outermost tips of a branching tree of historical developments, 
allusions to one or two causal variables of putative importance will not 
constitute an adequate explanation for them" (Hall 2003: 387).  
  According to his argument, historical and social developments are neither driven 
nor caused by some necessary coincidences of factors taken out of context. Besides, 
an explanation necessiates a more historically grounded analysis, not one that 
simply enumerates several historical factors without connecting them to their actual 
context.  
His critiques are conceded specifically as he argues that one or two causal variables 
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are not enough to explain the historical development in comparative politics.  
However, as Milton Friedman has argued valid predictions about phenomena is the 
goal of a theory or hypothesis (Friedman1953: 148) and to the extent an explanation 
provides predictions sufficiently “accurate” -in the sense that they are not yet disproved 
by empirical evidence- it can be regarded as academically relevant (Ibid., 157). 
With regard to the Iranian ancient civilization, developed societies should be 
categorized in a certain way so that their pre-modern conditions have more similarities 
to Iranian society. Therefore America, Canada or Australia are not proper cases for 
comparison. The rest of developed societies are divided into the European group of 
countries such as Britain, France, and Germany, which had an internal dynamic process 
of development, and the Late-Comers group such as Russia, Japan, and China, which 
started development after encountering Western societies. The social changes in the 
latter group however were initiated by a centralized political system and elites therefore 
there were internal processes of development as well. 
In these respects, Iran is similar to Late-Comers group. Amongst this group, Russia 
because of its historical and cultural background is closer to European societies. 
Development of China also in comparison with Japan and Iran occurred later (Black et 
al. 1975: 13-15). In addition to these reasons, my personal interest in comparing Iran 
and Japan are also important.   
 Answering the main question of this study, some effective factors are presented as 
hypotheses which will be proved or disproved here by applying the comparative method. 
Some of the most effective ones are political system and elites, social integration and 
classes, religion, educational system. By reviewing some works on development in Iran 
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and Japan these factors can be evaluated. 
 
Units and Periods of Study 
As explained the perception of development and underdevelopment as historical 
processes led this study to a comparative-historical research, consequently the Japanese 
and Iranian organizational structures and some administrative practices and institutions 
are the unit of analysis. 
Edo Japan (1603-1868) and Qajar Iran (1785-1925) are the periods of study in 
general scale. More specifically I will focus on the reign of the eighth shogun of 
Tokugawa, Yoshimune Tokugawa (ruled 1716–1745) and some of his reforms (kyôhô). I 
will compare his reign with the fourth king of Qajar, Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh (ruled 
1848-1896) and his reform measures. These two periods are not completely coincident 
but the focus of this research is on pre-modern era. The modern state in Japan took form 
by Meji Restoration (1868) and in Iran by Reza Shah (1925), therefore the historical 
periods which led to formation of modern states are the selected periods for this study.  
 
Review of Development Literature 
(Theoretical and relevant works) 
My analysis focuses on comparing societies utilizing the different school of 
development theory; therefore it is worthy to review the literature regarding this 
theoretical school briefly before presenting the abstract reviews of literature 
background. 
Although it is said that discussion on development started after World War II, some 
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scholars trace its historical background to the early 20
th
 or even late 19
th
 centuries 
(Ranis 1968: 409). In the beginning, theories of development fell into two camps, 
economic development and modernization. Economic concepts were applied in former 
one and social concepts were used in latter. Economist eventually developed the 
Structuralism School, which overtime took on a more advanced form incorporating 
social dimensions, and emerged as the Dependency School (Preston 1985: ch.1). At this 
stage historical view to Development and Underdevelopment was formed and led to 
World-System analysis. 
After World War II and the independence of former colonies of European countries, 
scholars from the developed countries presented economic theories to be used by the 
former colonies in order to help guide them onto a path of growth and development.  
These theories equated development with rapid and continuous per capita and national 
production growth. These basic economic theories lacked certain concepts and they 
failed to spur growth in the former colonies. To solve the problem, scholars incorporated 
institutional and structural frameworks into their theories as they moved away from a 
purely quantitative and economic concept of development to a more qualitative and 
social concept (Hoselitz 1968: 423) which is close to the definition applied here. 
 
Modernization School 
Changing the development concept from a more economic subject to a process with 
different political, social and cultural dimensions, introduced other scholars to the 
development discussion. In particular, sociologists weighed in with their theories, 
shifting the unit of analysis from the economy to society.   
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The Modernization School developed as vanguard sociologists such as Marx, Weber, 
and Durkhiem applied sociological concepts to economic issues of development.   
Gradually scholars formulated non-economic theories and standards and the 
Modernization school arose. According to this school, development is not only an 
economic fact but also a holistic change that requires a more qualitative and structural 
analysis than a quantitative/economic analysis. The Modernization School scholars, 
while not completely unified in their theories, generally assume that development 
occurs as frequent changes that make up a historical process within a social unit of the 
nation-state or society (Hall 1965: 7- 41).  
Considering development as an internal process, specifically from the viewpoint of 
sociology, the Modernization School focuses on the institutions and structure of 
societies and their gradual change. This theory will be applied for my analysis. 
 
Dependency School and World-System Analysis 
The Modernization School in analyzing development focuses on society as the unit 
of analysis; the basic theoretical assumption made by this theory is that development is 
due to internal changes which take place within a society. 
“Why do some societies develop later than the others?” is an important question for 
this school. “Obstacles to development” is the main answer to this question. These 
obstacles are partially related to traditional structures of these societies and are called 
“internal obstacles” such as high rates of illiteracy, unemployment and absence of 
democratic institutions. 
However, some scholars when they compared modern underdeveloped societies with 
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pre-modern European countries who are now developed, found that these ‘obstacles’ 
were in place in the latter group; therefore it could not be proven that they always 
blocked development. So some scholars turned to other factors including relationships 
between underdeveloped societies with developed ones (Roxborough 1979: 41-60). 
Therefore, transnational factors became the focus of third world scholars, specifically in 
analyzing Latin America countries. These scholars formed the Dependency School. 
From the viewpoint of this school, underdevelopment is a condition separate from 
traditional and pre-modern society; it is a transformed structure which results from the 
impact of development of other societies on the pre-modern society. Therefore, the unit 
of analysis gradually changed from society to the relation of societies (Shanon 1989: 1- 
12).  
Historical studies of capitalism based on the Dependency School and other 
underdevelopment theories later led to formation of World System analysis. It is not 
only derived from neo-Marxist literature on development but from the French Annales 
School tradition. From the viewpoint of World-System School, capitalism which formed 
in Western Europe in the 16
th
 century extends to all geographical regions through 
economic and political networks. At the present time, all societies are parts of this 
system (Ibid., 13).  
Immanuel Wallerstein a leading advocate of this approach, as a basis for comparison 
proposes four categories; core, semi-periphery, periphery and external arena into which 
all regions of the world can be placed. In the process of integration into the 
world-system, all societies have changed. But these changes have led to different 
outcomes: Core countries experienced development while periphery countries tended to 
be underdeveloped. Growth of capitalism and its mechanism differentiated these 
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outcomes with other internal and external mechanisms of growth influencing the 
outcome as well. Wallerstein eventually develops a theory that substitutes the 
World-System for nation-state (society) as the unit of analysis (Wallerstein 1974: 22). 
This allows the focus of analysis to be on the interplay of capitalism and existing 
internal and external mechanisms. 
Because the institutions and structure of society underlie the hypotheses of the study, 
Modernization School is the proper theoretic foundation of my analysis.  
 
The Methodology and Assumptions of Modernization School 
 As mentioned, development is the main theme of this research. Among the three 
dominant theoretical schools that analyze development processes, modernization, 
dependency, and world system, I adopt the first school based on the research of Alvin. Y. 
So. Within the Modernization School there are classical and new studies scholars; I will 
utilize the latter in my research.     
The Modernization School scholars found that evolutionary theory was sufficient to 
explain the transition of Western Europe from a traditional society to a modern one.  
However this has not been the case with Third World countries.  Therefore scholars 
had to apply both “evolutionary” and “functionalist” theories to interpret the 
modernization of the Third World countries. 
Evolutionary theory assumes that there are distinct stages of social change which 
moves in one direction from a primitive to advanced state. This movement is judged 
good because it is labeled as progress; slow and gradual change is judged better than 
revolutionary change because it does not radically disrupt the society as a whole. 
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Functionalist theory sees society as a biological organization. To distinguish 
traditional societies from modern ones, Parsons presents five “pattern variables”:  
1. “affective versus affective-neutral relationship” such as direct and 
personal relations between employee-employer in traditional societies versus 
indirect and impersonal relations in modern ones; 
2. “pluralistic versus universalistic relations” such as working for 
relatives’ company or shopping at a neighboring store in traditional society 
versus interacting with strangers  by universalistic relation in modern populated 
societies;  
3. “collective orientation versus self-orientation” such as being loyal to 
family, group or tribe in traditional society versus emphasizing individual talent, 
innovations, and attempts in modern societies; 
4. “ascription versus achievement” such as employment in traditional 
society based on applicant’s parents or relative relations versus, employment in 
modern societies based on the applicant’s achieved status, qualifications and 
experiences; 
5. “functionally diffused versus functionally specific” such as the 
employer’s role includes hiring, training and protecting the employee in 
traditional society versus the employer’s roles are more narrowly specified in 
modern ones (So 1990: 19-23). 
The Modernization School incorporates multidisciplinary scholarship with 
distinctive foci and goals; for instance sociologists focus on correcting unjust structural 
differentiations, economists on increasing productive investments and political scientists 
on improving the political system capacity. Despite these differences, Modernization 
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School scholars share two common sets of assumptions and methodology. The first set 
of assumptions is based on evolutionary theory as follows:  
1. Modernization is a phased process from a primitive, traditional phase 
to an advanced modern stage.  
2. Modernization is a homogenizing process. Countries that modernize 
become more like each other.   
3. Modernization is a Europneanization or Americanization process. 
These two societies are conceived as unique standards due to their stable 
democracy and advanced economy, to which other countries can aspire.  
4. Modernization is an irreversible process. It cannot be stopped once it 
is started.  
5. Modernization is a progressive and lengthy process. It is gradual and 
evolutionary change, not revolutionary. 
The second set of assumptions has been derived from functionalist theory. 
1. Modernization is a systematic process, in which all aspects of social 
life are affected.    
2. Modernization is a transformative process. All traditional values 
should be replaced by modern values because the latter are superior.  
3. Modernization is an imminent process. The focus of analysis is on the 
internal structures and influences 
Modernization School scholars have similar methodological approaches including 
using general and abstract methods of discussion, focusing on Parsons’s ideal-types 
such as traditional societies versus modern ones, and utilizing nation-states as the units 
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of analysis (Ibid., 33-36). 
 
The Classical Studies of Modernization 
Reviewing some of the classical modernization studies, Alvin So indicates some of 
their common features and criticisms of the Modernization School. McClelland argues 
that focusing just on economic infrastructures is not sufficient because it does not factor 
in human beings. He highlights the strong desire for achievement, doing a good job, and 
finding new ways for improvement which he calls “achievement motivation” have a big 
impact on a society’s potential for development. McClelland analyzes the achievement 
motivation within in the family and the socialization process through parents 
(McClelland 1964 quoted in So op. cit. 38-45). 
Under the theme of “modern man,” Inkeless focuses on the impact of modernization 
on the individual’s attitudes, values, and ways of living (Inkeless 1964 quoted in Ibid.). 
Bellah, as Parsons’s student, applies functionalist concepts such as rationalization of 
means, achievement and universalism to study the role of religion in the rapid economic 
development of Japan; he models his analysis on Max Weber’s study of Protestant 
ethics. He asserts that there is a strong relationship between religion and economic 
development both directly through ethics, as well as indirectly as mediated through 
political and family institutions (Bellah 1957 quoted in Ibid.). 
Lipset in his research asserts a connection between political democracy and 
economic development. He believes that the more wealthy a country the more 
opportunities for achieving democracy (Lipset 1963 quoted in Ibid., 48). 
According to So, the focus of all the aforementioned research is on the factors that 
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promote modernization in underdeveloped countries. It is also given, in this collection 
of scholarship that Western countries are modern and others are traditional ones. All of 
them, with the exception of Bellah tend to focus their discussion to underdeveloped 
countries. 
Many critics are cautious about the evolutionary and functionalist assumptions of the 
Modernization School. Critiques of this school include the unidirectional development 
assumption and the West is the best therefore should be imitated assumption. Critics 
worry that such models ignore that alternative directions can be adopted by the 
underdeveloped countries. The critics assert that concepts such as “advanced,” modern, 
traditional, and primitive are used as an indiscriminate judgment that the West superior. 
They also assert that Western countries’ success in achieving development necessarily 
will not lead to the development of underdeveloped countries.  
Critics are also opposed to the assumption that tradition and modernity are 
incompatible or diametrically opposed to each other, or mutually exclusive. For 
example, traditional China emphasized the ‘modern’ value of ascription and practiced 
an examination system based on achievement. In Japan’s case, traditional values were 
not obstacles to modernization but actually helped in its development. For example, the 
Japanese tradition of “loyalty to the emperor” was changed to “loyalty to the firm” in 
modern age.  In the process of modernization, many traditional values are present. 
Another critique is that the Modernization School utilizes a high level of abstraction. 
Lack of historical research before or after the certain period of modernization took place 
is another critique. From an ideological point of view, neo-Marxists call modernization 
a cold war ideology to justify the interference of America in underdeveloped countries. 
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Finally, some critics assert that the Modernization School focuses too much on internal 
factors such as tradition, to the point where external factors such as the influence of 
colonialism, are ignored (Ibid., 52-58). 
 
Revision and the New Studies of Modernization School 
In response to their critics, the Modernization School made changes to the new 
studies branch in the late 1970s. These studies were also at the national level and based 
on internal factors such as social institutions and cultural values. The assumptions of 
Modernization School were reexamined by the new studies. According to these studies, 
tradition and modernity were not assumed to be mutually exclusive concepts; rather 
they coexisted, interacted and influenced each other. They assumed a beneficial role of 
tradition instead of considering it as an obstacle. Traditional features such as familism 
and folk religion were accentuated more. 
There were also some changes in methodology. They focused more on concrete cases 
instead of a high level of abstraction as the basis of their discussion. Historical and 
comparative studies were applied in profound case studies. For example, “why did the 
same institution play different roles in different countries?” 
Based on historical and case study analysis, these studies did not believe in a 
unidirectional path that underdeveloped countries must take to move toward Western 
modernization; instead scholars considered the possibility of pursuing their own paths 
(Ibid., 60-61 ). 
By revising the assumptions of the Modernization School, new studies were done. 
Some of them are as follow. 
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Wong based his research in part on criticizing the interpretation of classical 
modernization theories of the role of family in traditional China. To promote 
development in China, the researchers of classical modernization believed that the 
family in traditional China functioned as an obstacle and should be removed. They 
considered the family as a force which promoted nepotism, ridiculed work discipline, 
weakened personal incentives, and was an obstacle to rationalization. But Wong 
believed the negative impact of Chinese traditional values has been overstated. Studying 
paternalistic management, nepotistic employment, and family ownership of the 
enterprises in Hong Kong, he concluded that the family had a positive impact on 
economic development (Wong 1988 quoted in Ibid.). 
Davis in his research on Japanese religion and development critiques classical 
studies on modernization as well. As Davis argued against Weber’s theory of 
modernization as a series of hurdles that traditional societies must overcome. Once they 
do so, they are rewarded with rationality and modernity. These hurdles are divided into 
three groups: economic, socio-political such as patrimonialism and kinship economy, 
and psychological such as achieving sense of duty. Contra Weber, Davis presented a 
barricades theory, which attempted to explain that traditional societies put up barriers 
against capitalist values in order to prevent social turmoil. They did so not to stop 
progress, but to control it so that existing traditional systems could adapt and function in 
new ways in the transformed society (Davis 1987 quoted Ibid.). 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Historical Background 
 
Following the literature review by Alvin So within the paradigm of the 
Modernization School, my overview of historical works on pre-modern societies of Iran 
and Japan, mainly focuses on their internal factors and structures and some comparative 
research on development in both societies, in order to provide in-depth information 
about the effective factors on the development of Japan and Iran. This research is based 
on three foci: Japan, Iran, and the comparison of Japan with other countries including 
Iran.  
 
Comparison of Japan and Russia 
In a comparative study, Black and his colleagues by referring to the similarities and 
differences between Japan and Russia compared them in three stages of pre-modern, 
transition and modernization in various fields such as international level, environment, 
political structure, economic growth and so on. 
The similarities of Japanese and Russian societies before modernization and their 
differences after that were compared by Black and his colleagues. Russia as a big power 
was in close contact with Europe and European culture while Japan as an insular and 
isolated country was far from such contacts. Unlike Russian various ethnic and social 
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features, Japan enjoyed high level of homogeneity. They also differed in religion, 
economy, and government. But despite of all these differences, they were good samples 
of “successful” latecomers and they are similar in this respect. 
The period from seventeenth century to 1860’s is the first stage of comparison. The 
second period or the stage of transformation by the modernizing elites start from 1860’s 
to 1940’s. It is a period of transition from agrarian society to an industrial one. And the 
last stage is the modernization. 
In each stage, the Japanese and Russian societies are compared in the following 
fields:  international environment, political structures, economic growth, general social 
interdependence, and education (Black et al. 1975: 2-4). 
On international field, the influence of Chinese and Byzantine culture on Japan and 
Russia  made the leaders of two countries accustomed to adoption of foreign ideas, 
institutions, and the imported values of Chinese and Byzantine cultures contributed to 
national unity and effective government. Both of them started to strengthen their 
traditional institutions by applying Western technology with Russia one and a half 
century sooner than Japan which began in the mid-nineteenth century (Ibid., 27-28). In 
this respect, the Chinese and Ottoman empires which stressed more on traditional values 
were not adaptable like Japan and Russia (Ibid., 37). And by the waning of Byzantine 
and Chinese culture, Russia and Japan turned away from their influence. They tried to 
stress more on native traditions such as Japanese Shinto to get rid of Chinese-Confucian 
influence. Confronting with the West, both Japan and Russia had similar responses. At 
the beginning both tried to get isolated from Western influence but later had to apply 
Western technology to protect themselves not for changing their societies (Ibid., 31-32). 
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Japanese and Russian societies enjoyed similarities in political structure at beginning 
of nineteenth century. Well-organized government at national level, politically unified 
country under long standing institutions extended to the rural area and function by the 
staff was not at service just due to their birth status but an indenture servant to the 
government. The concept of duty to the state was stronger than the rights and rural 
political life enjoyed more autonomy due to its collective characteristics. In comparison 
with the isolation of Japan, Russia faced with more crises in geopolitical respect. 
Therefore, Japanese institutions could develop gradually (Ibid., 38-40). 
The samurai had been separated from land and settled in in castle town from late 
sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries due to the control was exerted by the daimyo. 
The “Pax Tokugawa” conduced to conversion of the samurai’s military role to a more 
public service. However the military virtues survived but the samurai and lord relations 
got less personal and more administrative. The Russian gentry though were different in 
origin with Japanese samurai similarly moved toward being service classes by the mid 
nineteenth century. The number of Japanese elite was much more than Russians and 
also after assuming the state service, the Russian gentry remained dependent on land. It 
seems that state service was a means to obtain land unlike Japanese samurai who 
accepted state service as a goal (Ibid., 46-47). 
The early secularization of education in Japan in early seventeenth century and in 
Russia by mid-eighteenth century, elite education and considering skills and values 
necessary for public service in both Japan and Russia, commoners education by 
increasing the number of schools for them and publishing with far higher rate in Japan 
are the compared points in education field (Ibid., 101-102). 
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Comparison of Japan and Turkey 
 Answering the Question why the modernization process in Japan started earlier than 
Turkey and its more rapid rate, Ward and a group of scholars compared these two 
countries. Their differences which affected on development and underdevelopment are 
as follow: 
The geographic and geopolitical situation affected on nation-building process. Unlike 
Turkey, Japan as an island was homogenous in race, religion and language. Both Japan 
and Turkey borrowed a large part of modernity from abroad. The cultural borrowing 
was harder for Turkey. In comparison with Japan which had borrowed from China, 
Turkey’s borrowing of religion, script, and literary forms from Arabs and Persians was 
much more. After defeating Arabs in sixteenth century, they assumed themselves as the 
sole promoter and defender of Islam. Islam consists of theology, ethics, law and 
government became a powerful obstacle to modernization. Despite the predominance of 
a clerical body such as ulema in Turkey, the secularized Japan did not have so many 
problems to modernize its political system. 
The different Qualities of the leaders in both Japan and Turkey were another factor. 
Unlike Turkey and its ideal leader, Kemal Ataturk, lack of “great men” in the process of 
Japanese modernization was its prominent characteristics. The Japanese method of 
decision making is consensual rather than personal. 
Delay in economic development of Turkey due to external and internal political 
factors and different allocation of political power and role among people and efficiency 
and values factors (Ward and Rustow 1964: 434-468). According to the point of view on 
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tradition and religion, this work can be categorized in classic modernization researches. 
But as some other works within the new studies of Modernization School argue, religion 
can be a positive factor in modernization (Banuazizi 1987: 304). 
 
Comparison of Japan and Thailand 
Focusing on internal factors and Modernization School, this research refers to more 
and cheap labor in pre-modern Japan in comparison with Thailand such as progressive 
opinions of samurai, advanced monetary system, rapid adoption of Western technology, 
mass culture, and family system. 
 A research aimed at providing a better and clear comprehension of Japanese 
historical pattern of development was carried out by Ohkawa and his colleagues. 
Entering the Modern period, Japan and Siam (Thailand) had similarities such as limiting 
most of their contacts with Western countries at the beginning, opening to the trade by 
force in 1855 (Siam) and 1859 (Japan) but kept their independence, then started 
modernization coincidently and under the conditions prescribed by Western countries 
had to trade. Exporting mainly primary goods in exchanged for manufactured products 
was the initial pattern of trading for both of them (Ohkawa and Ranis 1985: 19). 
Their initial similarities specifically in trading with Western powers and then their 
different course of development suggests that dependency school (center-periphery) is 
not suitable to be applied for explain the development and underdevelopment of Japan 
and Siam (Thailand). Therefore, internal factors and modernization school can explain 
their differences better. 
Some of the main differences and advantages of Japan in comparison with Siam 
36 
 
(Thailand) are as follow: 
The population of Japan in the late nineteenth century was 35 million compared with 
five or six million in Thailand provided Japan with cheap labor as a good factor for the 
advancement of domestic industries. 
Progressive opinions of Japanese middle class (samurai) and a fatalistic one in Siam 
(Thailand) was an important socioeconomic factor.  
Monetary system including paper money and promissory note was widely in use in 
Japan while in Siam silver lumps and silver shells was used in the first half of 
nineteenth century. 
Rapid adoption and adaptation of Western technology by Japanese artisans denotes 
their ability during Tokugawa era. 
Practical education and mass culture is the background of developments in Japan but 
in Siam (Thailand) most of people were illiterate. 
Family system in Siam (Thailand) unlike Japanese unilineal was bilateral and lack 
which was not favorable for accumulating capital. 
The low-level Japanese samurai from four main domains as the emerging leadership 
did not have vested interests hence supported institutional changes but the Siamese 
leadership came from above, the king’s relative could not go too far in reform due to 
their own interests (Ibid., 21-23). 
The differences in primitive conditions led to institutional changes in the course of 
modernization, development and underdevelopment.  
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Ahmad Ashraf: Bourgeoisie and Patrimonialism 
According to Ahmad Ashraf the three important obstacles to the growth of a western 
type of bourgeoisie are rise of strong Shahs and dependence of capitalistic activities on 
a centralized government, strong tribal groups, their frequent invasions and dominance 
in countryside when the central government was weak and finally colonial penetration 
which gave rise to independent bourgeoisie.  
 Applying patrimonial concept of Max Weber and presenting a historical study from 
Safavid period to the modern era he tried to explain the aforementioned obstacles. He 
first refuted the former Soviet Iranologist periodization of Iran and feudalism period in 
Iran. Then referred to the analysis based on “Asiatic Society” and specifically Oriental 
Despotism by Wittfogel and criticized its main focus on water supply.  And finally 
points to those who see some similarities between Iranian socio-economic structure and 
western feudalism. He also stressed on the differences between Persia and West. Ashraf 
tried to explain the distinctive characteristics of patrimonialism and feudalism based on 
Weber’s theory to apply it in a historical analysis of the obstacles to the bourgeoisie 
(Ashraf 1970: 308-31). 
 
Homa Katouzian: Socio-economic and Foreign Factors 
Katouzian also in his analysis criticized some features of Wittfogel’s oriental 
despotism theory. He specifically refuted Wittfogel’s emphasis on water and “hydraulic 
society,” the existence of a centralized and extensive bureaucracy, and totality of state 
power and negligence of its arbitrary. Moreover he argued that these are not related to 
the Iranian case (Katouzian 1981: 21). 
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About the underdevelopment of Iran in nineteenth century, he presented two 
relatively close reasons:  “socio-economic disruption” which got “cumulative in its 
long-term effects” and “the development of other political economies both enhanced the 
relative poverty of a backward economy” (Ibid., 45). He also analyzed the impact of 
foreign factors on Iranian economy by applying Myrdal theory of “circular and 
cumulative causation” (Ibid., 47). About negative results of integration of Iranian 
economy in world trade, he referred to backwash and spread effects. “imposed 
preferential tariff treaties,” “deterioration of the terms of trade,” “the cumulative 
balance-of- payment deficit,” “the decline of indigenous manufacturing production and 
traditional technology,” “the shift of resources to primary production in the hope of 
meeting the growing import bill,” and “loss of self-sufficiency in food production” are 
the backwash effects.  “Commercialization of the Iranian economy,” “the growth of 
international trade,” “extension of total commercial capital,” and “greater centralization 
and concentration” are also the spread effects (Ibid., 48). He mainly focused on Iranian 
economy and the role of international conditions on Iranian internal affairs. 
 
Charles Issawi: Internal and External Factors 
 Issawi studied the economic history of Iran during 1800-1914. In geographical and 
historical background of Iran, he referred to the vastness and large territory of Iran as a 
main factor which prevented the formation of a highly centralized structure and its 
political and economic system was weaker that Egypt, Iraq and even Turkey. Unlike 
Ashraf and Katouzian, he argued that Wittfogel’s theory about “hydraulic society,” with 
strong government and big armies and extensive bureaucracies held in Iran. He believed 
that except for a short period, Iran mostly had a feudal and tribal fabric rather than a 
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bureaucratic. Enjoying of various mines and minerals such as oil, coal, iron, copper, etc. 
and relative development of handicrafts led to self-sufficiency of Iran and consequently 
lack of impetus to engage in large-scale commerce in world. Furthermore, its location as 
the trade route and access to the “silk road” and shift of trading to the sea routes since 
sixteenth century and its remoteness from Europe isolated Iran from trade and ideas 
flowing in Middle East. 
On historical background he referred to recurrence of foreign invasions and the 
resistance of Iran, dynastic cycle ended with a foreign invasion, lack of a strong 
principle for succession conduced to killings in royal houses and weakened them, 
confrontation between nomads and farmers, predatory by internal and external 
tribesmen, granting estates or taxing power to tribes or notables as salary reduced its 
revenues (Issawi 1971: 1-5). 
 He also pointed out some other weakness of Iran in comparison with other 
countries in the Middle East such as Turkey and Egypt. The government was not 
powerful enough to exert its control over the subjects specifically the tribesmen, 
inefficient administrative and fiscal system, underdeveloped educational institutions, 
social and political system which disrupted reformers attempts and the important factor 
according to him was the Anglo-Russian rivalry and intervention (Ibid., 15). 
In his analysis, Issawi attributed the underdevelopment of Iran to two internal and 
external factors. The internal ones are mostly related to geographical and political 
factors. The external factors also include global system and rivalry of colonial powers. 
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Majid Tehranian: Preservation of Culture and Adoption of Technology 
 In his comparative study of Japan and Iran, Tehranian stated that understanding the 
necessities for cultural preservation and technological progress is the goal of his work. 
He believed that Japan and Iran as the representative of two important Asian cultural 
traditions which responded to the facing with dominance of the West by entering to the 
modernization process led from above. They attempted to adopt science, technology and 
institutional arrangements from Western power while maintaining their own national 
identities (Tehranian 1984: 62). 
 He referred to some characteristics of traditional societies of Japan and Iran for 
comparison and contrast. They include imperial political system, a certain kind of social 
mobility, a national consciousness, a relatively ductile peasantry, a dependent merchant 
class. For their differences he mentioned their dissimilar ecological system (Japanese 
rice culture versus Iranian “hydraulic society”), Japanese collectivist culture was 
different from relatively individualist Iranian spirit, Japanese feudalism and Iranian 
patrimonial system,  secular bureaucracy of Japan and the autonomy of Iranian Shi’a 
ulema, incorporation of Japanese warriors (samurai) in feudal system and autonomy of 
Iranian tribal chieftains, long-lasting peace in Japan (17
th
-19
th
 centuries) and 
centralization and fragmentation periods in Iran, and isolation of Japan and historical 
interaction Of Iran with the West and its geopolitical vulnerability. 
On political background, Tehranian highlighted the different position and exerting 
power by the emperor and the Shah. The emperor was the representative of the ruling 
elite while the Shah directly ruled. He pointed to the five strata of Japanese society: the 
court nobility, samurai nobility, the priesthood, farmers, and the social structure of Iran 
consisted of urban, rural, and tribal community and suffering from the fluctuations 
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between centralization and fragmentation. 
About national consciousness, he acknowledged a high level of national 
consciousness and argued that the imperial system of both countries contributed to the 
continuity of cultural tradition by the help of civilian bureaucrats. However he indicated 
the different consciousness in both countries. Referring to Japanese isolation, small size 
and high population density as the effective factor in cultural integration of Japan, 
believed that vast territory, geographical barriers for communication, its location at the 
crossroads of world culminated in combination of Greek rationalism, Semitic legalism 
and Hindu mysticism as Iranian thought. Therefore, unlike Japanese who enjoyed a long 
period of peace till nineteenth century Iranian learnt how to protect themselves through 
cultural traditions in they were defeated. National consciousness in both societies had a 
positive role in creative responses to the West. 
He referred to the combination of social structure with adaptability of social mobility 
to some extent in traditional society of both Japan and Iran. He argued that although 
Japanese social system was more rigid than Iran, social mobility for the meritorious was 
completely possible in both systems. In Japanese society divided to five estates, the 
exercise of authority differed in each estate. The cultural value system exacted 
obedience in a hierarchical system. However the obedience and hierarchy rules were 
somehow moderated by Confucian ethics. Through a kind of compromise between 
heredity and merit, ability was continuously preferred. He also indicated that the 
adoption system in Tokugawa era led to individual mobility to a large extent. But he 
believed that the social system was far less rigid and centralized in Iran. Consequently 
the measure of social mobility was greater than Japan however entailed less social 
stability and personal security (Ibid., 64-68). 
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Conclusion 
Most of the reviewed researches directly or indirectly focused on the modernization 
in Japan and Iran. Some of them mainly focused on pre-modern societies of these two 
countries and the others include this period of history as the focused period of this study.  
As it is seen, social and internal structure as the favorite field of Modernization 
School are presented as the main factor in modernization of Japan or underdevelopment 
of the other countries compared with it. Some of the referred factors are as follows: The 
cultural values of religion in pre-modern Japan and after Meiji Restoration, the 
economic growth, environmental, political structure, international, educational factors. 
The role of cheap labor, progressive opinions of samurai, advanced monetary system, 
rapid adoption of Western technology, mass culture, family system, the impact of 
foreign factors, socio-economic disruption and patrimonial system, geographical and 
political factors, global system and rivalry of colonial power.  
Considering the important roles of the aforementioned factors, this study mainly 
focused on different societal structure of two societies of Edo Japan and Qajar Iran and 
the consequent culture which had an important role to provide the necessary potential 
and preconditions in the process of modernization. 
Different social structure, their capacities and incapability for implementing the 
proper practices by reformist rulers to overcome the problems are the focus of this study. 
Obtaining this goal, at least three ostensibly irrelevant topics are studied and compared 
to show their contribution to promotion and giving priority to individual’s talent and 
ability. Japanese ie and Iranian tribal societies mainly as theoretic and analytic study, 
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some regular customs in both pre-modern societies such as sale of status and offices and 
finally the comparison of the of Edo and Qajar petition box, its functions and 
effectiveness in providing opportunity for the commoners and samurai to propose their 
ideas or showing their ability, and its consequences in relation with the modern 
institution of parliament is studied as the special part due to its originality. Giving 
priority to ability and talent despite limitations of a pre-modern society regime which is 
called meritocracy in modern concepts and social mobility is common result of all these 
comparisons. 
 
Historical Background 
(First Contacts and Lack of Knowledge) 
Japan played an important role for the Iranian and Ottoman intellectuals regarding its 
advancement. The reformist statesmen and intellectuals of these two countries thought 
that Japan could easily obtain the European technologies and Western progress. Mirza 
Malkom khan wrote: “It is true that the Japanese have copied Europe. There is no such 
obstacle there as in our case, for their religion is not so strong” (Mirza Malkom Khan 
1891 quoted in Pistor-Hatam 1996: 111). How much he knew about Japan and the 
obstacles the Japanese encountered in adoption Western modernization? 
Implementing national seclusion policy (sakoku) by Tokugawa shogunate, made it 
practically impossible to have contact between Japan and Iran.  But according to the 
extant documents and reports there were contacts mainly after the formation of modern 
state of Meiji. 
A member of Safavid (1501–1736) embassy to Siam (Thailand) could reportedly 
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garner some information through the merchants who had traveled to the “splendid 
islands” in late seventeenth century and referred to in Ibn Muhammad Ibrȃhȋm’s 
itinerary (Ibn Muhammad Ibrȃhȋm 1972 quoted in Haag-Higuchi 1996: 73). 
Hȃjj Muhammad-Ali Sayyȃh Mahallȃti was the first Iranian who could visit Japan in 
his travel round-the world (1859-77) (Hȃjj Sayyȃh 1346/1967) and a Japanese 
delegation leading by Masaharu Yoshida visited Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s court in 1880 
(Rajabzadeh 1372/1993: 381-97). 
Ibrȃhȋm Sahȃfbȃshi, an Iranian merchant was the other person who visited Japan in 
his world tour (1897-98) twenty years after Hȃjj Sayyȃh’s tour (Sahȃfbȃshi 1357/1978 
quoted in Haag-Higuchi 1996: 73). And Mirzȃ Ali-Asghar Khȃn, Atȃbak-i A’azam 
accompanied by Mahdi-Quli Hidȃyat is the famous figure who visited Japan in 
September 1903 after he was ousted from office as the prime minister (Rajabzadeh 
1368/1989: 358-82).  
When Japan defeated Russia in 1905, its military success suggesting a certain level 
of technological and industrial achievement was discussed by Muslims. But before 
Japan’s victory, Muslim world knew little about Japanese history, society and religion 
through newspapers and other publications. 
Some matters such as modernization, European influence, constitutionalism and 
Islam were discussed in Akhtar, the Persian modernist newspaper published in Istanbul 
(1876-1896). The first article of Akhtar on Japan was published in March 1880 and 
continued till 1896. Akhtar obtained the information and details on Japan mainly 
through European newspapers and Waqit, the Ottoman journal and added some 
comments on Japan as a successful example of Asian modernizing country 
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(Pistor-Hatam 1996: 111-114). 
Japanese swift progress toward modernizations was praised in various article of 
Akhtar. In an article about education in Japan, Akhtar wrote: “…It is more than evident 
that twenty-five years ago [before Meiji Restoration] this country was not well 
administered, that its people were savage (vahshȋ) and deprived and ignorant of 
advantages of education, crafts (sanȃye), commerce (tejȃrat) and administration 
(entezȃmȃt). Today, in a short time, [Japan] has become like the most well-ordered 
states of Europe in every kind of indispensable improvement and order” (Akhtar 13 
October 1886, quoted in Pistor-Hatam 1996: 114-115). It seems the article contributors 
rarely had any knowledge about Japan and described it as an uncivilized country. This 
image of Japan suggests how similarly the Iranian intellectuals of the time described the 
government and society of their own country. 
This incomplete picture of Japan which is drawn by the Iranian reform-minded 
intellectuals based on limited and second hand information mainly on Meiji modern 
state may be justifiable. But a few works of contemporary Iranian scholars on Japanese 
modernization are similarly focused on rapid progress of Meiji modern state toward 
modernization. It seems that pre-modern Japan and Edo era for them is just a historical 
background which as an introduction to start their arguments is necessary to be referred. 
To highlight or exaggerate on rapid process of modernization after Meiji Restoration 
they try to draw a black and white picture of pre-modern and modern Japan by contrast 
lighting.  It can be attributed to the continuous lack of sufficient knowledge on 
Japanese history and its periodization. They apply the famous three-stage periodization 
of history: ancient, medieval, and modern. 
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But according to Bitȏ, the Japanese periodization changed to a four-stage by adding 
early modern era (kinsei) after medieval (chȗsei). As feudal (hȏken) age or period of the 
warrior (buke jidai) is equally applied to medieval era in Europe. Consequently, 
Tokugawa shogunate is considered as a part of medieval age, a dark age in Europe in 
comparison with the Renaissance. According to the Japanese periodization, the whole 
age of the warrior (buke jidai) is divided into two separate periods of medieval (chȗsei) 
consists of the Kamakura, Muromachi periods and early modern era (kinsei) comprising 
the Azuchi-Momoyama and Edo (Tokugawa) periods with Warring States (sengoku 
jidai) period in the middle (Bitȏ 2006: 6-8). Edo period which bore many striking social 
developments was in fact an opportunity to usher in a new era on modernity in Japan. 
But in Iranian scholars’ works, this prominent period has not been fully studied. This 
study tries to provide the Iranian scholars with more information about this period by 
selecting it as the period of study.  
 To start the main arguments and parts of this study, it deserves to present a historical 
review of the coincidental socio-political situation in these two societies in short based 
on. 
 
Historical Review 
In the late sixteenth century after the collapse of “Ashikaga bakufu” (1336-1573) and 
a period of civil war, Tokugawa Shogunate was established in Japan. Consisting of 250 
domains (han), the government of Tokugawa ruled Japan about more than two and a 
half centuries. In the middle of the nineteenth century, confrontation with the World- 
System, the 19
th
 century tariff conditions and sharp reaction of the political elites (the 
samurai class) ended Tokugawa rule and led to the restoration of Meiji (1867). Together 
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with Emperor Meiji, a group of ruling political elites started modernization in Japan.  
Two powerful lords, Oda Nobunaga (1534-82) and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98) 
managed to unite all regional military lords, or daimyô under a single military command, 
binding them together into a national confederation. Achievement of military 
consolidation which led to the establishment of a new shogunate in Edo (1603) was the 
most important political development at that time (Hall 1991: 1-2). One third of 
different regions over Japan were under the control of Tokugawa family. The relatives 
and allied military commanders ruled many other regions and these military 
commanders who recognized the Tokugawa rule, controlled the rest of regions. All these 
daimyô were relatively independent in accumulation of surplus and expending it. 
Nevertheless adopting different policies by shogun, they were all controlled. During the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, the samurai and peasants strata were segregated and samurai 
were forced to settle in castle town. They were compelled to depend on stipends and 
prevented from establishing ties to the land (Nakane 1990: 213-214). The daimyô have 
to visit the shogun's castle in Edo annually and leaving their families there as hostages 
and prohibited from extending their military forces. Buddhist prelates who were 
economically and politically powerful and the emperor's court and imperial princes 
prohibited from involvement in political affairs. Christianity entered and spread in Japan 
in early fifteenth century, was forbidden and foreign trade was limited to China and 
Netherlands. Guilds also which were formerly under control by the emperor and its 
court monopolized by shogun (Oishi 1990: 23-27).  
Aforementioned conditions during two and a half centuries of “Great Peace " paved 
the way for industrial and commercial growth in Japan. 
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Extensive commercial networks in Japan, development of local industry (silk), high 
rate of literate and educated samurai and people in rural areas, extensive bureaucratic 
system and a trading level of agriculture are the proper conditions for development by 
government in Japan. 
Early in the sixteenth century, after the collapse of Aq Qoyunlu government, Safavid 
Empire took form by Shah Ismail I. Depending on tribal military forces, Safavid 
Dynasty established a government consists of the present Iran and some parts of 
Azerbaijan Armenia, Georgia and Afghanistan and Shi'ite was the official religion. 
During a century after the establishment of Safavid Dynasty, tribal rulers came in 
conflict each other several times to penetrate the court. For example Shah Abbas I 
supported by the Ostajlu tribal chief, came to power. He created a new army by 
recruiting Georgian and Armenian slaves (ghulams). By emigration a group of Shi'ite 
clergymen from Lebanon to Iran they became more powerful in political system. 
Armenians were settled down in Isfahan and appointed to commercial and industrial 
affairs by the court. Development of transportation by Shah Abbas caused the cities of 
kingdom and trade prosperity. Expansion of royal workshops led to industrial growth as 
well as political and commercial with European states (Ashraf 1970: 315-316 & 320).  
During late Safavid Dynasty, Tajik bureaucrats, Armenian military forces and shi'ite 
clergymen improved their positions in political system. An Afghan tribal chief, Mahmud, 
succeeded to overthrow Safavid. After a short period, Safavid Dynasty's allied (Afshar 
and Qajar) came into conflict with Afghans. Afshar tribal chief, Nader, together with 
other tribes established a new government, geographically more expansive than Safavid 
Dynasty but did not last long. Again some Lor military commanders (Zandieh), 
defeating other rival tribes in other regions, established a government in Shiraz but 
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geographically was not as expansive as Safavid Dynasty. 
Early in the nineteenth century, Turk tribal chiefs (Qajar) formed a centralized state 
in Tehran. These are the historical events which occurred under the Qajar rule: the 
Iranian-Russian war of 1828, imposition of war reparations and tariffs on the trade with 
Iran, the Treaty of Turkomanchai (1828) and the granting the same concessions to other 
European states, Russia and Britain penetration in Iran, the ill-fated military expedition 
to Herat in 1855 (Ibid., 322) Tobacco movement (1891), Constitutional Revolution 
(1905). 
Following the military coup (1921), Reza Shah came to power (1925) and 
modernization in Iran started by the state. 
According to historical data unlike development of trading with other states under 
Shah Abbas's rule and a better internal development in comparison with Japan early in 
the seventeenth century, this process did not continue. Following the conditions after 
confrontation with Western powers, specifically encountering with tariff barriers in 
Japan the political system changed within 10 years and modernization started by a 
newly established government. But in Iran, it took about 80 years to establish a 
government to carry out modernization.  
As we see Iran’s confrontation with Western powrs and the imposition of tariffs on 
trade were years before Japan. After that, some reformist figures such as Prince Abbâs 
Mirzâ, Qâem Maqâm-i Farâhâni, and the most prominent one Mirzâ Taqi Khân-i Amir 
Kabir implemented some reforms. Considering some points such as coincidence of time 
and remarkable reforms and some similarities, this question is usually asked by the 
Iranian scholars “Why Amir Kabir’s reform (1848) which took place twenty years 
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earlier than Meiji reform (1868) failed?” 
Discussing on Japanese modernization, they mainly focus on Meiji Restoration. This 
is why they disregard the importance of Edo era in rapid modernization of Japan. 
Moreover, they make a mistake when try to compare Amir Kabir’s reforms as a sole 
figure in traditional bureaucracy of Qajar government with Meiji reforms implemented 
by a modern state not a person. 
 
 
The Structure 
 This research comprises of three parts: 
Part one, 
Theoretical Discussion 
Methodology and Theories Review 
Literature Review and Historical Background 
Part two,  
Organizational Structure and Some Practices  
(Uji (Clan), Tribal, and Ie (Household) Societies)  
Organizational Practices and Sale of Rank and Offices 
Part Three, 
The petition box 
Petition Box and Parliament 
51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Two: Organizational Structure and Some Practices 
 
Chapter Three: Uji (Clan), Tribal, and Ie (Household) Societies 
 
In part two, I will analyze and compare three societal units: ie (household), uji (clan), 
and tribal societies of Edo Japan and Qajar Iran. My main focus will be on comparing 
units that place importance of blood relations and those units that emphasize goals of 
preserving and continuing the family business, which allowed for the recruitment and 
adoption of people outside the kinship network.  I argue that uji society, which was 
mainly based on blood relations, had more similarities with tribal societies than ie 
society, which was distinctively Japanese. Besides the dominant social structure of Edo 
which gave priority to talent for preservation of the family business, some other 
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customs related to talent, ability and promotion are also studied and compared. Despite 
the strict hierarchical system in ie and Japanese society, some practices carried out by 
reformist lords demonstrated that in times of crisis or when needed, the Japanese system 
could adapt itself to the new conditions by the employment and promotion of talented 
people. Besides adoption, the sale of status (gokenin kabu) in Edo was a secondary 
practice giving priority to ability and promotion.  I will compare this practice with the 
sale of offices in Qajar Iran. The supplemental salary (tashidaka) was a third practice in 
ie society which was highly adaptive. Tashidaka did not have an equivalent in Qajar 
system, but it is still important to see how it helped the transition of Japanese society 
into the modern period. 
 In addition to these three practices, other measures in Edo Japan such as oshikome 
(“forced retirement” or “house arrest”) were exerted by the domain elders to control the 
lord’s behaviour. Other practices allowed the lower-ranking samurai in the 
government’s administration to take part in decisions and show their abilities through a 
bottom-up system of decision-making and through the circulation of documents. In the 
petition box system, this practice was seen on a larger scale as commoners also could 
submit their suggestions and critiques. It was also a channel that allowed all people to 
demonstrate their talent and abilities, making it possible for greater social mobility and 
for a stronger society that was able to harness these abilities within its government 
administration and in other societal sectors, such as business, as well.  This type of 
widespread incorporation of innovative thinking was lacking in the Qajar system.  
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Ie and Tribal Society: The Socio-political Consequences 
Introduction 
The social structures of pre-modern Japanese Edo and Iranian Qajar were the result 
of ecological adaptation. Two different ecological situations, wet rice cultivation in 
Japan and “hydraulic society” of Iran, resulted in two dissimilar tribal and uji (clan 
lineage), and ie (household or family) societies. 
Like many societies, Iran has experienced a transition from a tribal, rural and 
traditional culture to an urban, industrial and modern one. Even after the urbanization of 
the socio-political system in Iran, tribal culture still predominated for a long time.  
Japanese society also evidences such a transition process.  
 Social structure has a great influence on socio-political culture. The predominance 
of the ie (household or family) structure in the Edo period and tribal structure in the 
Qajar period influenced socio-political culture and consequently modernization in these 
two societies. In other words, the type of structure had positive and negative impacts 
well into the future. To elucidate the possible role of the structures effect on 
modernization in their respective countries it is important to analyze their historical 
background, development and distinct characteristics. 
 
Historical Background 
The period before the formation of the modern state both in Japan and Iran is the 
departure point for this research. As mentioned before, the pre-modern societies of 
Japan and Iran and specifically their organizational structurs are the units of analysis. 
The elite of Japanese and Iranian modern states overawed by Western civilization, 
decided to implement sweeping social changes in order to adapt to modern era ideals 
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and practices. They often found that the ie and tribal systems were obstacles to their 
reforms.  
The elimination of the ie system and replacement with new Western institutions 
based on individualism was one of the goals elites pursued after World War II in Japan 
(Hayami 1981: 415).  
Through Rezȃ Shȃh’s reforms introduced starting in 1925, a national pattern emerged 
in Iran. He and the political elite sought to build a modern bureaucratic state as a means 
to unify the nation and introduce modern reforms. Patterning these reforms on European 
nation-state building, they hoped to trace the same process of state formation as Western 
countries had experienced.  
Rezȃ Shȃh believed that tribal groups and their chiefs were obstacles to 
modernization and nation building. Attaining these goals entailed territorial integrity 
and the elimination of the tribal subculture; therefore measures were taken to make 
great changes in the tribal way of life. The changes implemented by the modern state 
led to a transition from a tribal identity to an ethnic one (Ahmadi 1389/2010: 23).  
Regardless of the merits of Rezȃ Shȃh’s discernment of the tribal system as an obstacle 
to modernization, his reform measures were superficial. While he might have been 
successful in the resettlement of tribes which cut off their ability to prevent modern 
reform into a nation state, he was unable to deter certain cultural aspects of tribal life 
from remaining in place within the new modern state. Thus he changed the hardware or 
structure of the socio-political culture while failing to change its underlying software of 
tribal customs, beliefs and practices. 
In the Japanese case, intellectuals misinterpreted the role of ie system. In fact, the ie 
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system did not hinder Japan’s modernization but rather contributed to its success in the 
establishment of a modern society. For example, principles of ie continued to function 
in Japanese firms after the war and performed a useful role in swift economic growth of 
Japan. Criticizing the ie system as an obstacle to modernization, Japanese intellectuals 
believed that the establishment of Japanese society was first based on the Western 
concept of individualism with a secondary emphasis on social group structures.  
However, ie was an asset for Japan, and had a significant role in the industrialization of 
this country (Hayami op. cit. 415). 
 
The Role of Ecological and External Factors 
Yasuske Murakami and two other experts (two theorists in economics and systems, 
and a political scientist, hereafter referred to as Murakami) authored the book “bunmei 
to shite no ie-shakai [The ie-Society as a Civilization]”. They analyzed Japanese 
historical preconditions as a foundation for the country’s modernization process. Their 
work helped to reevaluate the role of the ie system in modernizing Japan (Ibid., 416). 
 According to Murakami’s analysis, the agricultural and industrial revolutions were 
the key technological events dividing human history into three main stages: 
hunting-and-gathering, agricultural, and industrial. The emergence of Japan as an 
agricultural society started around third century B.C. with the introduction of rice 
cultivation.  For Murakami, it was the departure point for a period of socio-economic 
development that ended with the Edo period. During the agricultural period which 
lasted about two thousand and five hundred years, Japanese society at first was 
characterized by the uji (clan lineage) system but gradually shift to a society dominated 
by the ie (household or family) system (Hall 1985: 48). 
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(Kozo and Murakami 1984: 293). 
Murakami’s theoretical work was based in part on the Modernization School. Rohlen 
argues that the multilineal evolution applied by Murakami is not a theory. It is rather a 
kind of reaction to the “determinism of unilinear evolutionary approaches.” Rohlen 
points out that Murakami’s argument is against Marxist theory or other theories which 
posit that regardless of influences such as culture and geography, history must follow 
the same path (Rohlen 1985: 65). 
Murakami clarifies the definition of modernization against other classical scholars. 
According to his definition, cited by Hayami, modernization is a process which creates 
both “a value system that is capable of initiating and sustaining industrialization and a 
social system that is essential for the continuation of industrialization” (Hayami, 1981: 
416). Based on this definition, Murakami argues that modernization is not a unique 
Western process nor is individualism a fundamental, characteristic or required 
Socio-political orientation. Murakami argues that even the groupism (shudanshugi) type 
of modernization is better than individualism (Ibid., 416). 
Rejecting a unilinear development, Murakami argues that history is multilinear with 
each nation having its own distinct process based on its unique cultural and other 
influences (Ibid., 417). To differentiate his interpretation of Japanese history from 
professional historians, Murakami purposely stresses the importance of the uji and ie 
societial structures instead of using feudalist concepts (Ibid.). 
The expansion of Iranian tribal society might not be the same as its Japanese 
counterpart but due to its dominant role in Iranian society and culture as a whole and in 
the formation of the ruling dynasties throughout Iranian history its influence on the 
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transition to the modern state can be treated in a similar way using Murakami’s 
theoretical model.    
Within both the urban and rural communities of Iran, tribes (ȋlȃt and ashȃ’ir) 
comprised a quarter of the population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with an 
average estimated population between one and a half and three million people (Issawi 
1971 quoted in Tapper 1991: 507). As the third largest community of people, tribes 
played an important role in Iran’s socioeconomic and cultural arenas. In the twentieth 
century, as Iran transitioned to a nation state, tribes (ashȃ’ir) still comprised twenty five 
percent of Iranian population (Firuzan1362/1983: 16-17).  
Tehranian describes Iran’s tri-partite socio-political system. He argues that Iran held 
three strata of rural, urban and tribal settlements. Any one of these stratum could 
predominate when the central government was weak. Applying Weber’s categories, he 
explains that the Iranian tribal society was a patriarchal social system based on kinship; 
Iranian urban society was a patrimonial system that differentiated the professional 
classes; and Iranian rural society was a system which associated most closely with 
feudalism, where tribes and urban civilian and military all vied for power (Tehranian 
1984: 68-69). 
Murakami neglects the role of internal and ecological conditions in the emergence of 
Japanese social structure, opting rather to focus on the role of external factors. The 
isolation of Japan due to being geographically distant from other countries as well as 
being an island country did not prevent the inflow of knowledge and culture. The 
external contacts in two historical periods led to great transformation of Japanese social 
structure: 1. rytsuryȏka (implementation of Chinese codes of laws and ethics in the 
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seventh century), and 2. Kindaika (modernization in the nineteenth century). Despite 
these dramatic external pressures, Japanese society could absorb the impact of these two 
imported cultural, adapt to and internalize the socio-political changes.  
Murakami divided Japanese history based on Japanese social changes into two eras 
characterized by uji (clan lineage) which reached its peak under Ritsuryȏka and ie 
(household or family) which reached its peak under kindaika. These two eras covered 
2500 years of Japanese history; each one lasting approximately one thousand years. The 
transition from uji to ie eras as an “organizational revolution” was extensive, and for 
approximately 500 years the two practices overlapped (Kumon, Murakami, and Sato 
1976: 16-17).  
Hall posits this periodization to two distinct groups who ruled Japan: the court 
nobility (kuge seiken) and the military aristocracy (buke seiken). Murakami contra Hall 
argues that periodization occurred because of two types of social organization instead of 
dominant classes (Hall 1985: 48-49). Contra Murakami, Obayashi argues that ecology 
had an important role in the formation of the two social structures. 
Obayashi critiques uji and ie era arguments, because they disregard ecological 
adaptations as an important factor in changing the social structure in Japan. He 
emphasizes that the Japanese development of rice cultivation was an ecological 
adaption that was the basis for the socio-political structures within the multiple stages of 
the history of Japan. He argues that in most societies in Southeast of Asia where rice 
cultivation was a significant practice for the supply of food and trade, patrilineal 
socio-political structures arose. He gives as examples of this development: Thailand, 
Cambodia, Java, and Japan, (Korea was an exception), Vietnam and specifically China 
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which was also influenced by Confucian principles (Obayashi 1985: 5-6).  
In both Japanese and Iranian societies the importance of external, geographical and 
ecological factors influenced the social structure. Shahbazi divides the foreign research 
on the Iranian pastoral nomadic way of life into two groups: those who applied Marxist 
methodology and assume Iranian ȋlȃt and ashȃ’ir was the result of communal 
formations; and Western scholars (Shahbazi 1366/1988: 18). 
The rare historical references on pastoral nomadic life in pre-Islam Iran as well as in 
the early Islamic centuries suggest that this type of society was affected by the Iranian 
topologic, social, and cultural conditions. No’amani disagrees and attributes the pastoral 
nomadic life in Iran to the external movement of the Turkish and Mongols from the 
central Asia toward the Plateau of Iran in the fifth and sixth centuries, rather than to 
natural and geographical conditions (No’amani 1358/1979: 470). 
Shahbazi argues that while the three phenomena of “tribe,” “clan,” and “pastoral 
nomadism” are integral and inseparable they have been studied abstractly by the 
Western anthropologists. According to him, their usage of the terms clan and tribe by 
these scholars have as their point of reference American Indians, or Australian or 
African tribes, or to the pastoral nomads of Central Asia or North Africa; therefore they 
misunderstand Iranian nomadic culture. These analyses incorrectly focus on 
geographical conditions rather than on the actual social and tribal structures (Shahbazi 
op. cit. 19). 
The dynamic inner forces of the two distinct socio-political eras within Japan 
generated social changes. Each era contains two noticeable phases of initial/emergent 
production (proto) and reproduction/integration (meta). Each era has the capacity to 
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become the dominant model for the whole society through a “replicative expansion” 
process. As Murakami argues, the proto-uji which emerged in Yayoi times, during the 
Kofun Age, evolved to meta-uji which organized a federation under imperial clan 
(Daiȏ) in Yamato. As Japanese society was introduced to Chinese civilization, a new 
form of society developed under the uji structure which eventually became an 
established “secondary civilization.” This development is analogous to the Western 
Europe case which evolved faced with the influences from Roman civilization. The 
ritsuryȏ state was formed in Japan under the influence of China at the peak of uji society. 
According to Murakami, universalistic and indigenous principles and characteristics of 
Chinese civilization and uji society however would eventually lead to its decline and 
collapse (Hall 1985: 49).  
 
Tribal History in Iran  
As mentioned before, the rural, urban, and tribal systems comprised the Iranian 
social structure. The reason for comparing the tribal structure is due to its importance as 
the dominant influence on the ruling dynasties throughout Iranian history. The ruling 
tribes usually came to power by the support of other tribes. The authority of the ruling 
tribe could also be challenged in clashes waged by other tribes. The tribal system’s 
dominance resulted in a unique socio-political culture. Therefore it can be compared 
with both uji and ie socio-political systems in Japan, which also played an important 
role in Japanese society. 
The term “tribe” generally used as an equivalent for various Persian terms is not very 
accurate. The first usage of ȋlȃt (pl. of ȋl) in Persian was in the Ilkhȃnid (1256-1335) 
period. This term is used for nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes. Other terms such as 
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“ashȃ’ir,” “kabȃ’il [qabȃ’il],” and “tavȃ’if” (Lambton 1971: 1095) have been used to 
connote various forms of tribes, either nomadic or not. 
Tapper argues that the “tribe” concept is inaccurate and asserts that groups of people 
were defined by various criteria. Tribes also generally had various degrees or forms of 
organization from the camp to the confederation, therefore to categorize the different 
organizational structures, characteristics and practices under one name is misleading. 
Persian actually has multiple terminologies, of Turco-Mongol and Arabic origins, to 
define these distinct groups “(ȋl, ashȋra, qabȋla, tȃifa,tȋra, uymaq, ulûs).” These terms 
also were used interchangeably or combined. 
As a standard to define the different groups, Tapper recommends that researchers use 
“the notions of egalitarianism, individualism, independence and primary loyalty to 
parental kinsmen” as distinctions for classification purposes (Tapper 1991: 506-507). 
The frequent usage of the “ȋlȃt va ashȃ’ir” combination to denote tribe in medieval 
and modern periods implies that the two components are somehow synonyms. The term 
ȋlȃt usually was used with ulus (tribal followers) and oymak [uymaq] in the Middle 
Ages. This implies a nomadic way of life. For some groups of people in Persia (Iran) 
pastoral agriculture was a way of life; in the summer they would take their flocks to 
richer grounds, and live in tents. They would then return to their customary lands. This 
was tribal society but it was not truly nomadic; rather these groups practiced seasonal 
migration. The question for the researcher is how to capture these distinctions. Should 
the categorization be based on the society’s structure or on its practices? If one is opted 
over the other, will key differences be missed?    
Whether the origins of a tribal seasonal migration way of life came from Central Asia 
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or from other areas, it is not clear when exactly this way of life originated on the Persian 
plateau. Pastoral life was important before Islam during the reigns of the Achaemenids, 
Parthians, Arsacids, and Sasanians; however, there is not enough information about 
nomadic tribes before Islam in Persia. These dynasties enjoyed nomadic and 
semi-nomadic tribes in their armies, but were not dependent on them to the same extent 
as Saldjȗk [Saljȗq] and other Turkish dynasties were. Tracing their history and activities 
is difficult due to a lack of historical documentation. Some of the 
nomadic/semi-nomadic tribal dynasties were successful while others broke up or 
regrouped into confederations. Sometimes the rulers also fragmented the tribes and 
exiled them to outmost part of the country or granted them land in exchange for military 
services (Lambton 1971: 1095-1096). 
Iran has been invaded by nomads in various historical periods. In pre-Islam Iran, 
Cyrus the Great was killed by Massagetean nomads and the Sasanid ruled was 
weakened by the Scythian invasions and finally collapsed under Arab assault. A new 
wave of nomads entered Iran and spread throughout Iran coincident with Islam. After 
the dominance of Islam in Iran, Turco-Mongolian nomads invaded and entered into Iran 
(Dehqȃn-nezhȃd 1379/2001: 144-145). 
Lambton divides the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes into three groups in Islamic 
times: those of Arab, Turkomȃn and Turkish origins who had settled in Iran; those who 
were not Arab or Turkish living in Iran; and those already settled in Persia, such as the 
Lurs, Kurds, Baluch and Djil [Gil]. Persia was described as an agricultural community 
with pastoral and farming practices. There are only rare references to nomadic groups. 
The Mongol invasion caused the decline in the settlement of agricultural communities, 
not the Arabs and the Saldjȗks (Lambton op. cit. 1095-1096). 
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The Turkomȃn and Turkish tribal groups entered Persia mainly by the invasions of 
the Saldjȗks, Mongols, and Timurid. They first went to Asia Minor and Syria then came 
back with the Ak Koyunlȗ [Aq Qoyulȗ], Karȃ Koyunlȗ [Qara Qoyunlu], and Safavid 
dynasties. This immigration which led to the formation of the empires originally based 
on tribal support differentiated them from other groups. 
At the end of the tenth century the Oghuz/Ghuzz tribes, as well as one of the main 
tribes under the Saldjȗk family, who were familiar with urban life and later established 
the first Turkomȃn or Turkish empires, moved westward from Central Asia (Ibid., 
1098).  
Looking for a more stable basis of power, the Saldjȗks separated from their nomadic 
tribes and aligned themselves with the current rulers in Iran, who appointed them to the 
office of shihna to administer the territories. The rulers also granted the Saldjȗks special 
allowances (nȃnparȃ) in return for their allegiance. Nizam al-Mulk, the grand vizier, 
recommended some of the Saldjȗks to be kept at court for military service and as 
hostages (Ibid., 1099). This policy was very similar to Japanese alternate residence 
system in the Edo era (sankin kôtai). This system required the daimyô and his wives, 
heirs and retinues to reside periodically in Edo close to the shogun under the watchful 
eyes of the bakufu (McClain 1999: 278). 
Before the reorganization by Shȃh Abbȃs (995-1037/1587-1629) in the early period 
of the Safavid, the tribal leaders with their followers (ulus) lived on lands (ulkas) they 
obtained by grant or force; many of them served as governors. Between the positions of 
tribal leader, military commander, and provincial governor there was no clear line. 
During the reign of Shȃh Tahmȃsp, the tribal leaders as governors moved from province 
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to province and no tribe could claim a certain area. Under Shȃh Abbȃs, that practice 
shifted hereditary succession became customary by 1624. But with hereditary 
succession came more power to tribal leaders who could claim leadership over vast 
areas of land.    
The ruling dynasty was always wrestling with the problem of how then to unite the 
tribes which supported them so that it could dominate the empire, while limiting the 
power of the tribes so that they would not challenge that rule. By organizing a cavalry 
corps consisting of Georgians and Armenians who had been converted to Islam, Shȃh 
Abbȃs contained the tribal forces and consequently the vanquished tribal and military 
leaders’ powers were diminished. By appointing court commanders (amirs) rather than 
tribal leaders, Shȃh Abbȃs tried to weaken them further. He also replaced or divided 
some tribes such as Kȃdjȃr [Qajar] into three branches (Lambton op. cit. 1101).  
Similar policies were adopted by Japanese rulers to control the rival forces in the 
seventeenth century. The Tokugawa shogunate also had divided the daimyȏ into three 
groups based on their support of the shogun. The collateral houses (shimpan, ichimon or 
kamon) were the first and closest group to the shogun. The second and third groups 
were also hereditary daimyȏ (fudai) and the outside lords (tozama) (Hall 2008: 152). 
The rulers were always in need of a structure that allowed for the service of trusted 
allies and supporters. 
To control the influence of the tribes on the Safavid dynasty, Shȃh Abbȃs I tried to 
decrease his reliance on the Qizilbȃsh tribes through military and administrative reforms, 
as well as through the establishment of a new non-tribal military troop (Tapper 1991: 
508). 
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Shȃh Abbȃs organized a new tribe which consisted of his supporters and called them 
the Shȃsivan. Under Shȃh Abbȃs the importance of non-Turkomȃn tribes started 
increasing while the Turkomȃns’ power decreased. For example, during this time, the 
Shȃh appointed one of his leaders (khȃn) from the Lurs people stating that he was of the 
same rate as the ruling dynasty. That appointee’s son eventually inherited the role. This 
elevated the role of the Lurs people and their status as people close to the ruling dynasty. 
In a manuscript claimed to be a document from Shȃh Sultan Husayn’s state, the last 
king of Safavid, the tribes are divided into Persian and non-Persian origins. The Persian 
tribes consisted of six groups: the Lurs were listed as first, the Garrus, Kalkhur, and 
Mukri comprised the second group, and the Kurdish nomadic tribes of Khurȃsȃn made 
up the third group. The Djalȃ’ir and Karȃ’I comprised the lesser groups. The 
non-Persian nomadic tribes were mostly Arabs and Turks. The Turks were comprised of 
the Afshȃr, Kȃdjȃr [Qajar] and Shakȃki. 
After the Safavids dynasty, the following dynasties were founded by three tribal 
leaders: Nȃdir Shȃh from the Afshȃr tribe, Karim Khȃn Zand, and Âkȃ (Âqȃ) 
Muhammad Khȃn Kȃdjȃr [Qajar]. 
The disbandment of the Afshȃr tribe happened during the reign of Nȃdir Shȃh. After 
him, because of the disorder each tribal leader such as Muhammad Husayn Khȃn Kȃdjȃr 
[Qajar] and Karim Khȃn Zand tried to extend his power over a certain region. Defeating 
his rivals, Karim Khȃn Zand established the Zand dynasty and there was a period of 
peace. 
After Karim Khȃn Zand, disorder and strife resumed. Âkȃ (Aqa) Muhammad Khȃn 
Kȃdjȃr [Qajar], who had been imprisoned by Karim Khȃn Zand, ran away and united 
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the Kȃdjȃr [Qajar] tribe, extended his power to most parts of Iran and selected Tehran as 
the center of his government. However, the center of the Kȃdjȃr [Qajar] tribe remained 
in Mȃzandarȃn and Gurgȃn. The Kȃdjȃrs [Qajars], as the ruling dynasty, maintained 
their nomadic background. As Lambton citing William Ousely writes, like most of the 
Kȃdjȃr [Qajar] members Fath Ali Shȃh the second king of this dynasty preferred a 
village to a city or a tent to a palace.  
Nȃsir al-Din Kȃdjȃr Shȃh [Qajar] was originally a nomad. As in other dynasties, the 
tribal forces comprised the army. Lambton cites Morier’s praise of the military potential 
of tribesmen because they were able to easily inure to hardships of camp life and to the 
changes in weather.  
The Kȃdjȃrs [Qajars] were faced often with the dilemma of having to control tribal 
areas, through leaders that were from the respective chief tribal families. There was no 
assurance of their loyalty and allegiance. To deal with this issue, the Shȃh was able to 
override the strict succession rules by appointing a younger brother instead of the elder, 
or a nephew instead of his uncle as a chief. But the Shȃh had no power to appoint 
outsiders to the tribal areas. 
The kings of Qajar applied various policies toward the tribes. Âkȃ (Aqa) Muhammad 
Khȃn Kȃdjȃr [Qajar] resettled the tribes like the former rulers. Fath Ali Shȃh focused on 
overthrowing the tribes, killed some of the chiefs or took then to the court to control 
them. In general the traditional policy of the government on tribes was “divide et 
impera.” Rulers were constantly interfering in the relationships between the tribes, 
antagonizing one tribe against the other, through bribery, through open favoritism of one 
tribe over the other, or by the taking hostages (Lambton op. cit. 1102-1104). 
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 Fath Ali Shȃh, the second king of the Qajar dynasty, adopted a different strategy.  
He enacted measures such as making a network of marriages to link with the eminent 
tribal chiefs and taking their relatives as hostage in the court to guarantee their good 
behavior (Tapper 1991: 518).    
Eventually under Muhammad Shȃh and his son Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh Kȃdjȃr the power 
of tribes weakened (Ibid., 1104-1105). 
 
Some Characteristics of uji and Tribal Societies 
The structural order and characteristics of uji, Tribal, and ie societies have 
differences and similarities that are important to analyze and understand.   
Obayashi argues that the proto-uji in the Yayoi Age in adaptation to wet rice 
cultivation needed the cooperation of people and kin groups (Obayashi 1985: 10). 
The proto-uji was “the non-unilineal descent group of the Yayoi Age.” Its maturation 
and development was seen in the burial method of its aristocrat in Kofun Age and their 
building dwelling far from commoners (Obayashi 1985: 12). 
 Emphasizing the uniqueness of Japanese ie, Murakami referred to the existence of 
some groups such as uji in other societies and made comparison between these two. 
Based on some of the characteristics of the Japanese uji system, the tribal (ashira) 
structure is more similar to clan (uji) structure than ie. 
Some social groups such as uji existed in various societies throughout history; but 
the Japanese ie was more functionally active than the uji, which appeared historically in 
Japan as an exception. The concept of ie is different both from family and uji. Ie was 
more independent and became functionally the proto type for Japanese modern 
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companies’ organization. Some argue that if the uji era had persisted in Japan, as it did 
in China and Korea, it would have postponed the modernization of Japan (Kumon et al. 
1976: 17). The underdevelopment of uji allowed ie to prosper in Japan. Ie, unlike uji, 
was unique to Japan and did not exist in other societies.   
Before the emergence of the household (ie), the clans (uji) such as Fujiwara, 
Sugawara and the samurai clan of Yoritomo played an important role in the Japanese 
social order as a basic unit of society. In the uji system, as members claiming to have 
the same ancestor, blood relatives had a horizontal relationship within a complex family 
form rather than a lineal family relationship. The preservation of the wealth and 
property was complicated in this type of system, whereas in a lineal family type system 
such as the ie, succession is clear and wealth can accumulate. The attempts of samurai 
to maintain and transmit their estates to their heirs by inheritance was the impetus 
needed to change the uji system to the lineal ie system.  
The samurai families who claimed themselves as the descendants of the Minamoto 
clan, took family names according to the place of their estates such as Ashikaga and 
Nitta (Kasaya 2000: 9-11). Takashi Yoshida, a historian on ancient Japan, argues that the 
Japanese rytsuryô state (the state codes established at beginning of eighth century) 
attempted to establish an ie system to replace the uji system of the time (Ishii 1999: 
120). 
“The uji system in which the position of family head shifted within a wide range 
including collateral families and whose members were constantly changing as a 
consequence was too fluid a system for the ‘blood-lineage groups’ which headed the 
legal state.”  
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Promotion of the blood-lineage group took about a century to connect household 
administration (ie) to succession from father to son together with the change in the 
pronunciation of ie (Ibid., 120-121).   
The logic of the uji system was based on the assumption that the increased numbers 
from historically extended relationships among members of a clan was an important 
factor for prosperity. In comparison, the logic of the household (ie) system was based on 
preserving and supporting the family’s wealth (estates) through transmission within the 
family.  
 In Japan, ie prevailed and led to a patrilineal succession limited to one blood 
relation male heir. The other heirs received a small part of the inheritance or were 
adopted (Kasaya 2000: 9-11). The preservation of the estate through a clear line of 
succession through the son was the primary reason for the ie system to prevail over the 
uji system. As the ie system matured, the goal of preserving the estate and the family 
business became a well-defined goal for families. In order to accomplish this goal, faced 
with obstacles, such as lacking an heir or not having an heir capable of the management 
of the family holdings, families turned to non-blood relations, often adopting people to 
be their successor to continue the family business and name. 
Unlike Murakami and Kasaya, Keiji Yamaguchi believes that the succession in ie 
was not as simple as they assumed. Yamaguchi whose idea on ie represents the 
mainstream of Japanese historians indicates the relation of power and property with ie. 
And he specifically stresses on the succession in ie which was done based on the 
paternal chief of ie pattern. In Japanese feudal society, the unit of ie was the basis of 
power structure. The power structure of ie in both central government (bakufu) and local 
71 
 
governments (han) enjoyed hierarchy. Therefore in those political systems, there was a 
probability of dispute about the successor of the shogun or the lord. So in pre-modern 
Japanese society, “oie sȏdȏ” literary the factional struggles within a domain (han) was a 
matter of utmost significance (Yamaguchi 2001: 139). 
Yamaguchi categorizes “oie sȏdȏ” to five models such as: 1. discord among the 
family, 2. exiling the clan or old subordinates of family, 3. dispute over the successor 
due to the existence of several candidates 4. dispute among the whole family in a bigger 
scale such as “Date sȏdȏ” case in 1660-1671 interfered by bakufu, 5. dispute among the 
whole family and the farmers’ riots, such as “Gujȏ sȏdȏ” in Gifu prefecture in 1679 
(Ibid., 139-143). 
Within Iran, conditions were different and led to a divergent outcome. During the 
time of the Mongol invasions, many other Turk tribes entered Iran. The Mongols were 
different from the Saldjȗks in the administration of the territory. They formed military 
aristocracy and kept the political rule in the hands of tribal leaders. These leaders feuded 
with each other and contested the settled life of the townspeople and peasants, often 
exploiting them (Lambton op. cit. 1099).  
Some signs of autonomous vassals were seen during the Saljuq dynasty (1037-1157) 
but political and social instability and the changes of dynasties throughout Iranian 
history prevented the establishment of a feudal system in Iran as had occurred in the 
West (Tehranian 1984: 70) 
The new tribes entered Iran with the Mongols included the Qara Gozlu (near 
Hamadȃn), Afshȃrs (near Zanjȃn), Qashqȃis (in shirȃz). The Qajar was the most 
important tribe who claimed to be the descendants of the Mongols having entered Iran 
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with Timur and settled in Astarȃbȃd. Later in nineteenth century the Qajars became the 
dominant power and last tribal dynasty of Iran. The invader nomads defeated many of 
various ethnic residents of Iran such as the Laks and Tȃjiks and the survivors had to 
adopt pastoral nomadic way of life such as the Lurs and Bakhtiȃris (Dehqȃn-nezhȃd 
1379/2001: 144-145). 
At the end of Mongol period, new federations of tribes such as Ak Koyunlȗ [Aq 
Qoyulȗ] emerged. Tîmûr, one of its leaders, established a military organization that 
resembled the Mongols’. A military tribal aristocracy arose and was the basis of his 
power. There was a period of strife after Tîmûr’s death. The Ak Koyunlȗ [Aq Qoyunlȗ] 
and Karȃ Koyunlȗ [Qara Qoyunlu] were more similar to the Saldjȗks rather than the 
Mongols and the Tîmûrids. They were already familiar with Islam, but they could not 
unite the other Turkomȃn groups and rule the whole of Persia.  
The Safavid finally were able to complete the unification of the tribes and rule all of 
Persia. The tribes from Minor Asia, Syria, and Armenia such as Ustȃdjlȗ, Shȃmlȗ, 
Takkelȗ, Rumlȗ, Bahȃrlȗ, Kȃdjȃr[Qajar], and Afshȃr, as the Kizilbash formed the 
dynasty’s supporter base and main force of Ismȃ’il (Lambton op. cit. 10100-1101).  
One point needs to be mentioned about the tribes in Iran and that is not all tribal 
structures were purely based on blood relationships. The emergence of some federations 
such as Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu or the confederation of Kizilbash in Safavid was 
in contradiction with the principle in which tribes are formed based on their blood 
relationship. Although the consaguinal relation principle was also defined as prominent 
characteristics of uji (clan) system in Japan, there are some examples in that country as 
well that do not correspond with this principle. 
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 The members of an uji did not have always have consaguinal relations; sometimes 
these relationships were fictive. By making fictive kin relations between the chieftains 
of smaller families, the powerful families of Yamato government created large 
heterogeneous uji communities in order to bring them under their control. The political 
need for control through the Japanese ancient uji became organized. For instance the 
macro-uji of Monobe comprised of eighty uji. It is probable that these pseudo kin 
relations established customs such as adoption as a regular mechanism to incorporate 
small clans into major ones for political reasons in Japanese history (Obayashi 1985: 
12-13).  
Similar occurrences happened in Iran. For example, the creation of the Shahseven 
(Shȃhsivan) tribes in Ȃzarbaijȃn under Shȃh Abbȃs, the Safavid king; and the 
confederation of Khamsah which was comprised of five tribes in order to contest the 
power of the confederation of Qashqȃyee by the Qajar dynasty (Ahmadi 1389/2010: 
67-68).  
In fact, the scholars are divided on whether tribes are a kin organization or whether 
kinship is a necessary tribal element. “Some tribes claimed common descent as a “clan,” 
but more often they were composed of heterogeneous elements” (Tapper 1991: 526). 
From an anthropological approach, some posit that tribes are described as kin 
organizational units, decentralized, and egalitarian in a larger society (Salzman 1973: 
71-77); others, argue that the definition of tribes in terms of kinship relies on blood 
descent. The latter argument explains the intra-relationships of tribesmen at a local level, 
but fails to provide a robust explanation of the dynamics of inter-tribe relationships or of 
the political developments on a more macro scale. Therefore the definition based on 
kinship and neglecting other important factors is not accurate (Beck 1990: 193). Perhaps 
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the two concepts of tribal kinship must be accounted for when giving a full account of 
the formation of great dynasties in Iran throughout history by simple nomads, because 
of the various tribal structure and forms that existed. 
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the Muslim historiographer and sociologist who studied 
the various aspects of the Bedouin tribes’ way of life, as well as their social and political 
structures. In his description used an evolutionary process theory describing the 
Bedouin’s moving from a simple rural life toward a more luxurious urban life, and 
finally to one where they established their own state (Ibn Khaldun. 1958: 249, Vol. I). 
He remarked that this movement from the different stages was always purposeful and 
goal oriented and was not out of coincidence (Ibid., 252). He asserts that the Bedouins 
had an economic need to make a living, which caused them to separate from the 
sedentary rural people (Ibid., 250). 
From a socio-psychological point of view, Ibn Khaldun made a value judgment when 
he compared the Bedouins and the sedentary people. He preferred the Bedouins to the 
sedentary, and described them as better (Ibid., 253) and braver than the sedentary people 
to defend themselves (Ibid., 257). He argued that only the tribes who hold together by 
group feeling can survive in the desert. Ibn Khaldun argued that because the Bedouins 
are a closely-knit group of a joint descent they can defeat the enemy, since the affection 
for the family and group is a matter of utmost significance (Ibid., 261-63).  
According to Ibn Khaldun, a strong group feeling allows the group to move toward 
royal authority as its goal. The tribe, as the representative of group feeling, may attain 
royal authority to form a state directly or to assist the ruling dynasty (Ibid., 284-86). The 
group feeling (asabiah) Ibn Khaldun argues is needed to defeat the enemies and to 
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establish a dynasty. In the Bedouin this strong group feeling is related to kinship.  
As we can see, there is not an all-inclusive definition of tribes, and sometimes the 
descriptions are in contradiction. According to Shahbazi three important elements 
should be sorted in this issue: 1. Tribalism as social organization of ȋlȃt and ashȃ’ir, 2. 
Nomadism as their way of living, and 3. Pastoralism as their way of livelihood. 
Therefore to correctly establish the socio-cultural unit of ȋl, one must define it as a 
group with a tribal social organization, and a nomadic way of life, which mainly 
depends on pastoralism as its way of livelihood. 
The main constituents of ȋl identification are: 1.kinship, 2. a sense of belonging to ȋl, 
3. common culture, history and vernacular, and 4. ȋl (tribal) habitude (Shahbazi 
1366/1988: 20-21).   
 The Arabic term of tȃifa which is imputed to the Lur and Kurd tribes with Iranian 
native background is older than the term ȋl which was used to self-describe the Turkish 
tribes. The Iranian native tribes enjoyed a patriarchal aristocracy in comparison with the 
Mongolian military aristocracy which was also mentioned by Lambton. In general, 
every patrilineal kinship unit (either rural or nomadic) having a tribal organization could 
be called tȃifa. 
The political organization of the tribes coexisted and interacted with each other 
through history was divided by Shahbazi into three types:  
1. The Mongolian organization in which ȋl was comprised of Khȃn and tȃifa. Khȃn is 
a kind of patrilineal caste system with an aristocrat as a pivot around which the 
followers (tȃifa) as subjects unite. Khȃn does not marry a member of tȃifa s who are 
collection kin groups with patrilineal origins. The kinship in tȃifa is mainly based on 
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affinitive relations; an aggregation of these heterogeneous groups constitutes ȋl. 
Through the invasion of Turkish tribes from Central Asia to Plateau of Iran, Ilkhȃnid 
became the dominant tribal system. 
2.  The Ashȋra organization is based on clan (ashȋra) membership, and patrilineal 
kinship is the basis of social structure. Unlike the Mongolian organization, it enjoys 
co-operative relations rather than relying on subordination. There is a low level of 
nobility and imputed glory of descent in the group; everyone assumes that they are from 
the same blood and are cousins. It is not a closed caste in social affairs and marriage. 
The political organization of ashȋra in Iranian ȋlȃt and ashȃ’ir was sometimes combined 
with the Mongolian organization. The political power in low and middle level of ȋl is the 
ashȋra type and in top level it is aristocratic however in some of ȋlȃt it is solely ashȋra 
type. It was the dominant pattern in Turkmen tribes in Iran (Shahbazi 1366/1988: 
21-22). 
3. The aristocratic organization was the dominant pattern in some Iranian tribes with 
some differences between them. Unlike the Mongolian organization, it was based on a 
tribal democracy rather than a division of Khȃn and tȃifa. The ashȋra organization 
gradually led to centralism in one person or family and aristocratic organization 
replaced the democratic one. Social mobility and transferring the chieftaincy from one 
clan or tȃifa was possible within this system. According to Shahbazi, this organization 
was the basis of some pre-Islam states such as Elam and Medes and can be seen in 
contemporary Bakhtiȃri tribes (Ibid., 23-23). 
According to Shahbazi, patrilineal kinship and a sense of belonging to ȋl are two 
primary tribal constituents. Ashȋra and the aristocratic organizations have more 
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similarities with the Japanese uji system. Because of the horizontal relation of uji 
members the succession also could not be confined to a certain family which is a 
distinctive point with ie. 
The notable point is the lack of seniority in succession. The succession as the chief of 
uji was not necessarily always inherited through the first son but a wide range of both 
the former chief’s descendants and collateral lines which led to bloody clashes for 
imperial succession (Obayashi 1985: 17-18). As mentioned before, Kasaya referred to 
some famous uji (clans) such as Fujiwara, Sugawara and the samurai clan of Yoritomo 
where succession was not transferred through direct descendant rather the horizontal 
relation (Kasaya 2000: 9-11).  
Similarities between the uji and tribal system might include: some rituals within the 
uji system which were originally imported to Japan from pastoral nomad societies; and 
the weak possibility of common terminology, which has not been confirmed from a 
linguistic point of view. For example, the Japanese fire ritual marriage imported from 
China in the sixth century but originally from pastoral nomads was meant to purify the 
bride who entered the groom’s patrilocal residence.  
Under the Ritsuryȏ state, the patrilineal ideology was strengthened in Japan under 
Chinese influence (Obayashi 1985: 14-15) 
Referring to Altaic terms, Obayashi asserts that uji (udi in ancient Japanese 
pronunciation) was related to the Korean concept of kin group (ul) and from the Tungus’ 
concept of descendants (uru); it connotes “patrilineal exogamous kin group” (Ibid., 13). 
Further research beyond the scope of this paper is needed to establish whether there is a 
clear a linguistic relationship between Korean ul or Tungus uru and the Mongolian term 
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of ulus with the Persian pronunciation ȋl with its associations with tribes. 
In comparison with ie society, Murakami did not study the uji system deeply. 
According to Hall, he limits the uji system as an introduction to ie society and as a 
comparative tool with ie in an effort to stress ie’s role in the modernization of Japan. 
Due to Murakami’s focus on ie era, he slurred the role of uji in Japanese society in two 
significant ways.  
1. He indicated that uji connoted “stratified clan” which practiced a 
distinctive cognatic principle in family succession that was different than the ie 
era practices. 
2. Uji society and its evolving role of the ruling class (emperor, court 
hierarchy, Ritsuryȏ local administration) were not studied. 
Murakami did not explain how the uji principle helped sȏson as the only organization 
within the Kinai system which raise uji principle and its dynamic capability as a ruling 
organization for one thousand years.    
How Ritsuryȏ system, emperor, and the hierarchical court provided the structure and 
legitimacy for the samurai class to function for a long time is not clear (Hall 1985: 
49-50). 
 
Ie Society 
Introduction 
Murakami and his colleagues tried to present a historical analysis based on the 
principles of functionalism, which are important in the Modernization School.  
According to his definition, a social system is a historically “self-organizing” system 
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which fully transforms itself.  
As a lower rank social system starts functioning, then stabilizes until it eventually 
reifies. This core within such a system is the generation of higher-ranking systems as 
“imitative expansion” and differentiation. The development of uji and ie era are 
compatible with this “imitative expansion” and can explain the evolution of the 
principles of the two systems (Kumon et al. 1976: 17-18). Referring to this application, 
Rohlen presents some critiques. 
Rohlen argues that Murakami’s approach is “structural functionalism.” According to 
Rohlen critiques structural functionalism generally, and Murakami specifically, on four 
points: 
1. Arbitrary picking of similarities and differences from texts to support the 
argument; 
2. Emphasizing structural traits while ignoring other contributing factors; 
3. Ascribing features from other arenas (cultural, ecological, etc) to the structural 
one; 
4. Ignoring accidental origins and perceiving certain factors as causal that might 
not have any relationship to the system or its development (Rohlen 1985: 67). 
He also criticizes Murakami for equalizing culture and organization, and for limiting 
the organization to a few structural principles. Acknowledging the usefulness of ie’s 
principles such as its expansion, hierarchy and kin-tract-ship, Murakami fails to 
consider them as important in understanding modern Japanese institutions (Ibid., 
67-68). 
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Historian Ishii also critiques Murakami for over generalizing his concept. Susumu 
Ishii, the medieval historian, applies the katakana ie to the concept of independent 
ie-lordship as defined by Otto Brunner to describe medieval Japanese society. 
According to Ishii, the ie-lordship concept disappeared with the medieval era. 
According to Murakami, the ie system started with “early ur-ie” [proto-ie] in the 
early medieval period and was followed with the “great ie” [meta-ie] in its most 
widespread period, only to be followed by an era of “stagnation and fossilization in 
Brunner’s word. Unlike Ishii who limited ie in katakana to the medieval, Murakami 
tried to connect the ur-ie of early medieval period to great ie (daimyȏ) of pre-modern 
era by applying “analogous magnification” [“imitative expansion”] (Ishii 1999: 
117-118). 
Murakami presumes two institutions of “the samurai-style hierarchical corporate 
family (ie)” and “the consensus-type community exemplified in the rural village (mura)” 
underlie the basis of Japanese society. He believes that swift modernization of Japan 
was beholden to the principles of these two organizations (ie and mura) (Hall 1985: 47). 
Murakami asserts that Japanese modernization was influenced by its historical 
heritage; he does not use the Marxist theory and vocabulary and makes his own 
remarkable methodology (Ibid., 48). 
Kasaya ascribes some of the features of Japanese societies to the dominance of the 
samurai system whose Warrior domains were organized and functioned under the basic 
unit of the ie (household). 
While modern Japanese culture shares similar characteristics, behaviour and values 
with other Western and Asian societies, some of its distinctive practices and values 
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include “hierarchy, groupism, the lifelong employment system, the corporate family, 
corporate unity, the seniority system, emphasis on group relations and affiliation, 
bottom-up style decision making and authoritarianism.” The influence of samurai 
dominance in Japanese society, specifically its form in the Tokugawa domains, which 
was based on the household (ie) and functioned as a vertical society on the basis of rank, 
is clearly obvious in modern Japanese thinking and patterns of behaviour and 
organization (Kasaya 2000: xix-xx). In order to understand the importance and role of ie 
society in Japanese modernization, it is necessary to review its origin and historical 
background.  
 
The Origin of Ie Society 
 Hall cites Murakami that ie first emerged through the influence of the 
developer-lords in eastern Japan. Some scholars like Ishii question this claim and 
ascribe the origin of ie to other institutions and groups.    
According to Murakami, the “developer-lords” (kaihotsu ryȏshu) founded the ie era 
during the tenth century in eastern Japan. The developer-lords who founded the 
Kamakura bakufu system officially changed this system into bushi. The ie era was 
firmly established as a general practice in the Tokugawa period after coexisting with uji 
era practices for several centuries (Hayami 1981: 416). 
Murakami asserts that the proto-ie was a transformed branch of uji-type practices 
which originally emerged in tȏgoku (eastern Japan) among the samurai. Obayashi 
ascribes two factors, “ecological niches” and “the pioneer settlement of the frontier” 
contributed to the rise of the samurai and the eventual shift from uji to ie societal 
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structure (Obayashi 1985: 21). Although wet rice cultivation was an important factor, he 
argues that horses and pastures were catalysts for the transformation of uji to ie 
(Obayashi 1985: 23). 
Unlike the advanced civilizing development of saigoku (western Japan) and kinai 
(Kyoto), the development of tȏgoku (eastern Japan) which was largely wilderness area 
and isolated from uji state control, happened independently and took on different 
characteristics than the rest of the country. The tȏgoku leaders were the nobles 
disregarded by the Fujiwara clan and samurai lords who migrated to the area. They 
created new organizations combining military and agricultural practices and customs. 
The prototype of early ie arose out these efforts by the “developer-lords” and their 
families between the tenth and twelfth centuries. 
“The ur-ie [proto-ie] was a type of joint community built on private possessions 
centered on territories virtually independent of governing system of rytsuryȏ state.” The 
ur-ie could establish “a functional group of warriors possessing an agricultural base and 
a strong sense of unity.” At the time of uji society disintegration, the developer-lords 
adapted to the changing conditions of tȏgoku by establishing the ie unit as the only 
independent power (Kumon et al. 1976: 19-20).  
Although the samurai relied heavily on their military skills, the estate (shoryȏ) and 
its land rights were essential for the prosperity of samurai households. Escaping the 
control of the central government in Kyoto, lower level samurai with their families and 
followers settled in the undeveloped wilderness areas to cultivate new lands in hopes of 
bettering their lives. They did so without the permission of the central government. 
They became “local lords” (zaichi ryȏshu) and constructed domainal forts for their own 
83 
 
protection and to house their military troops. However, their newly obtained status and 
found lands were constantly being challenged by the central government in Kyoto who 
sent provincial governors to confiscate the lands. It was not until the late twelfth century 
when the Kamakura shogunate was established that the tȏgoku samurai could claim 
economic and military security (Kasaya 2000: 6-8). 
Murakami’s emphasis on tȏgoku (eastern Japan) as the origin of the ie system is 
often criticized. During the Sengoku period, daimyȏ could not make large domains in 
the capital area but small bushi houses did exist. Hall refers to some local families in 
charge of military functions similar to proto-ie in the tenth century in Baizen prefecture. 
There were conditions available for the emergence of ie in central and western Japan as 
well. Murakami’s emphasis on the tȏgoku origin and bushi autonomy of ie fails to 
account for the political relationship between ie and rytsuryȏ (imperial) state or to 
explain the functioning of certain organizations such as the shogunate and military 
government (shugo) under the imperial state (Hall 1985: 50). 
Murakami argues that the samurai disseminated the ie principle to other classes, 
including merchants and farmers in the towns and villages. As the ie influence grew, the 
Tokugawa government saw it as a way to realize political unity and advancement. 
Although the ie system did not start industrialization in Japan, it made it possible for 
Japan to adapt to external stimuli and transition much better than Europe (Hayami 1981: 
418). 
Contrary to Murakami’s emphasis on the role of samurai lords in emergence of ie, 
Ishii stresses the role of emperor system as a major contributor to the establishment of 
the ie system. The emperor system was the axis of Japanese society and the surrounding 
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structure can be regulated by ie written in kanji, not in katakana as is done in the social 
analysis by Murakami. Ie in kanji is a historical term and is different from the ie symbol 
in katakana. Murakami, asserting the katakana ie meaning, applies Weber’s social 
science concept of ideal type as an analytical tool to discuss peculiar characteristics of 
Japanese society (Ishii 1999: 116). Contra Murakami, Ishii attributes the origin of ie to a 
historical institution originally imported from China. 
The historical concept of ie can be traced back to its origins to an institution which 
was patterned on the Chinese legal system and adopted by the Japanese at the beginning 
of eighth century. Ie as a state concept was a household administration “granted” to the 
high ranking noble families at the political center of Japan at that time. It is important to 
note that not all classes of the society were granted ie status. Ishii asserts that ie was a 
government organization nearly the same as current prefectural ken with its official 
household leaders paid by state. In contrast to the current modern value of the 
separation of the public and private spheres, the Japanese during this time managed their 
regional administrations through the ie which melded, institutionalized and legalized the 
private and public spheres. This ie privilege could not be transferred to the next 
generation or to a chosen successor and was just granted based on the ability to fulfill 
the requirements of the position (Ibid., 119-120). 
While Murakami argues that the principles of ie transferred from the samurai class to 
the peasants and merchants, Ishii argues that ie transferred from the noble upper class to 
the lower inferior class. To demonstrate how ie was disseminated among samurai 
families (buke) as the engine of feudalism, he cites the Kobayakawa family case at the 
end of fifteenth century. Among the hierarchy of this household, except for kin (shinrui) 
and those inside (uchi no mono), intermediaries (chugen) and farmers were without ie or 
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surname. They were not slaves and maintained their own households, but they were not 
a part of the formal order which granted status. Ishii stresses that having ie was a kind 
of acknowledgment that a person officially was serving the emperor (Ibid., 124). 
Ishii argues that some groups of nobles, not necessarily samurai, were the founder of 
ie. Kasaya assenting with Murakami, asserts the noble status of samurai and their role in 
emergence of ie. Between ancient to medieval period, samurai as warriors with special 
martial skills and a hereditary status emerged as members of the nobility around the 
tenth to eleventh century as did other high ranking people in other categories of 
expertise such as law, literature, and ceremonies (Kasaya 2000: 1-2). 
Ishii argues that among the great noble families in the center of state, a core group 
formed the ie concept. He confutes Murakami’s argument that “developer lords” of 
eastern Japan were even involved in its development. He asserts that ie evolved within a 
hundred year timeframe in the eleventh century as noble families began to claim the 
right of succession of official posts based on blood-lineage shared by father and son 
(ikke). The imperial regents and advisors families (sekkan-ke) which inherited high 
offices in certain families such as Fujiwara clan are examples of ie’s evolution. The 
properties of these families (ke-ryo) together with the official post or duties were 
inherited by successor generations (Ishii op. cit. 121-122). 
Obayashi also confirms a form of inheritance system in this period and the increasing 
of this trend in other periods. During the Kamakura period, sons inherited the property. 
However the share of the inheritance to the family’s head son (sȏryȏ) was more than to 
the others. During the Muromachi and Sengoku periods the practice of succession 
changed as the sȏryȏ became the sole inheritor (Obayashi 1985: 24). 
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Ishii also asserts that during the late twelfth to early thirteenth centuries the concept 
of family business (ka-gyȏ) run by lower ranking nobles that served the emperor began 
to emerge. These lower noble run businesses specialized in a wide range of fields such 
as music, literature and law, and formed a new stratum within the ie system which 
practiced unilateral inheritance from father to son. Within this stratum, it was important 
that the businesses were run well by a qualified person not only to provide excellent 
service to the emperor but also to provide as a result financial security for the family. 
The capability of an ie head to carry out the duties was very important. Therefore, in 
cases where the natural successor was an unqualified person to perform the tasks of 
running the business, an adoption system which allowed for a legal non- kinship 
qualified successor was utilized. This practice of “ultra-kinship” [kin-tract-ship] as 
Murakami coins it, originated in the early Kamakura period (Ishii op. cit. 122-123). 
Ishii asserts that providing service to the emperor was the key factor in the 
establishment of ie and uses the example of shrines and temples as an illustration.  
Samurai families (buke) provided a system of hereditary military service to the emperor. 
When this term was used along with other ie such as the temple ie (ji-ke) and shrine ie 
(sha-ke) which were nonhereditary based, it suggests that  providing service to the 
emperor was the essential characteristic of the ie system, not its hereditary practices. 
Any business (ka-gyȏ) that provided service to the emperor added the kanji ie (Ibid., 
123). 
Ishii asserts that the shogun were in service to the emperor. Clashes between the 
samurai were competitions to achieve the shogun title to serve the emperor. These 
battles waged from the Kamakura period to the Meiji Restoration were not waged out of 
rivalry nor were they challenges to the emperor’s superior role. Instead they were 
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motivated by a desire to be the leading provider of military service to the emperor (buke 
no toryo). The military service system therefore was based on merit and was not an 
inherited right. The samurai constantly had to earn the right to serve the emperor. Rights 
of ownership for samurai were only recognized through appointments to various offices 
(shiki) with no right of inherited succession. In this system property rights were not 
recognized (Ibid., 125). 
However by the time of emperor Yoritomo, samurai pursued establishment of their 
own system of government (Kamakura bakufu). Ishii asserts that this demand still arose 
out of the samurai’s desire to serve the emperor although others argue that it was 
motivated by the samurai’s desire to secure their families’ wealth. In response to the 
samurai’s demands, Yoritomo institutionalized their service to the emperor through an 
inheritance based succession system, and assimilated it into the emperor system. 
The bushi supported Yoritomo’s establishment of the bakufu system with inherited 
rights. However, Yoritomo’s central administrative office (mandokoro), which started 
certifying the bushi’s right of ownership to their offices, maintained the emphasis on 
service to the emperor as the key to holding office. The bushi became office holders 
because they were appointed to maintain peace and order as a service to the emperor 
(Ibid., 125-126) and their right to inherited succession was based on the premise that 
successors would continue that service. Ownership rights carried with them a 
responsibility to serve the emperor. 
Refuting Murakami’s argument that the developer-lords were the founders of ie, Ishii 
asserts that the establishment of bukufu by the warrior lords as the dominant system for 
a long period, was the significant contribution to the development of ie. Alongside the 
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warrior nobles, other noble classes began to assert their inheritance rights tied with 
service to the emperor. This led to the increasing expansion of the ie system and its 
influence on Japanese society as a whole. In order to have a better understanding of the 
ie system, we must analyze its evolution, characteristics, mechanisms, and impact on 
modern Japan should be reviewed.  
 
 The Evolution of Ie 
As Murakami argues the ie era underwent significant changes and developed from 
proto-ie to meta-ie. Proto-ie emerged in tȏgoku in the eleventh and twelfth centuries 
(late Heian), as samurai families settled all over Japan. Proto-ie federations were 
established based on the Kamakura bakufu model, first introduced by the Yoritomo 
family and further supported by Muromachi. Meta-ie in the form of daimyȏ appeared in 
fifteenth century as Sengoku daimyȏ. Both meta-ie (daimyȏ) and sȏson (in central 
Japan) had the capability to form a federated structure in the form of military alliance 
and regional alliance (ikki) respectively.   
Meta-ie’s influence continued to expand and eclipsed the sȏson system under the 
Nobunaga and Hideyoshi reigns. During the Tokugawa reign the bakufu meta-ie 
federation stabilized and united practices around the country, and sȏson changed into an 
administrative village (mura) (Hall 1985: 50-51). 
With the foundation of Kamakura bakufu under the lord Minamoto Yoritomo in 1185, 
the rights of local lords (jitȏ) were publicly recognized and their positions in their 
territories were strengthened. Constables (shugo) who administered a unit of territory 
called a province (kuni) as well as jitȏ were appointed by the Kamakura bakufu. This 
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system paved the way for the development of great domainal lords (daimyȏ). Due to a 
series of wars, the shugo and jitȏ claimed increasing military and policing powers. With 
the overthrow of the Kamakura and the succeeding Muromachi bakufu (1392-1568), 
these regional warriors increased their political authority and extend their territories 
through battles and periods of rebellions, such as the warring states (Sengoku jidai) 
period (1482-1558) (Kasaya 2000: 14-16). 
As Murakami argues, the Kamakura shogunate was a federation of proto-ie vassals 
(gokenin) supporting a higher-ranking institution constituted by the descendants of 
Minamoto family. In this federation which was established through imitative expansion, 
the Kamakura state (Gen-ke) did not interfere in gokenin affairs. Due to the 
decentralized system, the control of Kamakura government over the gokenin was more 
limited than the proto-ie leader’s control over its kenin. The decentralized government 
of Kamakura was legitimized by the uji state as its head was appointed as the seii 
taishogun (barbarian-subduing generalissmo) and thus needed the support of the central 
government and its warriors. However, the Kamakura bakafu also were opposed to the 
emperor of uji system and had started their own ie system. Therefore, during the 
Kamakura period the two systems, of uji and ie, overlapped and co-existed.   
Due to increasing number of individual ie and their influence, the Kamakura 
government could not integrate all of them under the federation of ur-ie. The emergence 
of these new ie families, particularly in the frontier regions increased the instability of 
the Kamakura state as they demanded more land grants for their service to the 
shogunate. When the Kamakura government did not respond in full to these demands, 
the families accused the government of “breach of contract.” 
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Eventually the instability lead to the collapse of the Kamakura government, and 
governance returned to Kyoto. With this development, there was a risk that the ie 
system would be absorbed into the uji state and disappear. But actually the reverse 
happened with ie principles influenced the transition of the uji system into new form of 
ie referred to as great ie. The great ie structure resembled both a family group and a 
federated state of proto-ie. Combining practices from both, it developed a new system 
that fell between the two. Although the greater ie was smaller than the former 
federations it tended to rely more heavily on military force in order to make competing 
ie families its vassal. For easier command and supply of military service a better 
stratified role structure was necessary. The innovations implemented by some warlords 
developed meta-ie (daimyȏ) as a new independent entity. Those great ie larger than 
others became daimyȏ territories (Kumon et al. 1976: 23-27). 
Nobunaga was a daimyȏ as well as Hojo; Takeda and Uesugi were great ie heads. 
Nobunaga applied agricultural innovations and advanced military techniques in training 
his army; soldiers thus became skilled in both military and agricultural functions. By 
concentrating warrior vassals in Azuchi, he separated them from their estates and paved 
the way for them to become bureaucrats. Applying the kandaka system (putative yield 
of paddy field expressed in units of cash) and later the kokudaka system (productivity as 
calculated in terms of rice) Nobunaga was able to measure the vassals’ fiefs and the 
related military service which they had to provide. By these innovations great ie 
(meta-ie) was an independent, stratified entity as the imitative expansion of ur-ie 
(proto-ie). The old members of old ur-ie now as the vassals of great ie felt compelled to 
become bureaucrats; ur-ie changed to lower-ranking enterprises as “small ie” dependent 
on great ie. Also village (mura), sȏson and ko became semi-autonomous social units as 
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vassals under the great ie. As it is obvious in annual tax paying, the whole village 
comprised lower ranking vassals within the great ie. Attempting to establish a state 
based on his own great ie, Nobunaga abolished his rivals such as Ashikaga shogunate 
and the temples (Ibid., 28-31). 
 Meta-ie as the system of “federated state of great ie” was established by Nobunaga, 
was strengthened by Hideyoshi and was stabilized by Ieyasu Tokugawa, through 
different approaches. Nobunaga was a radical reformer. Unlike Nobunaga who wanted 
to abolish the emperor (tenno) system, Hideyoshi, who was a reconcilable person, did 
not desire such a radical overhaul, instead opting to continue his predecessor’s more 
moderate reforms, while adopting some innovations such as land survey (kokudaka), 
demilitarizing peasants and separating them from army. Ieyasu was a very conservative 
ruler. Ieyasu adopted a policy similar to the federated state of ur-ie under Kamakura 
shogunate and claimed his family as the descendants of Minamoto family. Murakami 
states that Tokugawa bakufu established a “federated state of large ie” (dai-ie rengo 
ie-kokka) including bakufu, shinpan and fudai daimyȏ after terminating the uji system 
(Hayami 1981: 417-418). 
Ieyasu also had the same problem as the Kamakura shogunate, in integrating the 
highly autonomous lower-ranking entities through the decentralized federation. 
Therefore he applied various policies such as isolation by closing the borders, 
controlling dangerous daimyȏ, depriving samurai from their privileges, obligatory 
services such as alternate residence of daimyȏ in Edo, and monopolizing foreign trade. 
During this period military units were organized to take turns serving the government 
(bankata) and a long age of peace and stability ensued during the Tokugawa period. 
This resulted in increased commercialization and the development of an elaborate 
92 
 
administrative system. During the Tokugawa period, bureaucracy built on the abilities of 
vassals as civil servants, urbanization, promotion of commerce and literacy were all 
pre-modern developments that left a great heritage for modern Japan. If the Tokugawa 
regime had adopted a proactive industrial policy in addition to these reforms, the para-ie 
of merchants would have transformed into a burgeoning bourgeoisie. While the great ie 
brought peace and stability, it was not as dynamic as before and there was no equivalent 
alternative to replace it (Kumon et al. op. cit. 31-34). 
 
The Organization and Characteristics of Ie 
According to Murakami, ie was a social organization that led to the emergence of 
corporate family practices, over and against a concept of contemporary conjugal 
household, particularly in eastern Japan (tȏgoku) (Hall 1985: 50). Nakane also attributes 
similar general characteristics of ie, which will be studied more in detail. 
 The Japanese concept of ie (household) semantically different from kazoku or 
“family” was the basic unit of social organization in rural, samurai and merchant 
communities. This institution can trace its history back to centuries before the 
Tokugawa Period, but factors of this period such as the economy and polity established 
ie as the basic social unit in Japanese society. 
The continuity of ie through successive generations was the major concern for the 
members of ie. The eldest son inheritance system fit this need and other forms of 
inheritance were disregarded. When there were no children to continue the ie, a son or 
daughter would be adopted as the successor, according to his/her qualifications and 
regardless of kinship ties to the head of the ie to carry on the household name. These 
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adoptions make it clear that the existence and continuity of ie which was of great 
importance did not depend on actual kinship. There were so many cases specifically 
among merchant houses that a faithful worker was chosen as the successor instead of 
the son. Therefore it can be said that ie was an ongoing enterprise rather than a family 
(Nakane 1990: 216-217). 
Although “blood relationship” was a foundational feature of the ie system, it was set 
aside for functional reasons when needed in the ie system. Although proto-ie was based 
on patrilineal succession, the agricultural and military establishment had already started 
rejecting the principle of blood relationship as the sole qualifier for succession through 
inheritance. “Blood relationship” was a distinctive feature differentiating the ie system 
from the uji system. The kaihotsu no so (founding father) who originally established a 
proto-ie private territory, provided a sense of unity among its members and also 
differentiated it from uji. The principles represented by the system of yorioya-yoriko 
(protecting parent and protected child) as an imaginal and unreal parent-child relation 
enabled ie to recruit non-blood members in certain cases when necessary. This allowed 
ie to function much more adaptively and functionally than the uji system as evidenced 
in the Ritsuryȏ state and feudal Europe, which did not allow for the adoption of son’s 
for succession purposes. “This meant that ur-ie became reified as a management system 
and its component members became interchangeable.” 
The proto-ie as a characteristic of ie became a common system for both the military and 
farmers. The proto-ie had a stratified structure with non-blood members having a lower 
status than blood members. This was perhaps influenced by the strict hierarchy often 
needed for a military to function. But stratified structure was not a fixed one. Unlike uji, 
the functional stratification feature of proto-ie, allowed for a person’s ability to be taken 
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into account. Therefore it was possible for a knave (genin) and a follower (shoju) to be 
promoted to vassal (roto) by adoption as a son. This was not just a promotion into a unit, 
but an adoption into a family, which strengthened the sense of unity based on blood 
relationships and on being a fully invested member (Kumon et al. 1976: 20-22). 
In order for this dramatic redefinition of family succession to occur the Japanese had 
to deal with their cultural tradition. The Japanese culture was greatly influenced by 
Chinese civilization dominant Confucian teachings and ideology which promoted the 
primacy of blood relations. The ie practice that allowed for adoption of non-blood 
members as successors was an offense to this teaching.    
As it will be referred to Bito, he explains that adoption, assimilation, and Japanizing 
a new version of foreign elements is a basic pattern in Japanese culture. Therefore 
Japanese scholars of the time could present a version of Confucianism to solve the 
problem of non-blood relation inheritance. Yoshiie compares Japanese practices with 
Chinese practices to show important differentiations, under two categories: the “patterns 
of social co-operation;” and “Japanese loyalty to others (non-kin) in social co-operation 
Chinese filial piety in co-operation with kin” (Yoshiie 1996: 6-9).   
The highlight of Japanese behavior which catches foreigners’ attention but they 
themselves are not aware of it, is their attitude toward groupism and self-sacrifice. 
Although in contemporary Japan it is a common behavior for Japanese, many years ago 
Japanese society like others was characterized by social co-operation with kin and 
relatives. Fujiwara clan as Imperial regent and later Taira clan at the Heian Court 
(794-1185) are good examples of this behavior in conducting politics based of kinship 
relations. The samurai system also started its enfeoffment based on consanguinity. 
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Social changes at the time of Northern and Southern courts (1336-1392) caused the 
collapse of enfeoffment system, and landholding by daimyȏ replaced the previous 
system; both were milestones in Japanese society for changing towards non-kin 
co-operation. 
Japanese Scholars, Naito Konan and Tokutomi Soho, also recognize the great social 
change around the Warring States or Sengoku Jidai (Warring States 1467-1590) as 
foundational for Japan’s development. In fact, this progress did not end the Japanese 
feudal society rather it transformed it from a feudal kin cooperation to a feudal non-kin 
system. This process is the distinction between Japan and other Asian societies. 
This structural change to a new society was characterized by ethics which mainly 
focused on loyalty or “sense of duty and honor” (giri). It is a turning away from kin 
cooperation based of filial piety which is relatively an unclear concept in Japanese 
culture and restricted to respect parents highly. But the long history of the family-clan 
system made it a connotative concept in pre-modern China. The hierarchical order 
which directed the internal relations within the clan produced patterns of behavior 
which were effective in all areas of life. This concept was promoted and rationalized in 
Chinese society by Confucianism teachings and ideological support. Even most of 
contemporary governmental corruption bears patterns of kin co-operation. 
The emphasis on loyalty rather than filial piety in Japanese society during the Edo 
period as well as its high levels of non-kin cooperation is very important when 
comparing Japan with other Asian countries. Establishment of this kind of cooperation 
and service towards those who are not members of one’s family or clan provided a 
valuable potential for Japan to begin the modernization process. Loyalty to lords and to 
96 
 
the domain (han) as the ruling system during the Tokugawa period, shifted to the 
restored Emperor and with the Meiji Restoration. Loyalty towards one’s enterprise and 
region increased as the role of Emperor and state decreased after World War II. These 
particular forms of loyalty in Japanese society reflects a “vertical society” (tateshakai) 
based on a non-consanguinal cooperation pattern (Ibid.). 
 Bito tries to explain Japanese ie and its distinctive characteristics and differences 
with Chinese family through different interpretations of Confucianism.  
Chu Hsi, the orthodox school of Confucianism, was in the mainstream of Chinese 
society during the Tokugawa period. The most important principle of this imported 
Chinese school held that an individual’s nature can innately judge whether social 
behaviors are morally good or bad. Individuals inherently are naturally moral. The Chu 
Hsi concept of individual morality was very popular in China, but faced resistance in 
Japan. Adopting different approaches, some Japanese scholars started criticizing the 
basic principle of this school. The characteristic of individualism was not compatible 
with Japanese society of the time. Therefore those critics established their own theories 
by adopting the concept of family or ie as a unit of social organization and the state as a 
composite of ie, as the real basis of morality. The ie and the state have the ability to 
judge an individual’s morality based on their functioning and performance within these 
units (Bito 1984: 137-138). 
In Chinese society the nature of family is based on a paternal kinship organization 
that grants rights and full membership to the boy who is born in the family. The birth 
order will be the basis of his social activities in the future, including the pursuing of the 
family name and business. In Japan the performing of this role in the family and by 
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extension in society is not achieved necessarily by being born a boy in the family (Ibid., 
127). 
Unlike the Chinese family which is purely a paternal kinship organization, Japanese 
ie is more a fictive social organization seeking preservation of family name, succession, 
business and property. A non-kin member’s succession in the ie is possible. To be the 
first son was certainly an advantage but not an absolute condition for inheritance. In 
many cases a non-kin member could replace an incompetent first born son.  
The Chinese do not have a family business system and family assets were divided 
among brothers equally. The obligation to obey the father, or Hsiao, was the basis of all 
moral order and unique to China. It was a foreign term which did not have an equivalent 
in Japanese.  
Tsuda Sokichi asserts that Japanese society emphasizes the individual’s relationship 
with the group rather than between individuals. He argues that the Japanese model is 
more “modern” than the Chinese model which is patterned on individualism (Ibid., 
137-138). 
Kasaya categorizes Japanese ie by the family types, blood relations, continuity of the 
family, and succession. Kasaya argues the emergence of the local lords was coincidental 
with the ie. The status and occupations of the local lords was patrilineally inherited from 
their fathers, which formed the unique ie structure. Kasaya states there are three types of 
families. The first type is the nuclear family, with parents living with their children, 
which is a common form in modern era and pre-modern Western society. The second 
type is the complex family consisting of parents living with their male children and 
male children’s nuclear families which was practiced in traditional China and the 
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pre-modern world. The third type is the lineal family parents living with one of their 
sons’ nuclear family (in Japan, their eldest son’s family) which is the normative ie 
practice in Japan. Japan, during the ie era did not require that the linear family be blood 
related (Kasaya 2000: 6-8). 
 Focusing more on continuity and preservation of the family business, Kasaya 
further explains about adoption. To maintain their rule and transmit their military skills 
and land rights, samurai ie was a lasting corporation that endured through generations. 
Therefore the inheritance and property was not divided among male heirs but the first 
son as the main successor inherited.    
Ie initially had an administrative mechanism to develop its agricultural lands through 
the family members as the staff in charge of this task. In other words family members 
were expected to administer the family business. Therefore, the dominance of patrilineal 
succession was not just due to the significance of blood succession, rather because the 
preeminent entity of the household (ie) was expected to lead the management of the 
family’s financial concerns. Consequently, the importance of household preservation 
entailed the potential talents and capabilities in administration of the successor. 
Therefore, in cases where the legal heirs were not qualified as the successor they were 
excluded in favor of an adopted talented son. 
A special adoption system was one of the the most observable features of Japanese ie. 
The adoption of children without any relatives or adoption by childless couples with 
individual or religious reasons is customary in the world. Under Confucianism in East 
Asian countries such as China and Korea, keeping the patrilineal succession is the main 
reason for adoption. Therefore, it is called “in clan-adoption.” The adopted son and 
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adopting father must have the same family name. In Japan male heirs from male 
relatives are preferred, but families could also choose from the mother’s family or other 
families. In Japan, a son-in-law also could be an adopted son when the father had just 
daughters. In Japan, the adopting father also had the ability to adopt a son based on a 
personality that best suited the household (ie) or for the abilities to manage the 
household (ie) (Ibid., 12-14). 
 
The main Characteristics of Ie 
Murakami asserts that there are four structural factors of ie: 
1. Including fictive kin in the form of adopted children and not confined 
to true legal members which is described by kin-tract-ship. 
2. Stem linearity was an important element for the continuation of the 
family (ie) as a status and a legal unit holding property. The succession is 
confined to just a person who is not necessarily the first born son. 
3. An organization with functional hierarchy aiming at fulfilling the 
duties collectively. The hierarchy was patterned on military form of 
“commander-officers-mounted soldiers-footsoldiers.” 
4. Economically and militarily self-sufficient organizations not 
submissive to superiors (Hall 1985: 50-51). 
Lineage, direct succession and inheritance to preserve and transfer the family wealth, 
the corporate characteristics of ie and its independence are also characteristics further 
explained by Kasaya. Lineage is an important feature of the household not only in Japan 
but also throughout the world; however, unique principles differentiated the Japanese ie 
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practice from its foreign counterparts. Lineages based on blood line were a kind of 
political legitimacy for royal or noble families all over the world. The distinct 
characteristics of the Japanese ie were as follows: first, direct succession of the head of 
family position; second, perfect preservation of the household capital from one 
generation to another; third, the way lineal succession guided family structure; and four, 
three generations of parents and the family of married children and specifically the 
eldest son who lived in the same house. 
The inheritance of the head of family position is based on premise of a father-son 
succession. This premise is obvious in the case of the inheritance of the position by 
brothers. It is done through the adoption of the younger brother by the older one.  
The direct successor at the same time controls the household assets. Dividing the 
inheritance among the brothers in Japan had been customary but by the fourteenth 
century this custom changed to single inheritance of eldest son as the head of family. It 
was not considered to be the inheritor’s personal assets rather it was the family wealth 
to be managed and transmitted to the next generations. Since the household wealth is 
not perceived as the personal assets of the family head and fully transmitted to the next 
generation, it can be deduced that the household has a corporate characteristics. The 
head of family possessed the right to control its capital and other members to promote 
the household. If head of the family misused the resources of household arbitrarily, he 
would be punished and deprived from his position by other members (Kasaya 2000: 
21-27). 
The proto-ie was a politically powerful and independent institution which could 
resist interference not only by the ritsuryo state, but also by the later shogunates, as their 
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higher-ranking representative. In this case it was similar to the feudal household of the 
medieval West but the distinct traits such as its corporate features and lineal structure 
differentiated it from the Western counterpart (Ibid., 27). The duplication of power of 
proto-ie in the form of main family (honke) and branch families (bunke) helped the ie of 
warriors spread all over the country through the jitȏ-shugo system of Yoritomo 
Minamoto (Kumon et al. 1976: 22-23).  
 
The Negative Impact of Tribal Organization  
 The characteristics of Japanese ie system is a very distinctive practice which made 
it possible for Japan to adapt and modernize. The ie system followed the uji system in 
Japan. As explained, generally there are more similarities between Japanese uji (clan) 
system and other societies which are mainly based on blood relation such as tribal 
society in Iran. The principle focus of this study is to analyze whether Iran’s societal 
structure could also change to a system that is more compatible with modernization, 
making it possible for the transition from a traditional society to a modern one to take 
place more swiftly in Iran as it did in Japan. The principle of kinship resulted in a 
socio-political culture in Iranian society led to nepotism in modern and contemporary 
times.  
The foremost point is that the modern state could superficially make changes in the 
pastoral nomadic way of life by forcing them to settle (takhteh Qȃpow) in certain areas 
and preventing their mobility (Naqibzȃdeh 1380/2001: 154), or by executing or exiling 
the tribal chiefs and military men and replacing them. These were all done by Rezȃ 
Shȃh’s order. Another superficial strategy attempted by the Shȃh to build an Iranian 
nation was the introduction of a unified system of European clothing and establishment 
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of a new bureaucratic system for the tribal areas (Amȃn allȃhi-Bahȃarvand 1374/1995: 
241). Despite these reforms, some characteristics of the tribal (ashȋra) culture were 
transferred from pre-modern society to the modern one. The domination of the tribal 
system throughout Iranian history for such a long time produced a certain culture which 
could not be changed easily.  
 The features of Iranian tribal structure were not confined just to kinship and blood 
relation. They can be categorized by their positive and negative impacts especially on 
the economy.  
A. The Positive Impacts: 
1. The main economic activity of tribes (ȋlȃt) was animal husbandry. Their 
products were meat, milk, oil, leather, etc. which were sold for consumption in cities. 
In addition to these activities, some of the tribes primarily focused on farming. 
2. The military role of tribes made them the main actors in the political arena 
throughout the Iranian history and had a significant impact on the development of 
Iran. On the negative they were always trying to attain the political power and 
dominate others; on the positive side and on a much larger scale they defended the 
country against foreign threats and invasions. During the Qajar, the tribes had to 
provide military service for the central government as a part of army. 
3. In addition to recruiting soldiers, tribes had to pay tax in cash or goods.   
B. The Negative Impacts: 
1. Most tribes were not used to manual work specifically farming. Due to a 
nomadic way of life, they tried to protect themselves or reach their goals by 
depending on weaponry, establishing prepared militaries and threatening with terror.  
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2. They had to adapt themselves to tough situations such as famine and natural 
locations and consequently developed an invasive and predatory moral ethic. This 
behavior gradually institutionalized as a culture among the tribes so that presenting 
braveness through plundering was a criterion for men to marry.   
The tribal invasions intensified in the absence of a strong government. Seeking the 
goals such as preserving the balance of power, acquiring booty and wealth, and reducing 
the population density of neighboring areas were the main reason for the invasions.  
A peaceful situation, observing the laws and private ownership were the main 
principles for economic growth which unfortunately did not materialize under the Qajar 
(Dehqȃn-nezhȃd 1379/2001: 145-147).   
The impacts of tribal structure on a society can be studied from various points of 
view but the main point is its cultural effects. As Murakami focused his study on the 
cultural impacts of ie society in modern Japan, Sarȋ al-Qalam also emphasized the same 
dynamic of the tribal structure on modern Iran. 
Sarȋ al-Qalam argues that the deep-rooted predominance of tribal culture in Iranian 
history has affected socio-political culture through its core issues of defining kinship, 
seeking for security, and feeling alienated toward non-tribal members. Throughout 
Iranian history, insecurity in different social, political and economic fields has restricted 
trust among people and institutions and organizations. Entrusting political and social 
roles and duties based on kinship and ethnic relations is one of the consequences of 
distrust. This is evident in the Qajar kings adoption of policies such as the elimination 
of rivals, the appointment of nonentities to key positions based on subordination, the 
suppression of those who were considered problematic, and the promotion of absolute 
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individualism (Sarȋ al-Qalam1377/ 1998: 34-35). 
Rationality is one of the essential constituents of modernization and it is in 
contradiction with kinship, age, status, ascription, political proximity, etc. as the 
constituent structure of tribal culture.    
It can be said that political history of Iran is actually the rise and decline of tribes.  
Sari al-Qalam mentions Medes, Achaemnids, Aracids, Ghaznavid, Seljuqid, Il-khans 
(Mongol), Qara Qoyunlu, Ȃq Qoyunlu, Safavid, Afshȃr, Zand and Qajar (Ibid., 35).  
He defines the distinctions between tribal culture and urban/rural cultures: 
a. Nepotism 
b. Aggressive and militant characteristic 
c. Persistence and extension of tribe through predatory actions. 
 Security is a base for tribal behavior. To ensure the security, a tribe must organize 
itself according to ascription, not duty or function which is a modern concept. Attaining 
this goal means weakening other tribes. Kinship is the source of obligation and duty. A 
member of the tribe must defend the other members. When a member of tribe is 
promoted socio-politically, the promotion is not only considered as a benefit to the 
individual. Instead the all the kin benefit, as the promoted individual lets his kin and 
other members of his tribe enjoy those privileges due to security and obligation. 
Self and others are two main factors used to define identity within a tribe. Since the 
circle of self, consists of kin it is very limited in comparison with numerous enemies 
who are others, thus the fear of outsiders is increased. This is the reason for a deep 
distrust of non kin and the appointment of a limited number of kin as officeholders. This 
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however, contradicts with functionalism and specialism as modern concepts (Ibid., 
37-39). 
 The second characteristic of tribal society is one based on geographical conditions that 
limit the way of life. Tribes are always perceived as threats to the ruling tribe; to counter 
this threat ruling tribes will move tribes to remote places to reduce their power. To gain 
sovereignty and preserve it is a result of intertribal warfare. Chieftains, opposed to the 
weakening of their authority, resisted the establishment of a modern army. One of the 
causes of Abbȃs Mirzȃ’s defeat in the Russo-Persian war (1826-1828) was that his 
military commanders were those chieftains who preferred their tribal interests to the 
nation’s interests. 
And finally, predatory tactics were instruments meant to frighten rival tribes and 
increase tribal wealth, which was necessary for increasing the political and economic 
power of a tribe and its persistence. A preemptive attack was necessary to prevent 
insecurity, which lead to spiraling intensification of hostilities (Ibid.). 
 
Conclusion 
The dominance of Japanese household (ie) during Tokugawa era when it reached its 
peak was a distinctive practice not seen in other societies. There were some social 
groups such as uji (clan) in other societies throughout history such as in Iranian tribal 
society. But ie was more functional, active, and independent than its precedent uji 
system in Japan and in similar societies all over the world. Ie because of its unique form 
represented the initial form of Japanese companies in modern era. If uji had continued, 
perhaps modernization would have been postponed as it was in China and Korea 
(Kumon et al. 1976: 17). 
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Faced with Western civilization, most of underdeveloped societies including Japan and 
Iran tried to adopt its practices as a pattern for modernization. They found it difficult 
since it was not compatible with their traditional culture and structure. 
In Japan, the Western ideal model in many ways was contrary to ie society, and 
Japanese society had difficulties adapting itself to the modernization process. Unlike 
Western European which was led mainly by an elite minority, the Tokugawa period was 
a diffused mass society, and patterning such an alien model was very difficult for prewar 
Japanese society (Hayami 1981: 418). 
During the Tokugawa period, conservative shogunate with its adoption of an 
isolationist policy, the Meta-ie federation could maintain this structure and eventually 
fossilized with little innovations. This made it resistant to change. 
After the Meiji Restoration, ie society was not completely overthrown however it did 
not function as strong as before when it was at its peak during the Tokugawa period. Its 
principles continued functioning but not on a national and political level. These 
principles were applied mainly in Japanese companies as the engine of modernization 
and the resultant culture kept reproducing in the society.  
During the Tokugawa period, members of the samurai class, forced to live in cities, 
lost their military function under these conditions, and had to reorganize themselves as a 
“degenerate” form of real ie known as “mini-ie.” This version of ie was transferred to 
the modern era and was still alive in a dormant state until post World War II. But the ie 
principle remained alive to “breathe life into modern management system.” The 
traditional form of consensual organization (mura) was kept alive after Meiji 
Restoration (Hall 1985: 50). 
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Although the ie system holds a strict hierarchical structure, similar to the whole of 
Japanese society, it enjoys a high rate of permeability to recruit non-kin members who 
are qualified to serve in the required positions. Although in ie society some groups 
dominated their subordinates, the latter group leaders also could promote to leadership 
in society and there was no gap to separate them or preventing them from attempting to 
rise up (Hayami op. cit. 417).   
The ie system eventually created a modern meritocracy in Japan. This allowed for a 
burgeoning bureaucracy where there were no obstacles for talented people to seek 
advancement. In Iran, the Qajar tribal system, influenced by centuries of tribal culture 
and social structure, created a modern society based on nepotism. In the latter case, 
obstacles fostered by nepotism kept Iran’s bureaucracy underdeveloped. 
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Chapter Four: Organizational Practices and Sale of Rank and Offices 
1. Promotion, Participation, and Control in Japanese Organization 
 The study of ie society as a Japanese organization shows that its unique 
characteristics entail a distinct mechanism for promotion within a strict hierarchical 
organization. 
The importance of management and preservation of ie wealth, makes the 
employment of a non-kin member necessary through the custom of adoption. 
 According to Kasaya’s study, there are at least two other practices in the 
Japanese-style organizations which paved the way for promotion by giving priority to 
talent and ability. The sale of status or rank (gokenin kabu) is the other custom which is 
studied and compared in the next part with some relatively similar measure in Qajar Iran 
as the sale of offices.  
The supplemental salary (tashidaka) system is the third method for promotion of 
lower-ranking samurai in Japanese organizations such as the domain which will be 
referred to shortly. “Forced retirement” or “house arrest” (oshikome) was a practice to 
constrain tyrant rulers by the domain elders. Other practices allowed the lower-ranking 
samurai in the government’s administration to take part in decisions and show their 
abilities through a bottom-up system of decision-making and through the circulation of 
documents (ringi system). 
In his another argument about the various social and political contradictions in 
baku-han system, Yamaguchi refers to the problems which reform-minded lords faced 
with in promotion of the qualified talent. It suggests that introduction of this plan by 
various practices was not so easy. But shogun Yoshmune and some other lords could 
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implement various reforms including the promotion of talented people. 
These contradictions can be divided to roughly three groups. 
1. Administrative contradiction in bakufu and han system. The administration system 
of the time was two-sided with bureaucratic and lord-vassal systems. In case of 
reform in state or society, the ability system was inevitable. But the promotion 
sometimes faced with the strong opposition of traditional faction. 
2. Financial contradiction. When the lords removed to the urban area and got 
involved in mercantile system and monetary economy, the natural economy and tax 
of land as the basis of baku-han system also changed and led to financial crisis in 
their territories.  
3. The hierarchical contradiction. The bakuhan social system consisted of farmers and 
craftsmen were basically in conflict with the lord on the top the pyramid. Many 
farmer riots and townsmen conflicts happened by the end of Tokugawa era 
(Yamaguchi 2001: 144-146). 
 
The Supplemental Salary (tashidaka) System  
Yoshimune, in eighth year of Kyȏhȏ (1723), implemented the supplemental salary 
(tashidaka) system reform policy. This system intended to guide the appointment of 
retainers to offices. Each retainer officially appointed to an office, was paid based on his 
status or the amount of stipend paid by custom. In cases involving low level retainers 
appointed to an office with a higher fixed standard amount than his household stipend, 
the difference was to be paid by the bakufu during the retainer’s term of office. For 
example, 3000 koku was the standard stipend (tashidaka) for the post of city magistrate 
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(machi bugyȏ) of Edo. If a retainer with household stipend of 1000 koku was appointed 
to this post, the amount of 2000 koku as the supplementary salary was paid by the 
government. This way, talented lower level retainers were allowed to be appointed to 
high level offices. This practice also benefited the bakufu because it was only a 
temporary increase in salary to be paid while the retainer was appointed.  
From a political point of view the system solved the bakufu’s organizational problems 
because it freed them to appoint outside the strict hierarchy based on a retainer’s ability 
rather than the status. Introducing the supplemental salary system predicated both salary 
compensation and the assumption of an appointed place based on merit within the 
samurai organization. This way officials could be appointed based on their talent and 
abilities, while still preserving the traditional status order. Appointments were not 
lifetime, and were for designated periods of time. Therefore, the promoted officer or 
retainer, returned to his original status after completing his term. In this way the original 
status order and the family stipends which were inherited remained intact. It was a wise 
approach for the better allocation of positions that could adapt to changing situations. 
This reform mainly was utilized in administrative positions, where adaptation to change 
was needed the most, rather than in high level military posts where appointments 
outside of established status were rarer. (Kasaya 2000: 126-130).  
Yamaguchi also confirms it as argues that Yoshimune tried to make a balance 
between traditional and talented factions unlike his predecessors who were mainly 
dependent on talented staff (Yamaguchi 2001: 155). We can also see that when he 
implemented tashidaka system, he tried to keep the traditional bureaucratic system 
while promoted talented staff for just one period. 
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“Ringi” System 
 The powerful daimyô in the Tokugawa era were the sole persons in authority to 
make decisions. If the daimyô’s retainers wanted to appeal a bad decision or correct an 
errant command they could only petition a remonstration. But this autocratic mode of 
governance was actually limited to the beginning of early modern period. With the 
consolidation of the domainal government’s authority, the daimyô only concerned 
himself with important decisions that needed his direct ruling or his active participation 
in conferencing with others. The actual daily management of the domain’s 
administration was left to the appointed domainal elders. 
This development eventually led to a bottom-up consensus type of decision-making as 
the domainal basis of policy formation. This occurred in two different forms: 
“question-response” and “ringi” (Kasaya op. cit., 79-80). 
Kasaya, in demonstrating the latter, refers to the Sanada family of the Matsushiro 
domain who was in charge of all the domain’s financial affairs (okatsute-motojimeyaku). 
Their duty was monitoring the usual expenditures so that they could calculate budgets 
and give an “estimate” on suggested projects. Concerning the cases such as rebuilding 
projects or financial affairs due to natural disaster and famines, the domainal elders 
(karȏ) would consult with this office by sending inquiries to the Sanada family called 
otazunemono (Kasaya 2005: 112). 
Entrusting the lower-ranking officials with bureaucratic affairs and inquiries paved 
the way for them to eventually take part in decision-making process in domains. 
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Although the domain was a typical hierarchically structured organization, with powerful 
daimyô and elites it tended to a collective method of decision-making, including all 
opinions from the lowest level to the top.  
The low-ranking officials submitted their findings of inquiries about laws and 
policies. They sent drafts of legislation which consisted of their consent and objection 
on the issues to the higher officials. In this process, the documents were circulated 
through a chain of hierarchical positions. Even in the case of urgent matters, the same 
process was carried out. By applying this ringi pattern, power was not monopolized by 
daimyo but was distributed among a wide range of officials, including the lowest and 
highest ranks. This unique pattern of decision-making continues today in modern Japan.  
It has been criticized, however as a time-consuming process due to the need for 
consensus amongst various levels before policies can be implemented (Kasaya op. cit. 
81-83). 
 
House Arrest (oshikome) 
 The vertical organization of the early modern (kinsei) domain based on the ie 
system put an end to the civil wars of the medieval era and increasingly strengthened 
the daimyô’s power. But oshikome (“forced retirement” or “house arrest”) was a way for 
lesser provincial leaders to constrain the daimyô’s arbitrary rule. 
The absolute obedience of vassals to the daimyô, the lost independence of the 
samurai to make decisions, and the total inability of the lower status ranks to resist the 
higher ones are dominant historical assumptions of samurai society in the Edo era.  
Kasaya however, reinvestigates and in some cases challenges these assumptions (Ibid., 
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77). 
In cases involving cruelty or mismanagement by a daimyȏ or neglecting the retainers’ 
warnings, the daimyô lord could be placed under house arrest or forced into retirement 
(oshikome) as actions taken against him to curtail his unjust power. If the lord did not 
express penitence after a period of house arrest, he would be forced to retire and his son 
would replace him if he expressed his desire to lead justly. Kasaya studied various cases 
such as the Arima house of the Kurume domain in 1729, the Mizuno house of the 
Okazaki domain in 1751, the Andȏ house of the Kanȏ in 1755, and the Matsudaira 
house of the Kaminoyama domain in 1780. 
According to Kasaya, oshikome was a typical and widespread custom within the 
warrior society which was assumed through agreement by the domainal elders and chief 
retainers as a proper administrative response to improper acts. The domainal elders and 
chief retainers had a responsibility to lead justly; if they did not, they understood that 
the public in protest could legitimately enact oshikome, which was not considered to be 
an insurrection.   
Any daimyȏ who was forced to retire could “return to his public office as daimyȏ” 
(saishukkin) if he reformed his acts and pledged not to repeat them. If upon 
interrogation daimyȏ could prove he had repented of his misconduct, he could come 
back to the office, otherwise his legitimate heir would be appointed as his successor 
(Ibid., 65-77).  
The aforementioned practices were customary in Japanese-style organizations 
suggesting that the image of absolute obedience or loyalty did not conflict with 
remonstrance or proposing suggestions. It seems even in a hierarchical organization, 
114 
 
there were ways for promotion based on ability to preserve the organization specifically 
faced with crises. In Qajar’s patrimonial regime there were rarely comparably similar 
practices. Although the social mobility was theoretically accepted in the Qajar regime, it 
never practically nor completely materialized. 
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2. The Sale of Ranks and Offices in Edo Japan and Qajar Iran 
 
Introduction 
In the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, sale of offices was practiced 
frequently in the West (France, England, Spain, Italy, Germany and Netherlands) and in 
the East (Ottoman Empire and China). In seventeenth century France, sale of both civil 
and military offices of various ranks by the king and officials was a customary political 
abuse. Not only was the practice corrupt, but entrusting incapable and unreliable people 
with carrying out the responsibility of important offices brought about political 
implications. The important institution of bureaucracy needed for governments to 
function was divested of capable and talented people, and subsequently weakened. 
Only the rich could afford to buy offices, others were excluded, which altered the social 
structure, with taxpayers having to bear the additional burden (Swart 1949: 1). This 
detrimental effect was the case in many European and Asian countries that used the 
practice of the sale of offices. The purpose of this section is to investigate historical 
cases in pre-modern semi-feudal and patrimonial regimes societies of Edo Japan and 
Qajar Iran to elucidate the different the characteristics of the sale of offices institution 
and its socio-political consequences. 
Sales of office generally arose out of financial crisis. Some of the secondary reasons 
for promoting the sale of offices were: to establish a bureaucracy under the control of 
aristocracy; to bolster commercial prosperity; or to cover the financial needs of a despot 
king or government (Ibid., 123). These are examined in both cases of Edo and Qajar to 
116 
 
determine the underlying motivations for establishing a sale of offices and status 
practice. In both cases, we can assume that the practice originated out of financial crisis. 
The questions are what other motivations came into play, what generated them, and 
were there any similarities.  
    
Historical Background and Definition 
 Financial crises especially emergency cases such as war, famine and floods were 
the main reason for the establishment of the sale of offices and status program. But it is 
a two-edged condition. People have to be willing and motivated to buy them. It is 
assumed that they would want something of value in return for their investment.   
There also had to be some level of economic prosperity, where at least a segment of the 
society would be not only willing but able to afford to buy the offices (Ibid., 113). In 
Qajar Iran, many had benefited economically from the increased productivity of the 
country due to long peaceful condition. This increased the segment of society who could 
afford to purchase offices and status, which intensified the competition among those 
candidates and drove up prices (Curzon Vol. I 1892: 438). 
 There was also a similarity between China and Edo Japan. As in China, Japan 
practiced the sale of ranks instead of offices. It was however a nominal difference since 
purchasing a rank entailed holding an office (Swart op. cit. 107-108).  Each samurai 
household enjoyed a certain rank and standard stipend which qualified its members to 
certain posts and offices. During Yoshimune Tokugawa’s reign (1684-1751) this 
practice was expanded to allow for more mobility within the system through the 
supplemental salary (tashidaka) system (Kasaya 2000: 126-127). According to various 
historical cases in both societies, this practice is studied on some levels. 
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Edo Japan 
The origin of selling offices in Japan is not clear but Mitamura Engyo argues that it 
flourished in the Hȏreki era (1751-61). The book “Seiji Kenbunroku” published around 
1816 (Murai 1983a: 721) also referred to the gokenin kabu, roughly translated as 
retainer stock, which suggests that people were aware of the sale of office practice.  
Kasaya places its origins a century earlier with the first evidence of the practice dating 
from 1715 (Kasaya 2000: 171). 
Gokenin kabu refers to the purchase of a shogun retainer’s (gokenin) rank for money 
in the Edo era. The sale was usually made between a seller or his family who was 
retiring and a buyer who wanted to succeed him, through the practice of adoption. As a 
result of the grave financial situation of the samurai after the mid Edo period two other 
ways to purchase offices arose (Murai op. cit., 721). Buyers could purchase another 
family’s genealogy (bandai) or a portion of the seller’s salary (Kasaya op. cit., 171). It 
is worth to mention that there are also some cases that the ranks were granted to 
non-samurai just based on the abilities and will be mentioned here separately. It is 
important to know that the level of the traded ranks and offices in both societies was 
different due to their distinctive regimes and social organizations. According to Qajar 
patrimonial kings`s willpower, all levels of offices could be sold regarding some 
exceptions. But in Edo Japan, low ranks of samurai statuse could be traded.  
A direct retainer or vassal of the shogun was known as a gokenin whose status was 
below the bannerman (hatamoto). The gokenin did not have a direct audience with the 
shogun (Fukai 1990: 583). Only part of the gokenin status could be traded. The lower 
ranks below hatamoto usually were allowed to be sold with some limitation on their 
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right to inheritance. In the Japanese aristocrat regime, trading originally happened to 
only a limited extent due to the small number of offices (Swart 1949: 115). Since just 
the lower status were allowed to be traded with certain conditions and limitation. 
A shogunal retainer (gokenin) status was divided into gofudaiseki and okakaeseki; 
the former was allowed to transmit his rank to his heirs; the latter was not (Takayanagi 
1948: 71). Kasaya asserts that nihanba and gofudaiseki were two ranks that were 
allowed to be inherited (Kasaya op. cit., 16). In the case of retirement or death of a 
gofudaiseki, his son could succeed him. But the status of the okakaeseki was limited to 
just one generation; however his relative could be recruited as a new comer.  
Gokenin kabu allowed for a third person to succeed in the absence of a relative 
through adoption. The transference of rank for money was first started by the sons of 
rich farmers and merchants. Later, even gofudaiseki and lower bannerman (hatamoto) 
status were traded especially when it flourished in the Hȏreki period (1751-1763) 
(Takayanagi op. cit., 71). This practice provided a kind of old-age pension for the elder 
officials, who could sell their statuses, and which made it a beneficial fruit of the 
bureaucratic system (Swart 1949: 121). The reason for various prices of the ranks and 
offices is the other level to be studied. 
The cost to purchase offices differed by rank. For instance, the rank of a lower 
military official and soldier (okachi) cost about 500 ryȏ, police official (yoriki) cost 
1000 ryȏ, and policeman or clerk (dȏshin) cost roughly 200 ryȏ (Murai op. cit., 722). 
Although the standard cost of a foot soldier (okachi) rank was 500 ryȏ, it varied 
depending on the period. The rank of a police official (yoriki) cost 1000 ryȏ, and a 
lower military official and soldier (dȏshin) cost about 200 ryȏ. The relatively high price 
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of okachi was ascribed to the expectations that the rank offered a lot of potential for 
promotion. Although the cost for these ranks was high, there were rich people who 
readily applied and paid for them (Donga 1965: 139). We will see in the Qajar Iran case 
that high prices were the result of other factors. 
In some cases, it was not necessary for men to be adopted as a family member in 
order to obtain a rank. They could become a bannerman’s (hatamoto) relative member 
which was actually a fabricated registration (giseki) (Takayanagi 1948: 71). In the 
transaction which took the form of inheritance, the successor must be a relative of the 
seller. Therefore, contrived adoptions were prevalent especially with cousins as 
designated as non-relative successors (Owaki 2014: 1). Both the successor and the 
gokenin would receive the death penalty if it was discovered that a registration had been 
fabricated; indeed there were many cases where offending parties received this 
punishment (Takayanagi op. cit., 71-72).   
The central government (bakufu) was aware of these trading practices and even 
supervised them. The bakufu considered focused on three areas in overseeing the 
succession process, and focused most of their attention on the practice of adoption, 
since it was the most official method used for the sale of offices. They were: 
1. Adoption of a well-born successor from the seller’s relatives;  
2. Prohibition of the transference of money for adoption;   
3. Transmission of rank to the heirs only in cases where the seller enjoyed the status 
of a lower shogunal retainer (gokenin) (Baba 1992: 35).  
Despite the government’s oversight, the prohibition of the transference of money for 
adoption was regularly ignored and the government, in the hopes of trying to maintain 
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the samurai household system, often turned a blind eye.    
 
Qajar Iran 
 The sale of offices in Iran was characterized by patrimonialism. By applying 
Weber’s theory, we can better understand its origins and it practices.    
The patrimonial regime mainly depends on trade where the ruler and his 
administrative staff are the source of profit (Weber 1947: 355). A patrimonial regime 
“leaves room for certain amount of capitalist mercantile trade for capitalistic 
organization of tax farming, and the sale and lease of offices for wars (etc.)” 
(Ibid., :357). 
Therefore when the patrimonial ruler is in need of money, specifically when there is 
a financial crisis, he has the ability to sell the offices to his subjects, with some 
restrictions and limitations. 
The patrimonial ruler treats the political administration as a personal affair and 
political power as his own personal property. Although this system can develop 
bureaucratic features through functional division and rational justifications, the 
patrimonial system preserves its main characteristics. In such a system there is no 
distinction between the “private” and the “official” sphere (Weber vol. II 1978: 1028–
9). 
Faced with financial crisis, Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh, the fourth king of the Qajar dynasty 
decided to put offices (civil and military), titles and royal lands (Khȃlisijȃt) up for sale. 
This action was also ascribed to the influence of the West on the expansion of 
officialdom which increased the supply of new offices and demand for them as a source 
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of revenue in Qajar’s patrimonial system (Sheikholeslami 1971: 107). In the second half 
of nineteenth century, “the central government was in constant and acute need of money, 
partly in order to buy Western goods, including arms to defend itself. This need 
encouraged the systematization of the sale of offices. Local governorships were sold to 
the highest bidder every year, so that governors were most concerned with the raising 
enough taxes to keep up with their bids and make a good income” (Keddie 2005: 161). 
Another contributing factor was that the decentralized and tributary state of Qajar was 
in need of more income for modernization. It further decentralized and debilitated itself 
through the proliferation of offices and their sale, which ironically lost it revenue 
(Bradburd 2001: 133-134). 
Almost everyone in the Iranian official hierarchy had purchased his post for money 
presented either to the Shah, a minister or any senior official who had appointed him. If 
there were multiple offers, the highest one would win the post (Curzon Vol. I 1892: 438). 
Due to excessive sale of various military ranks such as colonel, brigadier, lieutenant and 
so on, the number of noncommissioned officers who purchased them was twice the 
number of the soldiers. Eventually there was no demand for these positions and they 
remained unsold. Thereafter the fabrication of new honorary titles and their sale became 
widespread; because of the overindulgence in this practice even a lexicon could not help 
to come up with new titles (Majd al-Islȃm 1351/1972: 99). This practice was largely 
unregulated and many fake titles were circulated for sale (Ibid., 102-3). 
Mirzȃ Taqi Khȃn Amir Kabȋr (1848-51), the Shȃh’s first and famous sadr-i a’zam or 
grand vizier, attempted to revise the practice of granting of benefice, in some cases he 
even confiscating them. The Shȃh however, overruled him and resumed the sale of titles 
(Ȃdamiyyat 1348/1969: 268) and the royal lands (Khȃlisijȃt). These lands were usually 
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the confiscated properties of the governors who were in disgrace with the Shȃh (Ibid., 
108).  
The Shȃh usually depended on the members of his household and close servants for 
selling the offices.   
Proximity is one the characteristics of patrimonialism. Regardless of formal titles, 
the physical proximity is of great importance. Major political positions are usually held 
by those who live very close to the leader (Bill & Springborg 2000: 120-121). Therefore, 
the Shȃh’s sons held important offices. Besides Muzaffar al-Din Mirzȃ, the crown 
prince who traditionally resided in Tabriz, Zill al-Sultȃn was the governor of Isfahȃn 
and other domains. Kȃmrȃn Mirzȃ, the other prince was the governor of Tehrȃn and 
other princes also gradually extending their influences (Amin al-Dawlah 1355/1976: 48). 
Limiting the offices to Qajar kins or superseding them to others is the other level in 
addition to previous one which should be taken into consideration. 
The analysis of historical cases involving the sale of status and offices will help to 
make clear the mechanisms involved as well as provide a better understanding of the 
impacts of these customs in both societies. 
 
Talent and Promotion versus Ascription 
Edo Japan 
Edo Japan was a semi-feudalistic society whereas Qajar Iran was a patrimonial 
society. According to Weber, a patrimonial system is more capable of social mobility 
that a feudal society. Unlike feudalism, patrimonialism is much more flexible in 
allowing for social mobility and gaining wealth. The full patrimonial power of the king 
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tends toward monopolies of its own (Weber 1978: vol. 2: 1102). If Weber is correct then 
what we should see is that in Edo Japan social mobility occurred to a lesser degree than 
Qajar Iran. When we look at the practice of selling offices and status, however, we see 
the opposite. In Edo Japan the practice furthered social mobility while in Qajar Iran it 
did not.     
Baba’s case study of Hachiȏji village is a well-established one. According to him, 
there are twenty-three documents detailing the sale of the policeman (dȏshin) rank in 
this village (Baba 1992: 35). The main reasons for the sale were: the sellers’ illness; lack 
of a son; and an infant or sick son. The expansion of the trade of offices to rural areas 
presumes that the farmers were the new successors. Regardless of the bakufu’s policy, 
many policemen (dȏshin) who were not officially allowed to transmit their ranks to their 
heirs transacted it for money (Ibid., 40-43). Being at the age of minority for the 
successor who inherited was an acceptable condition to legitimize trading the ranks by 
others. It suggests the practical aspect of occupying a position or rank in Edo Japan 
unlike the superficial and honorific respect of the sale in Qajar Iran that is important to 
be noted as another level. 
It should also be mentioned that not all the trading of the status was for money. The 
investigated cases can be divided into two major categories with a common goal of 
future promotion. Some of the statuses were sold for money to the non-samurai class 
who were willing to pay for them. Some other similar cases were conferred without 
payment. Both groups could receive promotions to higher positions due to their 
contribution to the government, talents and abilities. It suggests a sharp distinction 
between Edo and Qajar cases. 
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The rural samurai (gȏshi) was one of the samurai ranks in some Japanese domains. 
They were a. quite distinct from the samurai in castle towns; b. granted land by their 
lord and farmed for a living; c. clearly defined as gȏshi in the samurai hierarchy of the 
domain; and d. had responsibilities as a soldier. These gȏshi contributed to the domain’s 
expansion particularly in their development of new paddy fields (shinden kaihatsu) and 
they also provided a much needed expanded security force. Therefore the domain often 
would grant to people the rural samurai (gȏshi) rank.    
It should be noted that the rural samurai of the Tosa domain played a remarkable role 
at the end of Tokugawa period (Kimura 1985: 362). In 1863 (Bunkyû 3), a military force 
(kiheitai) was established in the Hagi domain to defend it against the foreign threats 
(Takagi 1990: 492). The participants could obtain samurai status as they joined this 
force. The original participants were samurai, farmers, townsmen, shrine and temple 
monks. The non-samurai people willingly joined the military effort because they sought 
a chance to be promoted to the samurai status (Ibid., 493).  
The following are just a few cases within Japan’s semi-feudal society that evidenced 
social mobility. 
 Kawsaki Sadataka (1694-1767), an agricultural policy-maker, implemented a new 
cultivation plan and improved the Tamagawa Canal in 1738 (Genbun 3). In 1750 
(Kan’en 3), he was appointed as the project manager of Nagara River improvement in 
Gifu. Later he was promoted to both the auditor (kanjȏ ginmiyaku) and magistrate 
(bugyȏ) of Iwami silver mine positions at the same time (Shimizu 1998: 10).  
Kawasaki Heiemon Sadataka from Oshitate village in Fuchu-shi was promoted from 
village headman (nanushi) to the director of new paddy field development in Musashino 
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in 1738. He was promoted to rural deputy (daikan) in 1744 (Enkyȏ 1). While in this 
position, he accomplished new development in Musashino and improved the river of 
Mino (Gifu prefecture) (http://japanknowledge .com/psnl/display/?kw=川崎平右衛門
＆lid=30020130000411300 accessed 7 July 20014). 
Kan’o Haruhide (1687-1753), the Shimojima family’s second son was adopted by 
Kan’o Harumasa. In 1701 (Genroku 14), he succeeded his stepfather and was appointed 
over the years to the following positions: koshimonogata, Kirinoma guard (Kirinoma 
ban), koshimonogata, head of craftsmanship (saikugashira), catering manager 
(makanaigashira), and head of storage room (nandogashira). In 1736 (Genbun 1), he 
was promoted to an auditor (kanjȏ ginmi yaku) and the next year promoted to 
commissioner of finance (kanjȏ bugyȏ) with the responsibility to increase the annual tax 
collection. In 1744 (Enkyȏ 1), made a trip to Chûgoku area to increase the ratio of 
annual tax, where he discovered hidden farms which irritated the farmers. His salary 
increased to 1500 koku for life after his boss, Matsudaira Norimura praised his efforts 
(Takazawa 1983: 775). 
Kawamura Zuiken was born in a poor family in Ise (Mie prefecture), became a rich 
merchant in the lumber business after the great fire in Edo in 1657. He was active in 
development of new sea routes for rice transportation and the innovation of new 
methods for controlling Yodogawa River in Ȏsaka. In 1671 (Kanmon 11), he obtained 
shogunal retainer (gokenin) status as a civil engineer expert and in recognition for his 
contribution he was promoted to bannerman (hatamoto) in 1698 (Genroku 11) 
(Kwamura Zuiken, (http://japanknowledge.com/psnl/display/?lid=10800HS013202).  
Matsumoto in his analysis of social mobility in Japan focused on the succession from 
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lower samurai status and its impact on the family’s fortunes (Matsumoto 1998: 92).  
In particular Matsumoto studied the Takizawa family who held a hereditary retainer 
(fudai kashin) of bannermen (hatamotto). Takizawa Bakin (1767-1848) from this family 
was a famous playwright and his diary is the author’s main reference. Based on the 
source, Matsumoto presents some examples of buying shogunal retainer (gokenin kabu) 
ranks within this family.    
In the first case, Bakin’s uncle, Sadaoki (1704-1810) achieved the status of gokenin 
as a navy officer (ofunate dȏshin) when he became Kaneko’s family son-in-law. 
According to the author, the process of buying is not clear however he guessed it must 
have been done through connections and marriage (Ibid., 93). 
Tanaka Kyûgu (1662-1729) was an expert in agricultural policy in the mid Edo era. 
He graduated the temple elementary school (terakoya), became a farmer and then a 
woven silk peddler. He was adopted by the chief of the inn reserved for samurai in 
Kawasaki. He was also assigned as the wholesale merchant and village headman 
(nanushi). He compiled a proposal plan to the chief of the rural governor. He then went 
to Edo to study under Ogyû Sorai. Based on the experiences on his research trip to the 
west of Japan, he compiled a book under the title of “minkan shȏyȏ” on civil 
administration and presented it to Tokugawa Yoshimune, through Ȏoka Tadasuke, the 
city magistrate (machi bugyȏ). In 1723 (Kyȏhȏ 8), he reached samurai status in charge 
of river improvement. Due to the good results of controlling the river and new 
cultivation, he was promoted to controller (shihai kanjȏ) in 1729 (Kyȏhȏ 14) 
(Murakami 1988: 246). 
In another case related to Takizawa’s family, Bakin decided to buy a rank of gun 
127 
 
force soldier (omochi zutsu dȏshin) who served as the guard of Edo castle gate during 
peace for Tarȏ (1821-1894), his eleven years old grandson due to death of Tarȏ’s father 
and his son as a direct successor. Tokimura Mototate, Tarȏ’s other grandfather (his 
mother’s father) also supported him to obtain the rank (Matsumoto op. cit. 98). 
 They negotiated with Iso Mataemon who served in gunpowder section and also a 
Judȏ teacher. Iso who used to broker some cases of trading the status shogunal retainer 
got commission from both sides and Tarȏ side paid 5 ryȏ. The discord between Suzuki 
Kyûemon, the seller and Kinji, his father-in-law who adopted him as his son was the 
reason for selling the rank. The participants in the meeting for agreement were both 
buyer and seller sides, broker, and the group chief of the section Suzuki served. An 
advance of 30 ryȏ was paid. Last meeting was held in the group chief’s home and the 
official penman of the group wrote the agreement. The document was kept by the group 
chief and the payment was nominally for living expense through life span (Ibid., 93). 
Takagi Sakuemon (?-1760) was a municipal official (machi yakunin) in mid Edo era. 
In 1724 (Kyȏhȏ 9), he was promoted to gyȏmotsu yaku in Nagasaki. In 1739, he was 
simultaneously assigned to Nagasaki rural intendant (daikan) and thereafter Takagi 
family inherited the rank (--- 2001a: 1091). 
There is another case after buying a rank for Tarȏ. Due to his nonage, his grandfather, 
Bakin was looking for a person from gun force group to serve temporary in his place till 
he gets 16 years old and consequently can keep Takizawa’s family name. He consulted 
with the group chief but it was fruitless. Another option was Nakafuji who was son of 
Tokimura’s cousin. Nakafuji came from Shinshû (current Nagano prefecture) to Edo and 
worked used clothes shop for ten years till he was fired. Hence he resided in Tokimura’s 
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home and worked as a used clothes vendor. Bakin changed Nakafuji’s family name to 
Takizawa Jirȏ and adopted him as son of his son and Tarȏ’s stepbrother. The group chief 
advised Bakin to submit that Nakafuji is the son of his son’s mistress. Jirȏ and Tokimura 
presented a document to Bakin and Tarȏ stated that Jirȏ would serve in the position 
temporarily till Tarȏ becomes 16 years old. He must be paid 15 bales (hyȏ) of rice one 
person salary (fuchi) during this period. Also he must be paid a certain amount of 
money after the expiration of the contract and under the situation of that time it would 
be decided whether introduce him to other families or return Tokimura’s home. It was 
also indicated that he should be provided with official uniform and clothes by 
Takizawa’s side. When Tarȏ turned 13 years old, Bakin decided to take the position for 
his grandson and it culminated in a conflict with Jirȏ. He also threatened that he would 
expose the real age of Tarȏ to the bosses (Matsumoto 1998: 99). 
 Finally, Bakin paid 7 ryȏ to Jirȏ and he returned to Tokimura’s home and continued 
his former job as the vendor and Tarȏ took the position. When they argued over the 
position, the group chief advised Bakin to increase the amount of payment to Jirȏ but he 
assumed it a private matter and should not be mixed official ones. 
In the last case it relates that Tarȏ passed away one year after Bakin, his grandfather 
at the age 28 while he was still single. Sachi, Tarȏ’s sister married a physician’s third 
son and he was adopted as a son by Takizawa family the next year. She got a divorce 
after one year and the next year married again a dȏshin’s son. Both grooms paid 30 ryȏ 
as marriage portion which was the amount for an advance payment in buying the rank 
(Ibid., 100-101). 
In most of cases, the purchaser of ranks had the potential to be promoted to higher 
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ranks based on his abilities and talents. The following cases also show obtaining status 
for money.   
Sakurai Shȏu (1775-1829) was a rich merchant and haiku poet (haijin) in late Edo 
era in Iida (Nagano prefecture). In 1814 (Bunka 11), he wrote a book under the title of 
“the Charcoal of Pine Tree” (matsu no sumi). He bought a shogunal vassal’s (gokenin) 
status for money and served the central government (bakufu) and finally resigned and 
became a haiku poem teacher (--- 2001b: 562).  
On his way to Edo, a young masterless samurai (rȏnin) had to work part time at 
Yumoto [Hakone spa] to earn money. He formed a relationship with the widow of a 
merchant from Ȏsaka. As promised, she purchased for him the rank of foot soldier 
(okachi) for money in Edo, and announced her lover as an adopted son. Through her 
connections he was promoted to the chief of his group and gofudaiseki. The story 
occurred during 1784-1814 (Negishi 1972: 164-165). 
Kan’o from Izunokuni (Shizuoka prefefture) was a farmer of Mishima territory who 
went to Edo and purchased the foot soldier (okachi) rank. Through various contacts and 
activities he was then appointed as a government official in the finance office. He took 
advantage of the opportunities presented to him and was promoted to the post of 
commissioner of finance (kanjȏ bugyȏ) (Kasaya 2005: 15). 
All the cases, regardless of buying the status for money, or promotions based on the 
person’s talent and attempts, show that the strictness of the system was superficial and 
confirms Baba’s argument that the so-called feudal status system was void of rigid 
structures that prevented mobility (Baba 1992: 43). 
Sale of offices also influenced the social structure in some countries such as Edo 
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Japan. It increased social mobility and helped some classes which were deprived of 
public services by the ruling oligarchy to enter into the bureaucratic affairs (Swart 1949: 
122). On the other hand, limiting the office holders to the rich was the negative 
characteristics of this institution (Ibid.,). It may refer to Qajar Iran. 
 
Qajar Iran 
All administrative/government offices in Qajar Iran could be sold, except for the 
grand vizier and minister of foreign affairs positions. The prices for these offices 
depended on its potential for profitability not on the status it provided. As in the case of 
Edo, the high price of some statuses was also ascribed to the expectation for promotion.  
The high ranked offices of grand vizier and the minister of foreign affairs were not 
sold just for money by the Shȃh, who had to take into account Britain and Russia’s 
competing interests and considerations in these positions (Sheikholeslami 1971: 109).  
For example, when the Shȃh appointed Yahyȃ khȃn Mushir al-Dawlah as the minister of 
foreign affairs the British representative objected due to the appointee’s relation with 
Russia (Amin al-Dawlah 1355/1976: 108). 
Below are several examples of the sale of office within the Qajar Iran period which 
demonstrates that many people benefited when an office was sold. 
I’itimȃd al-Saltanah referred to a report of the Mint Services by the cabinet in 
Sh’abȃn 1311/February 1894 that Vali Khȃn Nasr al-Saltanah who farmed out the 
service should pay annually 123.000 tumȃns to the Shȃh, 2.000 tumȃns to the grand 
vizier monthly and the regent and he himself also will benefit 200.000 or 300.000 
tumȃns (I’itimȃd Al-Saltanah 1389/2010: 933).  
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There is also another report by Amin al-Dawlah. Amid the financial crisis, the regent 
warranted Vali Khȃn Nasr al-Dawlah to lease the Mint service for 120.000 tumȃns and 
paying 10.000 tumȃns monthly (Amin al-Dawlah op. cit., 128-9). 
The Shȃh invited two top officials, Mirzȃ Ali Khȃn Amin al-Mulk (later Amin 
al-Dawlah) and Aqȃ Ibrȃhim Amin al-Sultȃn, and suggested that they purchase the 
Ministry of Post jointly. Amin al-Sultȃn politely refused, saying that he had no money to 
buy it. Amin al-Mulk accepted the post service referring to his previous personal service 
in the post for Shȃh (Ibid., 51-52). 
The governorate of the domains and provinces was much more profitable than the 
heads of ministries, so their prices were higher. This was due largely in part to the 
ability of governor to levy and collect high taxes. The main source of real revenue was 
direct (land) and indirect (customs, guilds, tribal, etc.) taxes. These direct and indirect 
taxes were the real source to cover stipend, public services and military costs. There was 
also a practice of levying a surtax up to half the amount of the original tax, which the 
rulers considered as personal revenue to make up for the cost of offices. In the 
governors’ minds, the high price of office justified levying additional tax on farmers 
(Durand 1392/2014: 44-45). 
In his travel book, Furukawa also referred to the sale of offices in Iran by noting that 
the appointed governors to various domains by the central government could instate 
their bailiffs to levy tax amounts as decided by the Shȃh. Some officials, however, 
purchased the governorate office for more than the decided tax. Being aware of 
punishment of losing the office as well as wanting to preserve their personal interests, 
they utilized the surtax system to overtax their poor subjects above the amount that the 
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Shȃh had decided. For instance, the annual tax to be levied by the governor of Shirȃz 
was 620.000 tumȃns, but he received 2 Korurs [1 million tumȃns] (Furukawa 1988: 61; 
Curzon Vol. I 1892: 439-440).    
Every post appointment usually lasted for one year and was renewed annually at the 
new year fest (Now Ruz) by a new payment which was almost equivalent to the salary 
the official received (Curzon op. cit., 439). Therefore there was both a constant revenue 
stream from below floating upward, and a constant need for increased funding, which 
put growing pressure on the lower ranks to meet the demand. The grievous difference 
between the governorate and ministerial offices suggested that governors had more 
access to the revenues through the surtax than ministers. In other words, governors had 
the ability to take revenues directly from the peasants, while the ministers only had 
indirect access and had to rely on the governors’ consent and assistance, which was 
often withheld because it conflicted with their own financial interests. The case of 
Abbȃs Mirzȃ Mulk Arȃ demonstrates this. 
Abbȃs Mirzȃ Mulk Ârȃ, the Shȃh’s brother explained that when he was appointed as 
the governor of Gilȃn province, he paid 25.000 tumȃns the Shȃh, 7.000 tumȃns to the 
grand vizier and 1.000 tumȃns to the government agent in the province. In addition to 
other expenditures it totally cost him 34.600 tumȃn that he had to borrow for lack of 
direct funding (Mulk Ârȃ 1361/1982: 191-92). 
Abbȃs Mirzȃ also stated that after his nomination as the minister of commerce, he 
was forced to pay 2.000 tumȃns to the Shȃh and 1.000 tumȃns to the grand vizier. But 
confronted by the provincial governors he could not sell the ministerial offices in 
provinces to satisfy his cost (Ibid., 167-69). 
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Prices for the governorate skyrocketed in comparison to the ministry positions. 
Except for the custodianship of the holy shrine of Imȃm Ridhȃ, Shahȃb al-Mulk 
purchased the governorship of Khurȃn, an important province for 100.000 tumȃns in 
Muharram 1313/ June 1895 (I’itimȃd Al-Saltanah 1389/2010: 1015). 
In Sha’abȃn 1311/February 1894, Hisȃm al-Mulk Hamidȃni Zein al-Âbedin Khȃn 
paid 80.000 tumȃns to the Shȃh and 20.000 tumȃns to the grand vizier and others, 
totally 100.000 tumȃns to buy the governorate of Kirmȃn (Ibid., 935). 
A person by the name of Mirzȃ Ridhȃ, later titled as Mueen al-Saltanah, leased the 
royal lands (Khȃlisijȃt) of Qazvin by paying 10.000 tumȃns and later paid more 8.000 
tumȃns to be appointed as the governor of Qazvin. He also was supposed to pay some 
other amounts to other officials but could not. The shortfall in payments and the 
people’s discontent led to his deposition (Mulk Ârȃ op. cit., 166-67).  
The officeholders who purchased the offices were also willing to exercise the 
patrimonial concept of office as a part of property. They expected that their heirs would 
inherit offices in addition to other inherited rights to land and possessions. The Shȃh 
generally took a certain amount and transmitted the father’s title and some of his jobs to 
one of his sons (Sheikholeslami 1971: 110).  
One of the big differences between the inheritance of purchased status in Edo Japan 
and Qajar Iran involved the age of the person inheriting the office or rank. In Edo Japan 
an heir had to be of a certain age (usually 16) in order to take over the duties of his 
father. This practice was based on the assumption that the heir had to be able to perform 
the duties of the rank. In Qajar Iran this was not the case.   
 I’itimȃd Al-Saltanah mentions that some heirs of officials who assumed their 
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inherited office were at the age of minority or were very young. For example, the grand 
vizier’s son, Mirzȃ Hassan at the age of 10 became the treasurer (Mustawfi 
al-Mamȃlik); Mu’atamid al-Mulk, at the age of 9, became the Minister of commerce;  
Amin al-Sultȃn, by the age of 26, already held four ministry posts and 64 main offices 
and the minister of war was 28 years old (I’itimȃd Al-Saltanah 1389/2010: 309); and 
also Mushir al-Dawlah’s son became the vice minister of justice at the age of 12 (Ibid., 
328). To occupy these offices, true ability and merit of nominates was not required.  
Inherited public service posts were regarded as a commercial business to increase the 
family’s income (Swart 1949: 115). 
 The Qajar king’s inconsistent statements and measures tried to reform the 
unreasonable sale of offices and titles while benefiting and perpetuating it at the same 
time. 
Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh certainly must have had some concerns about the application of 
justice, effective administration, and the good name and prestige of the country. He 
complained to Kȃmrȃn Mirzȃ Nȃ’ib al-Saltanah (prince regent) about the inefficiency of 
the reforms in the government. He criticized the failure of his leaders to control the 
excesses of various practices such as endowment of offices and privileges. Addressing 
him contemptuously, the Shȃh bewailed the increasing numbers of unreasonable titles, 
offices, and medals which harmed the Iranian government’s prestige. He described the 
broken system of selling governmental honors as not even worth a farthing for. He 
reiterated his decision calling for the establishment of a council to review the criteria for 
granting civil and military ranks and titles. He asserted that intermediaries, pressures 
and unreasonable request should be eliminated so that applicants know whether they 
were eligible and could enjoy the merits or not. He stressed that the endowment of titles 
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or offices should be an accurate reflection of the position so that commoners would not 
ridicule them later. The Shȃh warned the prince regent to not grant the ranks such as 
sartîp (brigadier general), or the titles iqbȃl al-dawla (the Fortune of the State) or janȃb 
(Excellency) to a child or inept persons. He noted that the critiques of the daily 
newspaper which charged that intermediaries were preventing more and more of the low 
level servants to obtain the titles such as janȃb (Excellency) (Yarshater 1983: 4-5). 
Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh arbitrary acts were in sharp contradiction with the meritocracy he 
advocated for. 
For instance, the Shȃh himself had nominated Kȃmrȃn Mirzȃ Nȃ’ib al-Saltanah 
(prince regent) to be the governor of Tehran at the age of six, the prince regent at the age 
of eleven, the commander-in-chief of the army at the age of fourteen. The Shȃh granted 
him the title of amir-i kabir [great commander] at the age of fourteen (Bȃmdȃd 
1347-51/1968-72: 150-151). In another case, Malijak, one of the Shȃh’s favored persons 
became amȋrtumȃn (major-general) at the age of nine. Mirza Yusuf Ashtiani, the finance 
minister also asked his son, Hassan to be appointed with the title of mustawfi 
al-mamalik in his own post at the age of seven, which the Shȃh granted (Ibid., 9). 
 
Conclusion 
The sale of offices was a primary form of administration which had the potential to 
lead to corruption if it was used as a means of exploitation by the despot ruler or 
irresponsible government (Swart 1949: 123). On the other hand, the sale of offices also 
had the potential to establish social mobility channels which provided an opening for 
the entry of the middle class into the government and the development of an effective 
136 
 
bureaucracy. 
In the case of Qajar Iran because of the Shȃh’s limited choices among members of 
his household this latter potential could have helped the country develop an effective 
bureaucracy. However, due to virtual absence of a middle class in Iran, this kind of 
mobilization or social change could not be expected. The wealthy purchasers of the 
offices earned their fortune through governmental services. Even the lower ranked 
offices were held by members of the ruling class who could not do any reform against 
the wealthier and more powerful class (Sheikholeslami 1971: 112-13). Depriving the 
government of efficient officials culminated in discontent and even outbreak of 
revolution in some countries (Swart op. cit., 123) and it could also be one of the factors 
for the Iranian Constitution Movement  
Due to fluidity of the lower class samurai system and the lack of a continuous 
succession after the first half of eighteenth century, the pressure of the demands to fill 
administrative and military ranks, led to the widespread practice of selling ranks to 
second and third sons of gokenin’s son, sons of hatamoto’s and daimyȏ’s subordinates, 
and even non-samurai class such as rich farmers of suburbs in a wide area not limited to 
Edo. The end of Tokugawa era (bakumatsu), the ruled people such as artisans and 
merchants who had talent and ability in political affairs, and strong willed people such 
as farmers could request to be promoted to gokenin or subordinate of hatamoto ranks 
(Matsumoto 1998: 104). 
 Despite the superficial strictness and fixed hierarchy of the class society in Japan, 
there were different methods, established by reformist rulers such as Yoshimune and 
other local lords that paved the way for a dynamic administrative system. This system 
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helped Japan to transition into the modern era. In contemporary Iran, however, 
traditional ascribed norms versus achievement based systems are still alive in other 
forms, and reproduce nepotism and corruption. 
Depending on the type of political regimes and the aims of rulers, a relatively similar 
practice such as sale of offices can bring change for the good or can reify an exploitive 
system. In the former, wholesome consequences in the form of social mobility based on 
talent and ability are evidenced; in the latter, corruption prevails in the form of 
exploitation of subjects through unrestrained taxation, and the government withers as it 
is deprived of talent and reliable people. Eventually this too brings continued suffering 
to the people as such practices potentially affect the culture and future development of 
the society. 
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Part Three: The Petition Box 
Chapter five: Historical Background 
 
Introduction 
 Facing with crisis in pre-modern societies, rulers applied various methods or 
devices according to their political systems and personal innovations and goals. The 
petition box system was one of the indigenous and traditional institutions which was 
installed and established, albeit not coincidentally in Edo Japan and Qajar Iran, for the 
rulers to have direct contact with the public under its rule. However, the systems in 
these two countries were distinctly different. The question then arises: how did these 
superficially similar petition box practices function differently resulting in diverse 
consequences in the transition of these pre-modern societies into modern era? This is 
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part of an old question for Iranian scholars who attempt to understand the larger scale 
development and underdevelopment of Japan and Iran.  
This study argues that special goals and discourses utilized in response to specific 
problems contributed to the effectiveness and functional distinctiveness of the petition 
box system within the respective countries, especifically promotion of the talented 
people among both commoners and the samurai class in Japan. Among these important 
factors, those that were successful in dealing with problems paved the way towards the 
adoption of the parliamentary system of rule as a form of modern institution.  
As Ȏhira argued some similarities can be found between ancient Chinese and 
Japanese petition box systems in comparative-historical standpoint. It is said that in 
Vietnam there was a similar system and in Korea also verbal appeal was recognized. By 
comparing the causes for emergence of similar systems in other countries or similarities 
between them and the analysis of petition box system, specifically the Japanese one will 
provide us with useful hints (Ȏhira 2003: 212).  
This comparative-historical research, which is done for the first time, will focus on 
the characteristics, mechanism and probable result of meyasubako (petition box) and 
sanduq-i adȃlat (Justice Box) in Edo Japan and Qajar Iran as two unit of analysis.  
This part will be divided into distinctive sections that include: the description of 
petition box system in these two societies; a survey of its historical background and 
developments; an examination of the list of legal appeals and suggestions and critiques; 
an analysis of the justice discourse incorporated in the system as the distinctive 
foundation of the practice and finally; a review of the impact of the petition boxes on 
the development of the modern era parliamentary system.   
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The Installation and General Characteristics of the Petition Boxes 
 The usage of the petition box in both Edo Japan and Qajar Iran was the result of the 
implementation of a chain of reforms. In order to carry out the political reform, 
Yoshimune Tokugawa (1684-1751), the eighth shogun of Edo era sought to obtain a 
wide range of public opinion. For this purpose, Yoshimune ordered in 1721 (sixth year 
of Kyȏhȏ period), the installation of a tȏshobako (suggestion-petition box) also called as 
hyȏjȏshobako (the box in front of Supreme Court of Justice), sojȏbako (complaint box) 
and jikisobako (direct appeal box) (Harafuji 1992: 776). The device generally known as 
meyasubako also was popularized during the reign of Yoshimune. It was gradually 
patterned by the territories under direct control of bakufu and other domains. Some 
argue that this adoption was intentional patterning due to positive outcomes. To better 
understand this development, I will examine the case of the Tosa domain, based on 
Roberts’ analysis, and the case of the Iranian Fȃrs province, based on British-Iranian’s 
reports, as well as review the cases of the Tokugawa and Qajar governments due to their 
political significance, based on extant manuscripts. 
The meyasubako system, which was described by Harafuji as an invention of the 
eighth Shogun of the Tokugawa government, was used in 1811 (the eighth year of 
Bunka period) in the public offices of the Matsumae domain in Hokkaidȏ which 
belonged to the Tokugawa household, and was widely implemented in the rural areas. 
The Wakayama in Kishȗ and the Nagoya in Owari belonging to Tokugawa household 
are amongst the domains who adopted this system. So, many of daimyȏ implemented 
the petition box in their own domains. Even the modern government of Meiji installed 
meyasubako originally in front of the head office in Saiwaibashi in Tokyo (Ibid).  
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Although the domain leaders were impressed by the establishment of Yoshimune’s 
petition box, the adoption of the practice was not a case of simple imitation and 
implementation of a successful system. As it will be explained later in the case of the 
Tosa domain, the local people played an important role in the installation of the petition 
box by pushing the lord. A samurai’s reference to the historical tradition of petitioning 
through the box in ancient China and Japan, and his request for the creation of the box 
is examples of this grassroots demand (Roberts 1998: 110).  
In fact, the installation of petition boxes in Japan was not an invention by Yoshimune 
that he intentionally and systematically implemented throughout Japan. One of the most 
important factors which may differentiate the two societies and consequently the boxes 
is how they were initiated. A distinctive characteristic of how the petition boxes 
influenced society was whether they were established based on the ruler’s will or 
commoners’ demand. As it was indicated commoner’s demand for installation of the 
box was a strong reason to push the rulers to carry it out. The demand itself originated 
in the political self-consciousness of the people. This development was not just the 
result of the domain rulers applying the box as an efficient device and thus imitating 
shogunal meyasubako. High rates of literacy and political consciousness played an 
important role in motivating people to make political claims against their rulers and for 
holding their rulers accountable.  
The semi-feudal regime of Tokugawa granted potentially independent relationships 
between the domains and the bukufu. Domain rulers were not obliged to follow the 
bukufu in all respects, which resulted in the domain rulers relying on or being able to 
respond the people’s complaints. Commoner’s pressure in some cases such as Tosa 
domain as it will be explained more is obvious.  
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Unlike Edo, the so-called central government of Qajar i.e the Shȃh who directly 
appointed the provincial government could not wield absolute power, as they resisted. 
When it was time for the installation of the box in provinces according to the Shȃh’s 
decree, they could easily resist him. Although lower rank officials or commoners were 
somehow aware of a justice discourse they did not venture their opinions or demand 
dissemination of it explicitly. These points will be explained more.  
In 1291/1874, a locked Justice Box (sanduq-i adȃlat) with a key was sent from 
Tehrȃn to be installed in Masjid-i Vakil (Vakil mosque) of Shirȃz (the center of Fȃrs 
province). The sealed petitions of complaints were supposed to be sent to the central 
government in Tehrȃn and sent back to Shirȃz after related answers were written on the 
petitions (Hoseini Fasȃyee 1382/2003: 846). 
 
The Exact Date of the Justice Box Establishment  
According to the extant manuscripts and documents as the main sources, there are 
two different dates on the establishment of sanduq-i adȃlat by Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh 
(1831-1896), the fourth king of the Qajar dynasty. Some cite 1281/1864 while others 
establish the practice ten years later in 1291/1874.    
Unlike Mustawfi, who described the box as “a justice machine invented by Nȃsir 
al-Din Shȃh himself” (Mustawfi 1343/1964: vol. I, 137), Curzon claimed that “it was 
one of the results of the first European journeys of the Shȃh” and “an unconscious 
imitation of the old Venetian court when petitions to the Council of Ten were placed in 
the mouth of a stone lion” (Curzon 1892: 465). If Curzon’s argument is correct then 
Justice Box should have been established after the Shȃh’s homecoming from his 
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European journey in 1290/1873 (I’itimȃd al-Saltanah 1295/1878: vol. III, 331; 
Mustawfi 1343/1964: Vol. I, 127). Therefore the establishment date of the box should be 
1291/1874, though Curzon does not assert this date. Those who take 1291/1874 as the 
creation year of the box cite two different decrees issued by Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh in this 
year within a span of 11 months.  
For example, referring to the first European journey of the Shȃh and the enclosure of 
Irȃn daily published in Muharram of 1291/February 1874, some Iranian scholars argue 
that the box was established a few months after the Shȃh’s homecoming (Varahrȃm 
1385/2006: 243 and Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi 1989: 52) or simply cite the content of his 
decree published in the aforementioned daily and take it as the correct date of 
establishment (Dȃmghȃni 1979/1357: 98-99). Floor refers to the 1281/1864 date as the 
year of box installation though it seems his citation is not accurate (Floor 1983: 122). 
But according to I’itimȃd al-Saltanah (I’itimȃd al-Saltanah 1295/1878: 32, Vol. 3 and 
I’itimȃd al-Saltanah 1300/1882: 289, Vol. 3) the Shȃh’s decree on the establishment of 
the box (Dawlat-i Aliyeh Irȃn daily 1864/1281: No. 562 quoted in Floor and Banȃni 
1388/2009: 41-42), the manuscript of his decree on the box to be placed in Ark square 
(Folio No. 295/5139) and other correspondence on the box, the year 1281/1874 must be 
the correct date for its installation. 
Floor argues that Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s disappointing experiment with the diwȃn-i 
mazȃlim (Court of Complaints) in 1276/ 1860, lead him to issue a decree in 1281/ 1864 
ordering the installation of sandȗq-i adȃlat (Justice Box) in the public places of large 
towns once a month. These sealed boxes were to be opened only in Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s 
presence (Floor 1983: 122). By quoting Curzon, Floor argues that it was not a very 
useful measure. Since this transparent system threatened the provincial governors, they 
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“ordered a watch to be kept on the boxes; and the bastinado was freely administered to 
any indiscreet person dropping in a petition” (Curzon 1892: 465).   
As it will be mentioned later, some provincial governors reacted to the installation of 
the boxes by appointing a watch on them. Therefore Curzon claims that the Shȃh 
felicitated himself since the boxes were always empty indicating his subjects’ 
contentment (Ibid). In order to confute Curzon’s claim, Floor refers to a collection of 
“2006” petitions which were sent to the diwȃn-i tazallumȃt-i ȃmme (Court of Public 
Complaints) between 1300/1882 and 1303/1885 and studied by Ȃdamiyyat and Nȃtiq 
(Floor 1983: 122). 
Floor, however, inaccurately refers to the original sources, thus weakening his 
argument. Firstly, the “2006” petitions which he refers to was actually a collection of 
“two thousands and sixteen petitions” which were sent to majlis-i tahqȋq-i mazȃlim (the 
Council for the Investigation of Grievances) (Ȃdamiyyat and Nȃtiq 1356/1978: 376). 
Secondly, as Schneider points out, this collection was actually dated later than the box 
petitions and was sent through post or as telegrams (Schneider 2006: 35). 
Finally, Floor mentions the establishment of sandȗq-i adȃlat (justice box) by Nȃsir 
al-Din Shȃh’s decree of 1281/1864; but he mistakenly refers to the Shȃh’s decree for the 
appointment of Adhid al-Mulk as the chief of sanduq-i adȃlat issued on the 8th of 
Zihajjat-i al-Harȃm of 1291/ January of 1875, the last month of the year (Floor 1983: 
122). In fact, the Shȃh’s decree assigning Adhid al-Mulk as the person in charge of this 
service was issued on Zihajjat-i al-Harȃm 8, 1291/January, 1875 (Mustawfi 1343/1964: 
135- 137, Vol.1). Others also cite Adhid al-Mulk’s date of appointment as 1291/1875 
(Hashemian n. d.: 185) which followed the Shȃh’s decree ordering the placement of 
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sanduq-i adȃlat in Maydȃn-i Ark in Muharram in 1291/ February 1875 (Varahram 
1385/2006: 243 and Talayee 1383/2004: 39). Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s another decree on the 
establishment of the box which was published in newspaper in 1281/1864, seems to be 
the correct date of establishment (Dawlat-i Aliyeh-i Irȃn daily 1864/1281: No. 562 
quoted in Floor and Banȃni 1388/2009: 41-42).  
To add to the confusion of when the Justice Box was actually established, there are 
eleven manuscripts pertaining to the box in National Archives of Iran with registered 
dates of 1280/1863 [!]. These, however, must be instances in registering the manuscript 
date by mistake, therefore the year 1281/1864 should be the date of establishment of the 
box. 
The 1281/1864 date is further supported by a report to the Shȃh on Rabȋ al-Thȃnȋ 
dated 26, 1281/September 28, 1864. The report documents the proceedings held with 
I’itizȃd al-Saltanah, Mirzȃ Mustafȃ Khȃn Bahȃ al-Mulk, Mu’ayer al-Mamȃlik [Dust-Ali 
Khȃn], Minister of foreign affairs attending; as a result of the meeting, the group 
submitted Bahȃ al-Mulk’s name for commission [perhaps as the minister of justice] to 
the Shȃh. The head of dȋwȃnkhȃna- yi adȃlat (Court of Justice) was also ordered to hold 
an initiatory session in order to introduce of Bahȃ al-Mulk to the members of the court, 
(Folio No. 295/5373) with sanduq-i adȃlat being a part of his responsibilities. Therefore 
the box was initially established in 1864 and must have been reinstalled in 1874. 
Schneider confirms this when he refers to the Shȃh’s decision to “install (again) a 
sanduq-i adȃlat (“Box of Justice”) in Tehrȃn,” the capital city (Schneider 2006: 37).    
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Date and Place of Installation and Establishment 
According to these two rulers’ decrees, the petition boxes were placed in certain parts 
of the capital cities at the stated times for collecting the petitions.  
One month after Yoshimune’s order in August 1721, meyasubako was actually 
installed and applied. The box was made available to the public three times a month (the 
second, eleventh and twenty first days of each month) from 12 o’clock at noon at the 
designated place, in front of hyȏjȏsho (Supreme Court of Justice) at the entrance gate of 
Edo Castle. This complaint box plan was similar to the one established by Yoshimune in 
front of Wakayama Castle when he was the lord of Kishȗ domain (Harafuji 1992: 776). 
The Qajar one also had the similar arrangements. 
By the Shȃh’s order a guarded, locked and sealed wooden box with a small opening 
on its lid for the petitions to be deposited was installed in Ark square in Tehrȃn every 
morning till three hours past evening. Because the box was located in a heavily travelled 
area and highly visible, anyone could insert his petition with a feeling of security and 
with no pressure to flatter officials or pay them bribes. Any guards found preventing 
complainants from inserting their petitions could be punished by death.   
Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s decree for installation of petition box read as follows: “sanduq-i 
adȃlat must be installed in the Maydȃn-i Ark [Ark square]. Ostȃd [the carpenter master] 
Haidar Ali Ȃqȃ must make the box quickly. He must present the guideline on how to 
make it. A qarȃvul (warder) and yȃvar-i toop-khȃnah (colonel of artillery) must take out 
the petitions and bring them to our presence twice a week, on Mondays and Fridays. 
[This decree] must be published in daily newspapers for people to be learned about and 
that the petitioner who submits a false, nonsensical and vain petition, he will be 
punished… ” (Folio No. 295/5139). It was exactly installed in western side of Bȃgh-i 
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Gulshan (Gulshan Park) in Ark square which was a central place in Tehrȃn (I’timȃd 
al-Saltanah, n. d.: 70). After installation of sanduq-i adȃlat, it was reported that in the 
presence of the guard 10 people submitted their petitions and prayed for the Shȃh for his 
benevolence (Folio No. 295/5175). 
Boxes were also installed in public areas in the provinces, eliminating the need for 
people in the rural areas to have to travel to the city in order to submit a petition.   
(Iran daily, Muharram 1291/1874, quoted in Varahram 1385/2006: 343-344). Twice a 
week on Mondays and Fridays [twice a month in the provinces (Nashat 1982: 52)], the 
Shȃh’s trustee would collect the sealed petitions and deliver them to him for his review.   
 
The Box Form 
The two boxes resembled each other externally. “The volume of meyasubako was 75 
cubic centimeters and the opening in its lid was six square centimeters” (Fukaya 1999: 
25). The box was described as painted in black with a brass lock (Sakuma 1967: 183). 
The Iranian counterpart, sanduq-i adȃlat was also a mid-size squared wooden box with 
a narrow opening for the petitions to be deposited and a bag inside it (Rudgar 
1376/1997: 111).  
 
Background and Goals 
The establishment of the petition box in both Japan and Iran was the result of crisis 
situations. The box functioned as a pressure relief valve that alleviated public 
discontents. It is unclear, whether the motivations of the rulers in establishing the box 
were as a direct countermeasure to rising discontent or just as an instrument to obtain 
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other goals such as legitimacy. 
The weakness of Tokugawa shogunate government (bakufu) since the Genroku 
period (1688-1704) triggered public criticism and caused the ironic anonymous graffiti 
and comic poems prevalent in society (Harafuji 1992: 776). The spread of illegal forms 
of appeal or unsigned petitions left anonymously (sutebumi) was common, and the 
installation of the petition box was a countermeasure for it. When the bakufu banned 
sutebumi as an illegal act (Fukaya 1999: 25), the already erosive situation worsened; 
large groups of discontented farmer’s launched violent protests pressuring the bakufu to 
take emergency measures (Harafuji op. cit., 776). The bakufu did not want to suppress 
the movement completely, which could lead to the movements potential growth without 
their influence but they did not want to officially recognize it either. The petition box 
seemed a good alternative to the two options because it allowed the bakufu to get 
information about the social situation and monitor it. The box also functioned like a 
safety valve to release the social compressed pressure (Fukaya op. cit., 25), because 
people felt that their complaints were taken seriously. The radical reforms such as 
receiving common people’s petitions and direct appeals therefore was an effective 
measure established under Yoshimune’s bakufu administration (Harafuji 1992: 776).  
Shogun and other domain rulers also tried to apply practical countermeasure facing with 
crisis.  
On the Iranian side, the implementation of justice as the main duty of the king was 
emphasized. The Qajar king expressed his goals for the establishment of sanduq-i 
adȃlat as a system of justice. Providing comfort to all his subjects and disseminating  
justice in order to strengthen and sustain the kingdom were stated as the Shȃh’s goals 
for the establishment of the box in a government announcement dated 1291/1874 (Iran 
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daily, Muharram 1291/1874, quoted in Varahram 1385/2006: 343-344). The Shȃh 
explained and stressed furthermore that his goals for the establishment of the box 
corresponded with the goals of other high ranking officials who were his relatives. 
When the Shȃh decided to (re)install the justice box during Ramadhȃn 1291/October 
1874, he wrote a letter to his uncle (his father’s brother), Adhid al-Dawlah [Sultȃn 
Ahmad Mirzȃ] the governor of Qazvin, to explain his goals for the institution of justice 
boxes throughout the country. He described the main goal as “the performance of his 
duty as the king.” By applying this system, he explained, “I wished to know directly 
about the common people’s condition and maintain the poor people’s rights who could 
not inform me about their conditions to complete my duties as their protector…” In 
order to fairly and justly deal with the public’s problems, the Shȃh ordered his officials 
to imitate him in a “rightful and fair manner” in the administration of their duties. He 
insisted that the officials prioritize the implementation of the justice box over other 
responsibilities and backed up his warning by threatening to send strict and independent 
officers to serve directly as prosecutors, should the local administrators fail to comply 
and completely fulfill his order. He signed his letter as an “ultimatum” (Folio No. 
295/466).  
The Shȃh’s reforms, including sanduq-i adȃlat which replaced diwȃn-i mazȃlim (the 
Court of Complaints) indicates that he was not satisfied with how the legal system was 
operating in administering justice (Iran daily, No. 243. 1291/1875). He viewed the 
Court of Justice as an inefficient system, motivating the Shȃh to try various system 
reforms. The usage of nouns such as mazȃlim (injustices, plural form of mazȃlimah) 
which is an antonym of adȃlat or adȃlah by the Shȃh in his decrees against the existing 
institutions indicates his judgment against them. It also demonstrates that the Shȃh was 
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aware of the Iranian-Islamic tradition of justice and sought to legitimize his kingship by 
using these terms, which can be traced back to Islamic culture and history (Schneider 
2006: 25).  
Eleven month after the installation of sanduq-i adȃlat, the Shȃh desiring to maintain 
the importance of this reform, inducted his uncle (his mother’s brother), Adhid al-Mulk 
as the chairman of the box. The Shȃh trusted and had great confidence in Adhid al-Mulk. 
The Shȃh empowered him with the following responsibilities: detail the duties of the 
institution; correct the rules administered incompletely and report the results; administer 
the activities of the expeditionary officers and revise and replace those who are 
inefficient or corrupt; ensure that the provincial petitions did not get piled up by 
delivering them twice a month to the Shȃh; submit the petitions, open and summarize 
the ones directly related to the Shȃh in his presence to be attended; and delegate the 
responsibility of responding to the rest of them to the petition office (Iran daily op. cit., 
No. 243).  
 
Internal or External Motivation? 
There are disagreements on whether the installation of the boxes was an innovation 
by these two rulers or not. Some believe that it was “a justice machine invented by 
Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh himself” (Mustawfi 1343/1964, vol. I. 137). Similarly, some 
considered Yoshimune’s spontaneous thought. 
In 1891 (Meiji 24), an advisory board interviewed some of the former Tokugawa 
officials to better understand the Tokugawa governmental system. Kagenori Omata had 
served Iemochi Tokugawa, the fourteenth shogun as a high ranking judicial officer, Nara 
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magistrate and an inspector (… 1994 (jȏ): 105). He ascribed the installation of the box 
to the reign of Yoshimune. He believed that the eighth shogun exhibited the traits of 
leadership appropriate for ruling the country. Accordingly, by applying some tactics 
such as the petition box, Yoshimune was able to stay informed about the details of his 
government which gave him the ability to hold his officials accountable. Therefore, his 
officials could not neglect of their duties (Ibid., 114-115). Also under the title of “the 
Circuit from Common People to Government,” Masaki Wakao cites in “the Official 
History of Tokugawa” (Tokugawa jikki) that “opening a way to hear people’s requests 
and garner information from the inferior” was the main goal for installation of petition 
box in 1721 which arose independently out of Yoshimune’s leadership.  
Unlike the book’s argument, Wakao believes that the spread of unsigned petitions left 
anonymously (sutebumi) in front of high court motivated the shogun to implement the 
petition box as a countermeasure. According to Wakao’s argument “the inferior” were 
literate, had general knowledge about their society and had useful ideas about the 
political situation through reading books, therefore they were empowered to write 
sutebumi although it was dangerous. Referring to another book under the title of 
“Rijinshȏ”, Wakao cites the frequent warnings to the lord about the gap between the 
superior and the inferior. Though sutebumi could lessen the gap and ease the dissent, its 
unauthorized and unregulated spread would eventually lead to disorder in the society. In 
response, Yoshimune planned to restrain and control the pressure from the inferior’s 
discontent through the authorized route of the petition box (Wakao 2003: 290-291). 
Roberts also believes that the main factor in the installation of meyasubako in the Tosa 
domain was the people’s demands but the then elitist literature sought to create and 
reinforce vision of a sophisticated and kindhearted lord who created the box out of lofty 
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ideals (Roberts 1998: 115-117).  
Perhaps the best way to understand the implantation of meyasubako is to see it as a 
two-sided policy rather than just a one dimensional response. The central government 
(bakufu) and other domains (han) such as the Okayama domain did not seek to 
guarantee the peasants’ rights or agree to all their demands. If we fail to take this into 
account, we miss the full picture of the motivations behind the petition box system’s 
implantation. Indeed meyasubako functioned both to guarantee the peasants’ rights and 
maintain the stability of the government. The secret information which was extracted 
from the petitioners’ complaints was the political result of meyasubako installation. 
However it was not easily possible to prove which one of the submitted complains 
against inhumane behavior of the superior is false or true. Since the secret information 
mentioned in the petitions was not released in public, it was mentioned as a byproduct 
of submitting petition (Fukaya 1999: 19). It seems that it was a proper system to meet 
the needs of rulers and ruled. 
In the case of Qajar, some view the Shȃh’s measure as an imitation of Western model 
(Curzon 1892, 465). However this argument seems unlikely according to the dates of 
establishment of the box and the Shȃh’s European journey. It seems that regardless of its 
application as a personal measure or under external pressure or inspiration, the box was 
a proper device to manage the public discontent. 
The two systems in Japan and Iran are different in an ironic way. In Japan, a flood of 
obscenities, satires and illegal anonymous petitions (sutebumi) expressing discontent 
with the situation of the time motivated the shogunate government to establish the 
petition box. In Iran, after the installation of sanduq-i adȃlat, the practice was 
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suspended due to the submission of nonsense by the mobs (Hidayat 1363/1984: 75). 
Therefore one month later, another decree was issued to prevent anonymous authorship, 
insulting language and requests for alms.  
     
General Procedure 
The Shȃh wanted to make sure that the petition system functioned effectively with 
prompt attention given to the petitions. He surmised that most of the petitions 
requesting financial aid and/or employment were old suits which denoted there was no 
freedom to complain against the cruel officials. He wanted the officers to secure the 
freedom of petitioning without interfering in the jurisdiction of provincial governments 
while forbidding bribery (Iran daily, No. 243. 1291/1875). Therefore, he included in his 
edict the following instructions:   
“… The petition bags shall be brought to us by Azad ol-Molk [Adhid 
al-Mulk] who will break the seal in our presence. We will attend to the matter 
swiftly. We will keep a record of what is brought to our attention. The others 
will be sent to the office of Azad ol-Molk [Adhid al-Mulk]. He will summarize 
each case on the back of the letter to facilitate our procedures. The decisions 
shall be made and returned to Azad ol-Molk [Adhid al-Mulk] to put into action. 
 The petitions referring to the departments and royal court ministers, or 
people in the government, will be considered of utmost importance by Azad 
ol-Molk [Adhid al-Mulk], and put into action without delay. 
 The decision issued in any case will be exempt from exception of 
favoritism.  
… 
 Most of the petitions received have dealt with greedy petitioners or 
long-standing disputes. It should be known that the Box of Justice does not 
have the authority to stop tyranny and cruelty. The officials in the provinces 
must make sure that the Box of Justice does not interfere with law and order at 
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the same time and make the Box of Justice to all” (Mustawfi 1343/1964 
quoted in Schneider 2006: 36-37).  
As Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh established in his order the implantation of the petition box 
system, the same has been pointed out by a former official of Tokugawa regime.  
Kagenori Omata who had served Iemochi Tokugawa said in his interview that the 
petition box was installed opposite the high court before the entrance gate of castle town 
so that anyone could submit a petition to the shogun for consideration.  
The interviewee stated that some submitted petitions were personal grudges. The 
cases under false pretenses were referred to inspection through the senior councilors 
(rȏjȗ) to be investigated more accurately. Except for the shogun, no one else, even his 
senior councilors knew the petitioner and the content of the petition. The petitions were 
first taken to be inspected after the collection. Then the lid of the box was locked and 
taken to the shogun by an individual. As the interviewee explained no one, even the 
senior councilors (rȏjȗ), could learn about the content of petitions under review unless 
the shogun referred them for follow up (… 1994 (jȏ): 113-114). 
 
Limitations: Topics, Anonymous Petitions and Petitioners  
The direct appeals to senior officials without going through formalities and opening 
such a way was a matter of utmost significance and an epoch-making importance in Edo 
era. Each system naturally holds its own strictness (Harafuji 1992: 776). A petitioner 
had to submit his petition or suggestion through the box by noon, after stating full name 
and address, signing and sealing it. Unlike isamebako (the remonstrance box) which 
was installed in Okayama domain by its lord Ikeda Mitsumasa, signing the petitions in 
meyasubako was mandatory (Fukaya 1999: 25). 
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Mitsumasa, the lord of the Okayama domain announced that all petitions would be 
acceptable and in case of excellent suggestions he asked for the name and address of the 
petitioner to be submitted through isamebako (Ôhira 2003: 122-123).  But in the shogun 
meyasubako system, anonymous petitions, petitions without addresses and ambiguous 
petitions were burnt. Also the petitions implying a personal grudge and/or claims of 
wickedness against others, and petitions based on a person’s testimony who was not an 
eyewitness, as well as the petitions which had already gone through legal formality 
were not accepted as a direct appeal. Moreover the concealment of truth, frame-up and 
writing false petitions were considered as unsuitable complaints and were burnt. In 
these cases, the complainants were reproached, handcuffed and penalized (Harafuji 
1992: 776).  
The Qajar petition box system had similar policies. The Qajar box also excluded 
unacceptable petitions. The forbidden cases included: 
- nonsense petitions, 
- false accusations (which could be punishable by death), 
- and pleading old cases. 
Those who did not observe the restrictions of the shogun box and the sanduq-i adȃlat 
would be punished, whereas this matter was not clear in case of the Tosa domain.  
Although not observing legal restrictions in case of shogun petition box would threaten 
the petitioner with punishment, no punishment was guaranteed in the Matsuyama 
domain, and it was unclear in case of the Tosa domain if punishment would be 
administered for particular offenses. Therefore, some of petitioners emphasized on their 
opinions to exclude their family from punishment. The author attributed the fear and 
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distrust of the model to the dominance of the suppression of political discourse during 
this period (Roberts 1998: 125-126). 
As mentioned that the box was (re)installed on 22nd of Muharram 1291/11th March 
1874 in Ark square and the Shȃh took it with himself in his travels (Iran daily, 
Muharram 1291/1874, quoted in Varahram 1385/2006: 343-344). A little more than one 
month after (re)installation of the box, another official announcement warned that the 
repetition of the claims would be punishable and requests for allowances and beggary 
were banned. The announcement also mentioned that some cases against the provincial 
rulers or bailiffs were being made anonymously. These people were encouraged, not to 
be afraid of their rulers and to come forward to argue their claims and to vindicate 
themselves. This was the purpose of the freedom of petition system. The announcement 
argued that to submit petitions anonymously was useless and contrary to the values of 
justice on which the system was based (Vaqȃye`e-i Ittifȃqiah daily, 1291/1874, quoted in 
Varahram 1385/2006: 345-346).  
In some instances, there were exceptions made to the ban of submitting a repetitious 
claim. According to the Shȃh’s decree, the issued rule must be administered by the 
trustees of Justice Court and the petitioners could submit again if they neglected to 
implement the rule (Bayȃni 1375/1996: 9). The Shȃh expected the full observance of 
any decisions made on a petition. Violating or failing to observe the ruling in full would 
incur certain penalties.    
 
Ban of Civil Cases 
The parallel exclusion of civil or personal cases from acceptable petitions in both 
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box systems demonstrates that the petition boxes were initially established for 
socio-political cases. Citing the book titled ofuregaki Kanpȏ shȗsei which was a 
compilation of bakufu laws, Yokota suggests that the purpose of installing petition box 
was not for pleading personal cases, rather it was a suitable means to discuss the state of 
political situations and ascertain the impropriety of the officials’ behavior (Yokota 2005: 
298). The civil and criminal cases did not fall within the jurisdiction of the sanduq-i 
adȃlat either (Mustawfi 1343/1964: Vol. 1, 137; Amin 1382/2003:55).  
What then were the acceptable petition topics? Unlike sanduq-i adȃlat which did not 
stipulate clearly the recognized topics except for the prohibited ones, both systems 
recognized and prohibited ones that were indicated in the meyasubako. 
Significant Distinctions 
The written guideline on the official bulletin board also defined the acceptable 
suggestion and petitions for meyasubaku. According to the guideline, direct appeals 
must contain one of the following three issues:  
1. Suggested opinions about the political affairs or the policies adopted by 
government where the applicant is suggesting beneficial ideas for change.  
2. Identification of self-seeker government officials and their unjust behavior where 
the applicant is requesting redress.  
3. Cases where the courts had no jurisdiction over the lawsuits or issued an unjust 
rule, where the applicant is requesting an appeal. 
All the aforementioned issues were incorporated in the Kyȏhȏ reform (Harafuji 
1992: 776). The posting of these guidelines of meyasubako on the formal placard 
suggests the strong social pressure of the time. The first article of the guideline on 
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meyasubako which refers to proposing opinions is a matter of utmost significance. Since 
the Qajar box did not officially recognize such a right for petitioners, it differentiates the 
definitive characteristic of the Japanese system from its Iranian counterpart. The reason 
can be ascribed to the patrimonial characteristic of the Qajar king. It does not 
necessarily mean that Japanese shogun or lords were democrats. Faced with a growing 
political and social crisis, the Japanese rulers referred to public opinion in order to find 
the proper solution as well as provide a countermeasure to the pressure of dissent. The 
Iranian king and rulers did not basically recognize such a right for commoners. They 
considered the commoners as subordinates who were expected to be obedient. They 
could not interfere in politics. It was a great difference between the two box systems.  
Additionally there was another differential quality in the local application of 
meyasubako in Japan. This important distinction was limiting the petitioners based on 
their social status in the shogun and some domain boxes. These limitations notable in 
the local application of meyasubako varied within the different domains and had 
important consequences and orientations. 
Firstly, encouraging people to offer their suggestions for improving society was a 
Japanese tradition that had existed for many years in different forms, and had been 
requested by some other lords before shogun Yoshimune Tokugawa. Secondly, he 
excluded the samurai from petitioners unlike the lord of the Tosa domain who 
encouraged all people to petition regardless of their social status.  
For example, Ikeda Mitsumasa, the lord of the Okayama domain in 1654 established 
a petition box which took place following the social problems caused by the flood. He 
wrote on the placard of the box: “Because I, my senior officials, and magistrates make 
proclamations that are not always for the best, we should borrow the wisdom of the 
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whole country. Therefore, I am creating a remonstrance box [isame no bako], and 
people ranging from senior officials to the least individual may write on any topic, and 
submit anonymously their petitions into this box.” The role of box was of such great 
importance in eradicating corruption. Due to some impressive suggestions on social and 
political affairs, the lord decided to investigate the cases presented from all over the 
country (Roberts 1998: 107-106). Tosa daimyȏ also allowed everyone to write signed 
petitioned on those three aforementioned topics (Roberts 1994: 424).  
The direct appeal to the lord through the petition box system in the Tosa domain 
started in 1759 and functioned till 1873, some years after the formation of Meiji modern 
state for over a century. The lord of the Tosa domain allowed everyone to write signed 
petitions related to the following fields: 1. Suggestions to improve social and 
governmental affairs, 2. Complaining and informing about officials and situations, 3. 
Giving appeals to the lord about the cases which they felt was not ruled fairly by court. 
By applying this special system, a direct, one-way and guaranteed communication 
from ordinary people and the samurai to the lord was provided. The topic of petitions 
included a wide and various range of political, social and economic problems. The 
petition box in the Tosa domain, implemented primarily due to social unrest, welcomed 
people from various and widespread social groups to use the system, and helped to 
implement many important policies and reforms (Ibid., 424-427).  
In shogun territories, as it was possible for the samurai to directly appeal to the lord 
or superior through an inspector (metsuke), the petition box system was established for 
the “townsmen and peasants’ appeals” (Yokota 2005: 298). Additionally, if litigation 
within the system was impossible or unfairly administrated, the litigator could directly 
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refer to an inspector (metsuke) instead of appealing directly through the petition box. 
After the installation of meyasubako, some Samurai also used it but in 10
th
 year of 
Kyȏhȏ period, the usage of the boxes was just recognized for peasants and townsmen 
(merchants and craftsmen) (Harafuji 1992: 776). Perhaps this is due to the preservation 
of the existing hierarchical order and the prevailing bottom-up system to receive the 
samurai suggestions. In May 1719 (the 4
th
 year of Kyȏhȏ period), two years before the 
installation of meyasubako, the shogunate government ordered all officials to suggest 
their propositions unhesitatingly on the following topics: 
Describe inconsistent or malfunctioning practices within the current system, identify 
old systems as bureaucratic obstacles to the efficiency of government and administrative 
offices, introduce new efficient systems and institutions. 
No answer, however, was received and the government had to order the same decree 
in August of the next year. The petition box system was designed for farmers and 
townspeople, excluding the shogun’s bannermen (hatamoto) and retainers and stipended 
housemen (gokenin). For the samurai a different system was available in which they 
could present their criticisms or suggestions on aforementioned matters through a 
designated mechanism (Kitajima 1978, 479). In fact, this mechanism was ringi system. 
As Kasaya argued in the ringi system of policy making, a draft of written judgments 
or decisions was circulated by the lower officials in charge through a certain process to 
be approved by higher level officials. In this system which was administered by the 
bakufu administration, a proclamation was issued by the city magistrate (machi bugyȏ) 
in Edo (Kasaya 2000: 80-81). In the case of the Tosa domain there was no restriction 
against bureaucrat samurai who were familiar with political affairs. Therefore, two 
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different political and social orientations were the outcome of the received suggestions 
in the Tosa and shogun domains respectively. 
 
Petition Box in Tosa Domain and Fȃrs Province 
As mentioned, the installation and popularity of meyasubako in shogun territories 
impressed leaders in other domains. Unlike the Qajar, which was much more of a 
centralized system, the domains in the Japanese shogun system enjoyed a certain degree 
of autonomy in their own affairs and policy-making. Therefore, the provincial governors 
of Qajar were obliged by the central government to install sanduq-i adȃlat following the 
Shȃh’s order with strict adherence, while some of the domain lords in Edo era decided 
to create meyasubako with certain conditions. 
Regarding the significance of the political consequences of the box installation in the 
Tosa domain and in Fȃrs province, these two cases were also studied parallel to the 
central governments’ efforts mainly based on Roberts’s works and the extant 
manuscripts and reports. By applying the content analysis method, Roberts has studied 
and analyzed the 149 transcriptions of petitions which survived between 1759 and 1771 
on the box in the Tosa domain (Roberts 1994: 424-427). Approximately 118 years later, 
the box was installed in Shirȃz in Fȃrs province. 
To study the socio-political situation of Iran, during the Qajar period in 
1291/1877-1322/1904, it is helpful to read Saeedi Sirjȃni’s edited collection of the 
reports filed by a British-Iranian working for Great Britain on the general situation of 
Fȃrs province based on the news garnered by his confidential agents. The reports and 
the manuscripts of the officials’ correspondence are the main source of the analysis 
below. 
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In his monthly report of 1291/1877 (July 13-August 13), the British-Iranian reporter 
referred to the establishment of sanduq-i adȃlat in Shirȃz at the behest of central 
government. Based on the report, a government herald brought a Justice Box to be 
installed in the Vakil mosque and read the decree which welcomed everyone to submit 
his sealed petition to be taken to Tehrȃn (capital city) and judged (Saeedi Sirjȃni 
1362/1983: 13). The commoners’ discontent with the general situation and specifically 
with the officials’ behavior was certainly one of the most important reasons for the 
Shȃh’s implementing the petition box system in the capital city and the provincial 
centers.  
The absence of sources that would indicate that the people had demanded a petition 
box system indicates that in Qajar, Iran no such demand was made. Instead, the petition 
box system must have been invented for the first time by the Shȃh. After the installation, 
many officials out of appreciation for his efforts complimented him for this reform.     
Rural protests in the 1750’s had an important role in provoking people against the 
officials of the Tosa domain. Though some of the lower officials tried to convey the 
comments to the government, it was the samurai class, in comparison with commoners, 
who had more restrictions on their political discussions. Nevertheless, it was both 
commoners and samurai who eventually pressured the government to set up a petition 
box to ease the limitations on political speech (Roberts 1994: 432). As the people 
became aware of meyasubako and it usage, they demanded its installation. The samurai 
class who were familiar with political affairs due to their important positions had a 
fundamental role in urging the lord for reform. For instance, in a letter to the lord in July 
1759, a senior official urged the lord for general reform and suggested the installation of 
a petition box beside the entrance gate of the castle town. Although the lord did not 
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accept the petition box suggestion, he did let the retainers submit their sealed petitions 
to the domain’s inspector. It was considered the first stage in reforming political 
expression (Ibid., 436) and later lead to even more reforms.  
In case of Shirȃz, the problem was the resistance of the governor against the Shȃh’s 
order. After pursuing the Shȃh’s decree, Novvȃb-i Vȃlȃ [Hisȃm al-Saltanah] consulted 
with Mushir al-Mulk [Mirzȃ Abu al-Hassan Khȃn] and found its implementation a 
violation of government policy. He sent a wire to the majestic government’s top officials 
and claimed this system would lead to the debilitation of the government and asked the 
order to be rescinded. The request was refused and the order referred to the provincial 
authorities. Since it was imperative that the box be installed, accompanied with a group 
of trades people and village headmen, the provincial authority went out of city to greet 
the justice box according to the decree and installed it in Vakil mosque and placed a 
sentinel as warder.  
The governor of Fȃrs and some other governors reportedly agreed with the 
installation of the box grudgingly for understandable reasons. According to the report, 
the first petition filed in the petition box contained a complaint against Mushir 
al-Mulk’s encroachment on a mullȃ’s (clergy) properties. No one before had dared to 
complain about this and other similar issues. Still many doubted whether their petitions 
would be dealt with seriously and others were cautious because they feared that there 
would be retribution by the officials (Saeedi Sirjȃni 1362/1983: 13).  
The Tosa domain lord’s decision which allowed about 18000 retainers from different 
officials to submit their ideas to him was widely welcomed by them. For example, 
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Kawatani Sadaroku (or Kawatani Keizan [!] as Roberts mentioned in other place
1
), a 
low level retainer from a commoner origin and with close relations with townspeople, 
wrote to the lord in the last part of his petition: “I am only writing what I have heard the 
people talking about, which is that if you set up a petition box, then the conditions and 
feelings of the low will reach you and people will submit [to your government].” It 
suggested that people from different strata, even though socially separate from each 
other, requested a common need i.e. petition box. People also knew about the boxes in 
neighboring domains and communicated with each other thus spreading the demand for 
its implantation (Roberts op. cit., p. 437). 
The samurai’s and commoners’ request for petition box was understandable, but why 
did high ranking officials advocate for it? To answer this question, Roberts uses the 
example of Zusho, a high ranking official appointed to carry out reform, who writes in 
his petition that he wishes for the box to be installed in deference to the lord’s 
inspirations. If worded any other way, it might be interpreted that somebody else other 
than the lord suggested it. In fact, it was considered a “tool of government” to 
emphasize on the high position of the lord and to attribute motivations to the lord rather 
than emphasize personal efforts, ideas or beliefs. Therefore, in the high ranking officials’ 
petitions, fealty becomes the primary motivator for their support of the petition box. 
Toyonobu, the lord of Tosa finally issued a decree in August 16, 1759 setting up 
petition box. In doing so, he asserted his will for rooting out corruption, implementing 
reforms, and establishing a system that would help him know his subjects’ condition. 
All people regardless of their status could suggest their ideas in a sealed petition with 
                                                   
1. Luke S. Roberts, 1998. Mercantilism in a Japanese domain: The merchant origins of 
economic nationalism in 18th – century Tosa. Cambridge University Press. P. 115. 
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their name, address and date. 
The author argued here that the main factor to accomplish this goal was the people’s 
demands but the then elitist literature was under a delusion that a sophisticated and 
kindhearted lord created the box (Roberts 1998: 115-117). It seems the main point in 
installation of the box in these two local territories (Tosa and Fȃrs) was the preliminary 
resistance of the rulers. One of them resisted the people’s demand the other the royal 
decree.  
 
Historical Background 
Meyasubako owes its popularity mainly to shogun Yoshimune Tokugawa but it is a 
centuries old device. The petition box in Japan can trace its history back to the years 
before its installation by Yoshimune. Petition boxes have been mentioned in decrees and 
histories of other domain. For example, a decree was issued creating isamebako 
(remonstrance box) in Okayama domain in 1654, long before Yoshimune Tokugawa’s 
reign. Besides chronological order which suggested the precedence of isamebako over 
the one applied by Yoshimune, the isamebako had neither subject limitation nor 
signature obligation for the submitted petitions as a consideration of the petitioners’ 
convenience. Also the submitted petitions were not limited to the samurai. Due to high 
public literacy rates and the spread of knowledge there was a little difference between 
peasants and samurai. The frequency of poor peasant petitioners indicated their 
capability of reading and writing (Fukaya 1999: 20).  
The origination of meyasubako is over 167 years before Yoshimune. For example, 
the term meyasu, an equivalent word to “petition” and “complaint” was available in the 
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documents of Kamakura period (1185-1333). Tadazane Ogasawara as the founder of the 
Kokura domain (appointed as the lord of the domain in 9
th
 year of Kan’ei period -1632- 
and died in the 7
th
 year of Kanbun period-1667) applied the petition box in his domain 
during his reign
2. In this particular system, the public could complain against “some 
people’s misbehavior” or “out of proper course behavior”, or “the government official’s 
illegal activities,” etc. and request the amendment or prohibition of these practices. The 
box was taken into the castle town of Kokura on a determinate date and time where they 
were read and discussed at a meeting of officials. This unique system opened a 
bottom-up route for communication and satisfied the people of this domain (Yoshinaga 
1954: 9). Among the reports about the usage of petition box in villages in this domain, 
one of them dated was from about 25 years earlier, implying that perhaps the practice 
existed locally even before the official decree. 
Information about the functions and treatment of the petitions can be extracted from 
reports by the village headmen of Kokura domain to inspectors. In a report on 7
th
 year 
of Kan’ei period (1630) a village head man from the Tagawa district in the domain 
stated he had nothing to say when the bakufu inspector asked him to submit any 
petitions. Answering to the inspector’s exclamation, the village headman said that the 
domain lord had annually ordered the county office to maintain the petition box until 
just last year. During that time, he continued, they had put their petitions and 
suggestions into the box, therefore they had nothing to mention at the present time. 
Also in a report, on the 9
th
 year of Tenpȏ period (1838) another village headman 
                                                   
2. However Roberts mentioned 1726 as the year of installation of the box in Kokura 
domain in table 5.10 page 108 (Roberts, Luke Shephered. 1998. Mercantilism in a 
Japanese domain: the merchant origins of economic nationalism in 18th century Tosa. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
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informed the inspector that the petitions of the box were taken into the castle town from 
village monthly on 29
th
. The petitions were treated two times in a year in the spring and 
the fall. The village headman would question the petitioners about the cases submitted, 
so that he could properly make a decision (Ibid., p. 10). 
The petition box was apparently instituted by the Emperor Kȏtoku in 646. It was 
periodically created during Japanese medieval times and some daimyȏ of 
Sengoku-period also used the boxes in the mid-sixteenth century. A remarkable number 
of daimyȏ in Tokugawa period created the petition box and the number increased over 
time (Roberts 1998: 106-107). This brief historical background was about meyasubako 
itself as a special petitioning system. Besides meyasubako, the general litigation system 
can also trace its history back to years before early modern period Japan (kinsei).  
Skimming through the peasants’ petitions against the lords’ representatives 
throughout Japanese history specifically mediaeval period, Fukaya argues that the 
institutionalization of litigation in kinsei represented two steps of permission for 
petitioning to the superiors at the beginning of kinsei and then institutionalizing it after 
the settlement of a chain of peasant riots and thereafter (Fukaya 1999: 10). 
The peasants’ could prove their demands in various forms throughout history. Their 
reactions in the forms of riots and runaways in particular put the lords under pressure to 
satisfy their needs. The establishment of a litigation system in order to stabilize the 
rulers’ dominance was based on many years of experience from ancient time to the early 
modern period.   
Fukaya believes that the institutionalization of a “litigation” system occurred over 
time with the accumulation of former cases. It was not certainly limited to the peasant’s 
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cases in kinsei. There are historical documents that suggest Japanese peasants at the end 
of the ancient period demonstrated in order to have the right to submit their petitions to 
the local government officials or present their requests to the local officers. But 
temporary riots in the mediaeval deepened and were more extensive in the time of kinsei. 
Due to peasant riots and/or the presence of “local powers” at the beginning of kinsei, 
newly appointed lords could not enter into their domains. The peasants’ disobedience 
also took the form of individual or group runaway which impacted the lords 
economically. Therefore, the lords (daimyȏ) permitted peasants to submit their petitions 
to prevent the riots and the runaways in order to stabilize their rule. This period has 
often been labeled as the “local powers rebellion”, “peasants’ runaway” or “submitting 
the petitions” (Ibid). Besides the installation of meyasubako, Yoshimune implemented 
some other reforms in the legal and judicial fields. 
Before the installation of meyasubako in Edo, in May of Kyȏhȏ period (4th year) and 
the next year in August, Yoshimune had ordered to change and improve old 
inappropriate laws and customs within his governmental offices. He had also issued an 
order legalizing the inferior’s right to express their opinion to the superiors. After the 
installation of meyasubako in Edo, by August of Genbun period (1
st
 year) in 1736 the 
petition boxes had been installed for the peasants of Gokinai, Suruga, Kai and in front 
of the magistrate’s offices of Kyȏto and Ȏsaka. After the second article of the guideline 
of Edo meyasubako that in cases of government officials, prefectural governors, sales 
agents and village headmen’s misbehavior, this sentence was added that people should 
appeal directly (Harafuji 1992: 776). Yoshimune’s motivation to implement this system 
over a wide area was to garner information about the social and political situations. 
As Yoshimune was well-informed about the condition of commoners, he promoted 
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an environment of esprit de corps. For example, in the first year of his reign, he called 
his rȏjȗ (the senior councilors) to consult with them about the amount of annual 
agricultural tax and the number of watch towers in Edo castle, etc. and admonished 
them not to be idle.    
Yoshimune had always been interested in knowing the social condition of his people.  
During his tenure of the Kishȗ domain lordship, he had organized a system of private 
investigation. In order to garner information about the domains which were under the 
direct control of bakufu, he took twenty of these investigators to Edo. He also 
personally met san bugyȏ (the three magistrates), ȏmetsuke (inspector general) and other 
heads of departments in order to learn more directly about the social situation of his 
kingdom. His most famous reform was the establishment of petition box system in 1721 
(the 6
th
 year of Kyȏhȏ) to institutionalize the commoners’ idea about the government 
which was useful in reinforcing the officials’ esprit de corps (Ȏishi, 1996: 35). He also 
wished to expedite attending to judicial cases. 
Yoshimune sought to bring reform to his government agencies. During his rule, the 
number of punished government officials such as prefectural governors and sales agents 
in Kyȏhȏ era were so high that people stopped counting them. Numerous lawsuits were 
filed against the government officials for negligence of duty and unjust behavior such as 
the systematic legal abuse of delaying lawsuits by citing jurisdictional issues. 
Yoshimune ordered the repeal of existing case laws and compiled new legal standards. 
He ordered his judges to try cases applying strict regulations. These measures were just 
a few undertaken by Yoshimune which demonstrate he desire to disseminate justice and 
accelerate the judicial procedure (Harafuji 1992: 776). 
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The establishment of sanduq- i adȃlat (Justice Box) was one of the results of the 
judicial reform in Qajar period. The Justice Box indeed can trace its history back to 
ancient time Iran but not in the form of the petition box. The Iranian kings and rulers 
including Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh tried various forms of institutions and devices to deal with 
the complaints of the aggrieved due to significance of the concept of justice as a 
fundamental responsibility of the Iranian-Islamic kingship. 
During the about 50 years of Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s reign, the reform of the judicial 
system was implemented in the three different periods: 1. Amir Kabȋr’s Reform 
(1265-1268/1848-1851), 2. The Reform after Amir Kabȋr (1275-1287/ 1859-1871) and 3. 
Sipahsȃlar’s Reform (1288-1297/1872-1880). The practice of sanduq- i adȃlat was 
established in the second period (Amin 1382/2003: 51&55). 
Following a series of changes in the judicial system which started in the early 
nineteenth century, Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh (1831-1896) decided to establish sanduq- i adȃlat. 
Unlike some superficial changes and improvements in the judicial process at the 
beginning of Qajar period (1796-1924), in the Mirzȃ Taqi Khȃn Amir Kabȋr’s period, 
the Shȃh’s first and famous sadr-i a’zam or grand vizier (1848-51), a central 
dȋwȃnkhȃna-yi adliyya (Court of Justice) was established as a structural reform of the 
judicial system. Although Amir Kabȋr planned to improve the quality of the courts and 
extension of the state’s control over them, the courts’ role and authority decreased as he 
was dismissed and executed in 1852. 
In 1278/1861, Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh decided to revive the authoritative role of the 
central court of justice (Floor 1983: 117-121). Amir Kabȋr’s reform was suspended for a 
period of time after his death, however continued in different ways. Mirzȃ Ȃqȃ Khȃn 
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Nȗri who succeeded Amir Kabȋr proposed a code of laws by modeling the Ottoman 
Khatt-i Sharȋf-i Gulkhȃna and European laws which failed (Floor 1983: 120). But the 
interest for judicial reforms, specifically with the attempts of some reformers such as 
Mirzȃ Malkam Khȃn and the strengthening the powers of central authority remained 
alive (Ȃdamiyyat 1351/1972: 173). According to the Shȃh’s decree issued in 1275/1858, 
the central court of justice would delegate a representative to supervise the local courts. 
The Shȃh’s decree, however, was soon suspended due to the provincial governors’ 
criticism and opposition that its implementation would be a violation of public order 
(Bakhȃsh 1978: 84). 
Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh decided to deal with his subjects’ complaints personally. He 
patterned his system after the Sasanid kings’ giving audience and diwan-i mazȃlim (the 
Court of Complaints) derived from Islamic practices in Iran (Amin 1382/2003: 55 & 
Mohit Tabȃtabȃ’ee 1346/1967: 44). 
The Shȃh, who wished to show his attention to his subjects (ruȃyȃ), and check and 
control the government officials at the same time, issued a decree in 1277/1860 
permitting anyone to present their petition to him to be personally judged. The Shȃh 
allotted Sundays exclusively to give audience to his aggrieved subjects. The purpose of 
the establishment of the court was not to deal with criminal or civil cases; the Shȃh 
wanted to hear his subjects’ complaints against the government officials’ behavior.  
The provincial petitions were submitted to the Shȃh through dhabit-i chȃpȃrkhȃna 
(superviser of postriders) who had to send them in a bag to him. This public court was 
also suspended (Floor 1983: 121). These initial reforms were the foundation to the 
establishment of sanduq-i adȃlat (Mustawfi 1964/ 1343: 93). Contrary to Curzon’s 
claim, the Shȃh’s procedure for petitioning was an emulation of ancient princes’ practice 
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(Mohit Tabȃtabȃ’ee 1967/1346: 44). 
Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh issued a decree in 1278/1861 to re-establish the dȋwȃnkhȃna-yi 
adliyya (Court of Justice) with the aim of revitalizing its authoritative role. The 
following year in 1862 by a new decree, the Shȃh reconfirmed the court’s position and 
competence and actually himself as the lone source of judicial authority. The decree also 
mandated additional reforms that affected not just the central government. The central 
court was to delegate officials to be dispatched to the provincial towns to supervise and 
report how the governors were dealing with cases in the provincial court system (Floor 
op. cit., 121- 122). Through such decrees the Iranian kings, including Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh, 
remained the source of justice and judicial authority, maintaining tight control and 
oversight over the system through a formal reporting system.   
 
Direct Appeal 
One of the most important goals of the petitions box was dealing with the problems 
related to the politics and powerful government officials; direct appeals through the box 
were necessary to remove any obstacles of reporting that ordinary peasants faced. 
Therefore, recognizing direct appeals by establishment of the box was one of its notable 
characteristics. However, the systems of direct appeals differed in the two countries.  
Meyasubako functioned like an alternative expressway or shortcut in addition to the 
general litigation system of the time, while sanduq-i adȃlat remained a dependent 
branch of diwȃn-i adȃlat (Court of Justice). 
According to Fukaya, “submitting petitions to the superiors” continued from the 
Genna era (1615-1624) even after Shimabara Rebellion by Christian peasants and the 
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defeat of “local powers” who led the rebellions in the second half of seventeenth century. 
After this period, the “litigation system” was working mechanistically. Therefore, he 
believes that considering just the first part i.e. “permission to submit petition” is 
one-sided but what has been emphasized is “submitting the direct appeals” of peasants 
to the officials which was originated from Tokugawa shogunate (Fukaya 1999: 10). 
For the Qajar king it was very important to clearly be seen as the sole source of 
justice and the box was a good device for this purpose. Providing the subjects with 
direct contact to the Shȃh whenever and wherever they needed however was impractical.   
The state tried to keep up its “public relation stunt” by taking some measures intended 
to facilitate the submission of grievances by the subjects. The sanduq-i adȃlat (Justice 
Box) and majlis-i tahqȋq-i mazȃlim (the Council for the Investigation of Grievances) 
were two innovative institutions which gave the Shȃh’s aggrieved subjects direct access 
to him (Sohrabi 1999: 262). Their systematic method in registration and administration 
of the submitted petitions in comparison with the previous judicial measures were a 
significant improvement introduced by the implementation of the petition box.   
According to a report after the establishment of sanduq-i adȃlat, it was customary for 
commoners to submit their petitions directly to the Shȃh when they met him in public 
places. Such practices supported the Shȃ’h’s image as the source of justice, but were 
highly impractical. A letter to the Shȃh during this time, demonstrates the need for 
preventing petitioners from blocking the Shȃh’s equipage. The solution, the letter asserts, 
was to refer the petitioners to the court through the sanduq-i adȃlat installed in 
provinces and the Court of Justice (diwȃn-khȃnah-i adȃlat) in Tehrȃn (Folio No. 
295/3602).  
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In early modern age Japan (kinsei), specifically in the Kyȏhȏ period (1716-1736), the 
financial problems of the bakufu system led to an antagonism between the central 
government and society. Yoshimune as a tactic decided to implement the meyasubako 
system. By the development of the petition box throughout the country, the central 
government (bakufu) and the numerous domains (han) systematized the "guaranteeing" 
of complaints". In practice, direct appeals to the shogun and local lords (daimyȏ) were 
accepted through the suggestion-petition box and "guaranteeing of complaints" was 
provided. Under the judicial system of the time, the plaintiffs’ complaints on public 
litigations were indeed administered based on general laws and procedure (Ȏhira 2003: 
206-207). Therefore, direct appeals on certain topics, through the new system 
(meyasubako) were easily adopted alongside the already established general system. 
The Qajar king also preferred to be in direct contact with his aggrieved subjects to 
prevent misrepresentation of their complaints. As pointed out before, the Shȃh began to 
hold public audience to listen to his aggrieved subject on Sundays in 1277/ 1860. This 
was a foundational practice that eventually lead to the establishment of sanduq-i adȃlat 
as another form of direct appeals. Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh preferred dealing directly with his 
subjects, rather than relying on the messengers who might not be fair-minded. Also 
verbal messages were likely to be transmitted incompletely or distorted by the 
intermediaries (Iran daily, Muharram 1291/1874, quoted in Varahram 1385/2006: 
343-344). Consequently, to be in direct contact with the plaintiffs was one of the 
functions and features of the box.  
In Japan’s "guaranteeing of complaints" through the meyasubako system, appeals 
could be made to the shogun or daimyȏ without involving the central jurisdiction. These 
informal complaints were investigated and were unofficially recognized. The 
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widespread crisis situation generated the need for the implementation of a “guaranteeing 
of complaints” in the various domains. This direct appeal practice was a new policy 
designed to relieve public discontent through a more formalized process. The bakufu 
needed to win the people's support to establish and strengthen national unity as a 
breakthrough in the crisis situation (Ȏhira 2003: 206-207). The “guaranteeing of 
complaints” system was also a security measure for the complainants to litigate against 
powerful officials through the direct appeals recognized through the box. 
 A little more than one month after installation of the box, another official 
announcement was published to emphasize on direct dealing with the subjects’ petitions 
which was tangled by the nonsense petitions of idle and greedy people (Vaqȃye`e-i 
Ittifȃqiah daily, 1291/1874, quoted in Varahram 1385/2006: 345-346). Consequently, to 
be in direct contact with the plaintiffs was one of the functions and features of the box. 
Fukaya develops several positive themes that arose out of the implementation of the 
meyasubako system. First, submitting the petition to influential superiors proved to be 
fruitful for the first time. Although it was not implemented systematically, the superiors 
would receive the appeals and it was implicitly assumed that the security of the 
petitioners through meyasubako would be guaranteed. Second, through the direct 
petition system, the purposes of the shogun government and peasants’ appeals were 
directly linked. Third, submitting direct petitions was a suitable means to remove the 
obstructions and blockage in the administration of justice caused by middle rank 
officeholders and the bureaucratic system. The “litigation” system had been problematic 
step by step process that slowly and incompletely moved complaints from inferiors to 
superiors. This inadequate system in operation since the beginning of early modern age 
(kinsei) had caused a lot of resentment within the general society. It was expected that 
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submitting direct petitions would amend these inadequacies. Fourth, submitting direct 
petition functioned as a surveillance mechanism for the government. 
The petitioners’ complaints contained information unavailable to the central 
government through normal means. This secret information could be used then by 
officials to stop unjust actions within the domains. Finally, officials hoped that 
meyasubako would prevent peasants from participating in illegal riots and from running 
away (Fukaya 1999: 10-11).  
Pre-modern Japan and Iran had different motivations for and distinct 
implementations of the petition box system. Both, however, moved from a general 
litigation system where normal petitions had to go through a problematic and often 
incomplete judicial administrative procedure, to one where complainants could make a 
direct appeal. This was a significant reform for both countries. 
 
Iranian Despotism 
Fukaya points out that one of the motivations for installing the direct appeal petition 
box system in Japan was to monitor government officials’ practices to ensure justice. In 
fact the government officials often complained that the petition box interfered with their 
ruling system. The officials’ concerns and reluctance about the continuity of the box 
operation was even more obvious in case of Qajar. 
While the Japanese lords finally had to acquiesce to the commoners’ demands under 
social pressures generated by meyasubako, the Iranian king and governors, due to their 
patrimonial system, did not pay much attention to the widespread dissatisfaction.  
More strange was the resistance of the governors and officials against the Shȃh’s decree. 
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Faced with financial and social crises, the shogun and some other lords decided to 
adopt meyasubako system as a countermeasure not only to alleviate the unrest and 
stabilize their rule, but also as a benefit they received from good proposals. This 
suggests that they had recognized the commoners’ right to express opinions and found it 
useful in policy-making. As it was mentioned before, Ikeda Mitsumasa, the lord of 
Okayama domain conceded the weakness of his administration in policy-making and 
requested his people to take part through meyasubako; he also found that meyasubako 
was a good device to eradicate corruption (Roberts 1998: 107-106).  
In case of Iran, however, neither the Qajar King nor his governors welcomed the 
subjects’ opinions on government reform. Despite Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s claim that all 
subjects could freely submit their petitions to majlis-i tahqȋq-i mazȃlim (the Council for 
the Investigation of Grievances) this freedom was limited to the nonintervention in 
politics. For example, in response to the letter of the Kȃshȃn guilds who expressed 
gratitude to hear that their cruel governor, Mahȃm al-Saltanah was ousted by the Shȃh, 
he ordered: “Answer them: Do not interfere. The assignment of the governors is not 
based on the subjects’ wish.” In another instance, the people of Ashraf in Mȃzandarȃn 
province expressed consent for their newly appointed ruler, the Shȃh answered: “There 
is no need for interference.” When the Shȃh was informed by one of his subjects of the 
chaotic situation in Sȃveh city, he replied: “It is none of your business. There is a 
magistrate for the city.” (Ȃdamiat and Nȃtiq 1356/1987: 378). 
Both the Justice Box which was created in imitation of Anûshiravȃn’s “justice chain” 
and majlis-i tahqȋq-i mazȃlim (the Council for the Investigation of Grievances) were 
failed attempts for reform. The content of petitions reflects a real image of the time 
which was directly disputed by rulers and authorities. For instance Ȃsif al-Dawlah, the 
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ruler of Fȃrs territory wrote in a wire sent from Shirȃz to Tehrȃn in Rabi`i al-Thȃni 
1287/July 1870: “There is no problem in the territory… If the mobs sometimes have a 
claim or write down something as they frequently submitted thousands of false and true 
petitions through justice box, it is never true” (Ibid., 375-376). In the Fȃrs domain, ruler 
Farmȃn-Farmȃ was dismissed in 1293/1876, Farhȃd Mirzȃ Mu’atamid al-Dawlah was 
appointed as the new ruler by the Shȃh (Saeedi Sirjȃni 1362/1983: 62). When the royal 
dispatcher informed Farhȃd Mirzȃ that petitions must be sent to the center regularly and 
directly, he replied by wire that “If I am the domain ruler, I would never implement such 
an order and if I am obliged to do so, you can expel me.” The central government tried 
to convince him that the government’s reception of the petitions would have no impact 
on his rule. But Farhȃd Mirzȃ would not back down and the central government 
withdrew its order. The domain ruler, delighted by the decision, happily sent back the 
royal dispatcher (Ibid., 75).  
Hence forward, Farhȃd Mirzȃ knowing that the central government would not 
challenge his rule became a tyrannical leader, mistreating his people to stabilize his rule, 
and ignoring their complaints. In monthly report dated 1295/1875 (October 
24-November 27) once more his resistance against central government orders was noted. 
In a telegraph Mustawfi al-Mamȃlik, on behalf of the Shȃh’s directives, advised Farhȃd 
Mirzȃ to “treat his subjects leniently” since they were angry with him. He had 
reportedly resisted the new central government’s order and had refused to implement the 
new regulations. Farhȃd Mirzȃ replied by wire that “in five or six months, the current 
year will be ended and there is no need for regulation. If I am supposed to remain as the 
ruler in next year, I will explain it in details. Otherwise issue the order in accordance 
with, if it is your recommendation” (Ibid., 99). 
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In another monthly report dated 1296/1879 (February 16-March 16), by the Shȃh’s 
order Mustawfi al-Mamȃlik wrote to Farhȃd Mirzȃ, “together with the elders of Fȃrs 
domain, twice a month you are summoned to telegraph station to hear the royal decrees.” 
But once again Farhȃd Mirzȃ, directly and mockingly opposed the Shȃh’s order 
replying: “I am a ruler not a president [!]. Do not issue such orders if you are willing to 
keep me as the ruler. If you insist on your decision, [I will resign and] soon depart for 
Tehrȃn” (Ibid., 105-106).  
These reports support Abrahamian’s argument that “the Qajar monarchs [were] 
despots without instruments of despotism” (Abrahamian 1974: 9). He argues that 
although European visitors to the Qajar court were overawed, they found that the court 
had no working instruments such as a large army or a general bureaucracy to wield their 
power. The appointed governors to the provinces were nominal subjects who showed 
their allegiance to the court by submitting a small amount of tax revenue to the center. 
With no instrument to wield their willpower, the Qajar monarchs had to withdraw as 
they were opposed. In other words they were a “Shadow of God on Earth whose writ 
did not extend far beyond the capital” (Ibid., 11-13). Farhȃd Mirzȃ’s resistance against 
the royal decrees and his riposte is just one example of many that demonstrate the 
impotency of the king and the central government.  
The governors of the provinces considered the sanduq-i adȃlat or majlis-i tanzimȃt-i 
hasanah (the Council for Beneficent Reorganization) which concerned with reform of 
taxation, as direct interference by the central government into local affairs that 
challenged their governance as well as their power. Many of the governors disputed, 
mocked and openly confronted the implementation of these reforms. Husain-Quli khȃn 
Nizȃm al-Saltanah, the governor of Yazd implicitly ascribed his resignation to the 
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arrival of the box to his province. As he claimed it seems that sanduq-i adȃlat supported 
the petitioners’ complaints against surtax, and the riffraff who looted the people’s 
belongings (Nizȃm al-Saltanah Mȃfi 1362/1983: Vol. I, 71-7; Vȃlizȃdah Mu’jezi 
1380/2001: Vol. I, 534). 
Due to different political system in Japan and Iran, such a confrontation between the 
lords and the shogun over the implementation of direct appeal box reforms did not occur. 
The consequence of the local governors’ clear disobedience against the higher level of 
hierarchy in Iran was that the Shȃh’s subjects and their demands were ignored. In 
contrast, in Japan a healthier system developed where the people and both their 
complaints and opinions for reform were heeded.  
 
Accelerating the Administrative Process 
Shortening the administrative process was one of the goals of the petition box system 
as an express way or shortcut through direct contact with petitioners. But large 
accumulations of cases caused problems and worried the rulers. Therefore, those who 
were in charge of sanduq-i adȃlat took various countermeasures and suggested different 
solutions. What follows is an analysis of these reforms based on the contents of official 
correspondence and reports during the years when sanduq-i adȃlat functioned as well as 
a brief comparison with the Japanese case.   
In response to lagging administrative processing of petitions and the resulting 
volume of unread claims, Yoshimune issued a decree in December 1741 (the first year 
of Kanpȏ period) to three of his magistrates: machi bugyȏ (the city magistrate), jisha 
bugyȏ (the magister of temples and shrines) and kanjȏ bugyȏ (the superintendent of 
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finance). He asked them to focus their investigations on the complaints which had not 
been settled within a ten month deadline. He also required them to submit a detailed 
report including the precise date of each petition’s acceptance and the number punished 
criminals annually in spring. By September 1750 (the third year of Kan’en period) the 
deadline was reduced to six months (Harafuji 1992: 776), indicating that the reforms 
had indeed lessened the administrative processing time.  
Recognizing that there were administrative processing delays in the petition box 
system, the Shȃh ordered his officials to report the reasons for the problem and solutions.   
In response, one correspondent in charge of the box suggested dividing the 
responsibilities of registering of verdicts and its administration from the minister of 
justice. He explained it would be better that the petitioner refer to him to receive the 
verdict on their complaints and for its administration. He argued that this would speed 
up the process, preventing from people crowding as well as stop the wasting of the 
minister’s time in having to follow-up on the implementation of verdicts as advantages 
of his suggestion (Folio No. 295/1927). 
Another report refers to the petitioners who mainly looked for stipends or 
employment (Folio No. 295/1929). This report indicates that the reason for the delays 
was the numerous petitions requesting stipends and jobs, which were not part of the 
Shȃh’s goals for the establishment of the box.  
Various reasons and justifications for the delay in attending the petitions were given 
by the persons who were in charge sanduq-i adȃlat. Hȃj Ali Khȃn [Hȃjib al-Dawlah, 
I’itimȃd al-Satanih I, the implementer of Amir Kabir’s death sentence and justice 
minister] informed Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh that petitioners had complained about not 
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receiving any answer, with only the investigation of less than 150-160 cases monthly 
due to numerous petitions. He mentioned that investigations in other provinces dragged 
along as well (Folio No. 295/5303, P. 3). 
He also complained that the petitioners’ penmanship as the reason for delay in 
sending the abstracts of petitions. He indicated that his daily presence in Niȃvarȃn to 
attend to the larger number of plaintiffs and complaints was also taking up much of his 
time and he expressed hope that reforms would result in the weekly administration of 
the petitions and their registration (Folio No. 295/1979: 1). 
Clarifying the reason for accumulation of petitions in his district, Muhammad Quli 
reported that the box key was lost, therefore Mustawfi al-Mamȃlik ordered to make 
another key. He also briefed the Shȃh on reading, answering, and registering the 
petitions, listing odd petitions separately. He described that his work required him to be 
present in the Court of Justice (diwȃn-i adȃlat) to deal with the petitions except on 
Mondays and Fridays (Folio No. 295/3526). 
Hȃjib al-Dawlah reported that in the cases of irresponsible clerks who had no 
compelling reasons for delaying the administration of the petitions, he would reprimand 
the responsible clerk. Due to a mass of petitions, three or four times investigation of the 
related ministries, and apprising the Shȃh on the results of his investigations, he argued 
that the sending the final verdict to the Ministry of Justice took too much time and 
prolonged the process. He further argued that despite the decree forbidding the 
submission of rubbish petitions some people continued to present unclear petitions that 
rambled on (Folio No. 295/5303: 4). 
Another report on the box affairs documented the public presence of I’itidhȃd 
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al-Saltanah and other ministers in the Court of Complaints (diwȃn-i mazȃlim) on 
Mondays. This report urged the provincial officers of the box to pursue the incomplete 
administration of the petition there and send the results together with the sealed bags to 
the Shȃh (Folio No. 295/3560). 
In answer to the higher level official’s inquiry about dereliction of duty in sending 
the petitions of Kȃshȃn, one correspondent explained that there had been complaint 
about it and all petitions were sent on time. Another correspondent argued that if there 
were a delay it would be due to the postriders (chȃpȃr). The delay was also reported to 
I’itidhȃd al-Saltanah by Novvȃb Sahȃm al-Mulk (Folio No. 295/3676). As a follow-up 
in previous report on the petitions of Kȃshȃn, a report to the Shȃh confirmed that based 
on the correspondence between Adhid al-Mulk, Sahȃm al-Mulk and the supervisor of 
postriders (dhabit-i chȃpȃrkhȃna), the post office dereliction of duty was the main 
reason for the delay in sending the petitions (Folio No. 295/3679). 
Reports to the Shȃh indicated that the registration of the referred petitions and their 
rules and delivery to Adib al-Mulk had been completed, with 96 petitions still pending 
due to understaffing. The two clerks had not been able to complete the task assigned by 
the Shȃh at the beginning of the month (Folio No. 295/3751). Answering the Shȃh’s 
reprimand for the delay to serve the issued verdicts to the petitioners, Hȃjib al-Dawlah 
reported that the complainants did not want to receive their verdicts. Therefore, the 
town crier (jȃrchi) had been commissioned to call them and the results of this action 
would be reported back to the Shȃh (Folio No. 295/5303: 8). These examples indicate 
that the Shȃh’s direct involvement in administering the petition box system, including 
his reprimands, questions, and critiques of the delays and idleness of the clerks was 
effective. Furthermore, those in charge of the box reacted by supporting the Shȃh, 
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answering his questions and justifying their problems. 
A report was made supporting the clerks of sanduq-i adȃlat against the Shȃh’s 
criticism of their idleness and his desire to entrust their duties to clerks of the Court of 
Justice (diwȃn-khȃnah-i adȃlat). The correspondent attributed the problem to the issue 
that the clerks were often idle at the beginning of the month when they received no 
referred petitions. However, by the middle of the month the petitions flowed in and this 
caused considerable work for the clerks that led to their exhaustion. This poor timing 
should therefore not be interpreted as inefficiency on the part of the local clerks (Folio 
No. 295/1805).  
Besides the reasons or excuses to justify the protracted process of dealing with 
complaints, bribery was another problem that the Shȃh wanted prosecuted. In Hȃjib 
al-Dawlah’s report he made to the Shȃh’s order to investigate injustice, and charge those 
who were being greedy and/or were disregarding the petitioners’ complaints. The Shȃh 
issued a documentary order for the investigation and the guilty or accusing complainant 
be punished in order to maintain the reliability of high court (Folio No. 295/5303: 3).  
Hȃjib al-Dawlah continued his report by arguing that bribery amongst the agents of 
high court was impossible except in certain cases where fees for the registration service 
were collected or in cases where the lawbreaker would be obliged to repay double the 
penalty owed (Folio No. 295/5303: 4). Hȃjib al-Dawlah suggested the Shȃh as a 
measure to prevent bribery that the government should distribute monthly 50 tumȃns to 
the high-ranked employees as a reward for their exemplary service. If any were found 
guilty of bribery and avarice, they would be penalized, punished or fired for the amount 
of bribe he had received. 
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Hȃjib al-Dawlah reported to the Shȃh that in pursuance to his order the 
administrative mistakes were rectified and his clerks were scrupulously performing their 
duties. But in cases where clerks were accused of bribery how to correct the problem 
was difficult. Accusations or bribery against a clerk might be just a malicious report 
filed by a disgruntled complainant; sometimes the amount of the bribe is contested or 
cannot be discerned apart from the verdict amount. Hȃjib al-Dawlah suggested the Shȃh 
to punish Hȃjib al-Dawlah himself to show the spiteful people that the Shȃh had 
immediately ordered for investigation the high court affairs as soon as he received the 
complaint (Folio No. 295/5303: 6). Hȃjib al-Dawlah argued that employees could not 
stop people from offering bribes. He added that he could not document any instances of 
bribery therefore he could not directly reprimand any of his officials. He recommended 
the Shȃh transfer the accused employees without investigation (Folio No. 295/5303: 8).  
[Dust-Alikhȃn] Muayer al-Mamȃlik [the treasurer] wrote a letter to the Shȃh if we 
are informed based on one of commoners’ petition that any of the government officials 
have received money more than stated amount, the case would be investigated at once 
and the additional amount as well as complainant’s transportation cost would refunded 
to him (Folio No. 295/1768). Muayer al-Mamȃlik also recommended the Shȃh an 
honest person to be in charge of the box to ensure the proper management of the box 
system. 
Hȃjib al-Dawlah reported the assignment of Mahmud Khȃn Malik al-Shu’arȃ 
[Mahmud Khȃn Sabȃ] who was an honest and not greedy person as the head of the 
high-ranked administrators. But he claimed that Mahmud Khȃn Malik al-Shu’arȃ was 
too busy with painting. So Hȃjib al-Dawlah requested that the Shȃh order him to accept 
the job and fulfill his duties (Folio No. 295/5303: 8). 
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The petition box system in both the Edo and Qajar governments was an office had 
many bureaucratic problems which caused delays in dealing with the cases. Bribery was 
especially a common problem in case of sanduq-i adȃlat system that required constant 
attention by the Shȃh and the central court. 
 
The Box Mechanism and Security 
The direct appeal to the lords and rulers and petitioning against government officials 
on political power requires that the petitioners feel secure in making their claims. 
Powerful officials did not like petitioners accusing them of improper governance or 
complaining about their behavior or decisions. Therefore, they tried to prevent 
petitioning against their cruelty in various forms. Aware of this issue, rulers tried to 
provide a secure situation for petitioners to lodge their appeals or critiques in order to 
lessen anxiety and prevent instability that resulted from the menacing actions of local 
officials such as classifying the petitions as either false or true claims.  
According to Kagennori Omata, meyasubako system worked well in handling issues 
of bribery and false claims. In one case, a complaint was made against Kobori To’otȏmi, 
the magistrate of Fushimi, alleging that he received bribes. The shogun upon 
investigating the complaint seized control of the magistrate, his family and relinquished 
his power over the domain. In some cases there were petitions filed for the personal 
grudges or under false pretenses. These suspected cases were referred for in depth 
inspection by the senior councilors (rȏjȗ) (… .1994 (jȏ): 113-114). 
In the case of sanduq-i adȃlat, while many of the governors ridiculed or tried to 
sabotage this system, Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh who was aware of these responses tried to take 
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sufficient countermeasures. Curzon exaggerates his evaluation of the box as an abortive 
reform attempt. It is hard to evaluate the box system in Qajar Iran. It was not the ideal 
institution and did not function perfectly, but as my summary of the extant documents 
on issues with the petition system and the related rules which were implemented 
demonstrates Curzon’s claims are not completely true.    
For instance, the Shȃh had warned that an evil guard or anyone who prevents the 
complainants from inserting their petitions might be punished by death (Iran daily, 
Muharram 1291/1874, quoted in Varahram 1385/2006: 343-344). According to some 
reports concerning commoners’ complaints and the results, it seems the Shȃh’s warning 
was effective. His attention was not limited to warning. According to some reports, he 
directly was involved in the prosecution of the affairs concerning official abuse in 
administering the sanduq-i adȃlat. 
The punishment of Mirzȃ Bȃqir Khȃn-i Tufang-dȃr (the musketeer) due to his 
negligence in the performance of duties related to the petitions was reported to the Shȃh 
(Folio No. 295/3620). In another report, answering the Shȃh’s inquiry about the rumors 
on Husain Khȃn, the officer in charge of Tabriz city sanduq-i adȃlat, it was explained 
that he was recently sent on mission. The report details that it was hard to judge him in 
such a short period, but it was likely that the allegations against him, were the result of 
previous problems between the telegraphers and Hȃshim Khȃn, the former officer in 
charge. The report indicates that the Shȃh would be informed of the results of the 
continuing investigation (Folio No. 295/3679). These reports demonstrate that the Shȃh 
was serious and cared about the failures within the sanduq-i adȃlat. 
An anonymous letter published in Iran daily on 18
th
 Zi Qa’adati al-Harȃm/ 28th 
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December 1874 explained that after the installation of sanduq-i adȃlat in other cities, 
people could easily submit their petitions. However the governors of the cities spread 
rumors through their kin that any petition against the governors would be punished. The 
letter claimed spies informed on these governors to the central authorities and the result 
was that some of the governors including the magistrates of Nahȃvand, KermanShȃhȃn, 
Kurdistȃn were reportedly dismissed and the box system successfully implemented. He 
proposed that the central government should assign trustworthy agents in other cities as 
well to implement the issued injunctions for the petitions and to hold the local 
governors accountable by reporting any misbehavior back to the center for investigation 
(Iran daily, No. 240. 1291/ 1874). The Shȃh’s ensuing decree and the anonymous 
person’s report suggest that there were some restrictions on filing petitions due to 
corrupt local governors and magistrates. However, investigations were made in order to 
clear up the situation and ensue the people’s right to access the box and file a petition.  
The argument that nobody could use the box to submit a petition is simply not true. 
The advisory board established to review the Tokugawa government practices 
interviewed Yȏsai Takemoto. He had been occupying positions such as custodian of 
foreign affairs, top secretary of shogun, intermediary between shogun and his senior 
councilors (rȏjȗ) during the reign of Ieyoshi Tokugawa (the twelfth shogun ), Iesada 
Tokugawa (the thirteenth shogun) and Iemochi Tokugawa (the fourteenth shogun) 
(… .1994 (ge.): 10). Takemoto’s explained the formalities of collecting petitions and 
submitting them to the shogun. He highly contested the rumors about officials gaining 
access to the contents of the petitions before they were submitted to the shogun.  
Takemoto explained that the shogun box was installed in front of the bakufu high 
court (hyȏjȏsho) on the given days and anyone besides the samurai who served their 
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lord could submit a petition. He denied the rumors that some people holding a master 
key to the box could gain access to the box. The box had just one key which was kept in 
shogun’s amulet pouch which was always carried by him. Each senior councilor (rȏjȗ) 
according to his monthly shift would receive the box from the inspection office and 
deliver it to the shogun’s secretary. Takemoto gave a step by step description of the 
transfer process and the people involved, who included senior Budhhist priest. Once the 
box was delivered to the shogun’s room by his secretary, the shogun would open the box 
with his key and empty the box’s contents. Takemoto explained that the box was 
sometimes either full of petitions or empty. Occasionally the box contained complaints 
against senior officials such as the senior councilors (rȏjȗ) and criticisms opposing the 
government’s policies (Ibid., 34-35). All in all, Takemoto argued the box system worked 
effectively due to the measures to control illegal handling of the box by corrupt 
officials.   
Despite of all measures to reform the box system by the Shȃh, the contents of the 
petitions and their verdicts were often unofficially leaked and led to the people’s unrest.  
One attendant of the box wrote to Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh detailing the problem. Arguing for 
the concealment of secret petitions, he explained that leaking of the contents of verdicts 
would lead to the convicted criminals fleeing before receiving their verdicts. He was 
also concerned that he would be suspected of leaking. While maintaining his innocence, 
he ascribed the main cause of leaked information to the people who boasted about 
having special access to secret documents or claimed to be a confidant to the royal court 
(Folio No. 295/1888: 1). 
Answering to the Shȃh’s concern that the clerks and scribes of the high court learnt 
of the content of secret petitions and verdicts, Hȃjib al-Dawlah wrote that the Shȃh 
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apparently thought the leaked contents happened because clerks had to register and 
number the secret petitions and verdicts. Hȃjib al-Dawlah stressed that numbering was 
done by clerks under his supervision without reading the contents. He argued that even 
clerks inadvertently read the contents they were urged not to reveal them. Hȃjib 
al-Dawlah reassured the Shȃh that by including the word “secret” on the petitions and 
verdicts was a warning to the clerks not to disclose their contents (Folio No. 295/5303: 
9). Hȃjib al-Dawlah also asked the Shȃh to administer the petition of Qom people 
against Mulla Ibrȃhim with firmness, in order that it would be a warning for others 
(Folio No. 295/1979: 1).  
Revealing the contents of the box was a general problem not limited just to the box 
in Tehrȃn. There were some reports on the same problem from Fȃrs province. For 
example, there was a report to the governor (Novvȃb-i Vȃlȃ) that the clerk assigned to 
register the complainants’ name had opened and read the petitions. The governor called 
and reprimanded to stop this practice henceforth (Saeedi Sirjȃni 1362/1983: 20).  
Emphasizing his trustworthiness in another report to the Shȃh, Hajib al-Dawalah 
referred to the unregistered petitions as classified. In his report, Hȃjib al-Dawlah also 
informed the Shȃh about a list of secret petitions against military commanders and civil 
official to be dealt with urgently. The list of classified and unclassified petitions was as 
follows: 
 An anonymous critical petition against ministers and the higher level 
officials, 
 The royal guards’ complaints against their commander (shȃtir-bȃshi), 
 An anonymous complaint against Mirzȃ Musȃ (the magistrate of 
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Tehrȃn), 
 The soldiers’ complaints of Savȃd-kuh corps against their commanders’ 
bribery, 
 The soldier’s request for their biannual furlough (urgent attendance to 
their case was emphasized because they were special warders). 
Hȃjib al-Dawlah mentioned the difference between these petitions and those which 
were sent directly to the Shȃh, unbeknown to him ((Folio No. 295/1979: 2). 
Despite urging the petitioners to write down the date, their address and name, 
thirteen petitions survived that have no name. The existence of nameless petitions in 
Tosa domain indicate that the petitioners might have feared that they would be punished 
for submittal a complaint or that their petition might be burnt if they had identified 
themselves, before the lord could read it. There were also cases of petitions written 
pseudonymously such as Miyata Bunsuke (Bunsuke means “the writer helper”) 
(Roberts 1998: pp. 124-125).   
The fear of punishment was also prevalent in Qajar Iran. Many petitioners explicitly 
expressed it in their petitions, asking the king not to refer them to the ruler or governor 
they had complained. A group of people complained against Abulqȃsim Khȃn’s 
persecution, the mayor of Chȃleh Meydȃn neighborhood in Tehrȃn through the Justice 
Box. They explained that they had wanted to complain against the unjust mayor prior to 
the installation of the box, but they were too frightened by Musȃ Khȃn, the magistrate of 
Tehrȃn, that they did not dare to do so. They finally begged the Shȃh not to refer their 
petition to Musȃ Khȃn, so he could not punishment (Folio No. 295/5336).  
Even in case of anonymous petitions there was a risk for the petitioner to be 
192 
 
identified.  
In one case Mahd-i Oliȃ [Malik Jahȃn Khȃnom], the Shȃh’s mother, identified a 
woman of the harem (haram-sarȃ) whom was believed to have deposited an anonymous 
petition in the box (Folio No. 295/1802). She urged the Shȃh to punish the woman.  
Regardless of the petition topic which Mahd-i Oliȃ did not mentioned, her intervention 
suggests that the usage of the Justice Box was far from being secure. 
In another report, a British confidential agent related that some of the guilds in a 
petition to the Shȃh complained against Qavȃm al-Mulk [Mirzȃ Ali Muhammad Khȃn] 
for levying additional tax. In order to deal with the case, Mustawfi al-Mamȃlik sent a 
wire and summoned the masters of the guilds and the rulers of the domain to the 
telegraph station of the city. But fearing Qavȃm al-Mulk, the complainants denied the 
submission of such a petition. Therefore, Mushir al- Mulk was charged with the duty of 
administering the case, reporting the result to the Shȃh, and stopping the additional tax. 
Two days later, however Mushir al-Mulk fudged the Shȃh’s order, and the central 
government did not prosecute the case any further. The British confidential agent’s 
report did not describe if any further retribution by the Qavȃm al-Mulk was taken. 
There were also other petitions submitted to the Shȃh through the petition box but 
when the central government formally called upon the ruler of Fȃrs domain to answer 
these accusations, he denounced them as a bunch of lies and filth with no basis of truth 
or justification. 
Some asserted that local rulers would assign clerks to read the petitions to ensure that 
their contents were not against the ruler, his counselor and bailiff, so that these 
complainants could be identified and debarred from submitting their petitions (Saeedi 
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Sirjȃni 1362/1983: 18). 
One of the difficulties or administering the petitions was judging the veracity of the 
complaint. Any false or true claims could be propounded through the box which 
entailed additional investigation. The shogun box had a specific method for this 
purpose. 
The shoguns’ secret agents were used to verify claims made in the petitions. A 
smaller group of two or three representatives of the shoguns’ secret spies was in direct 
contact with shogun. When summoned by the shogun through the shogun’s secretary, 
they came through the inner garden to meet him at the place where his palanquin stood, 
located between the shogun’s living room and his harem. Sometimes the shogun’s 
secretary would also be present in order to witness and verify the cases.  
In very important cases, the shogun himself would directly investigate and prosecute 
the petition (… 1994 (ge): 36). In Qajar case there was no document to enlarge upon 
such an investigative system but sometimes petitioners themselves asked their claims to 
be investigated and verified by an honest representative.  
In one case, following Nasir al-Din Shȃh’s order to investigate about the bearer of a 
petition by a group of people from Qom city against Adib al-Mamȃlik , the governor of 
the city, the person in charge introduced him in his report as a mullȃ (clergyman) called 
Mullȃ Ibrȃhim, resident of Qom. Fearful for the severe hurt the petitioners incurred in 
the prior year, Mulla Ibrȃhim was trusted to submit the petition on the people’s behalf to 
Justice Box in Tehran, the capital city. He suggested to the person in charge, if the Shȃh 
found it expedient, that he would dispatch covertly a trusted representative who was not 
evil to Qom to investigate the governor’s unjust administration, and either hear their 
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complaint directly or let a group complain directly before the Shȃh (Folio No. 
295/1837). The efforts undertaken in this process, indicate the problems that occurred 
when the Shȃh’s rule about the punishment of a delinquent governor were leaked.  
In another document, the people of Isfahȃn complained to the Shȃh against Majd 
al-Dawlah [Amir Arsalȃn Khȃn] via the petition box. Subsequently, the Shȃh’s private 
decree to punish him was apparently leaked which made trouble for the complainants 
(Folio No. 295/5396). Both of these cases demonstrate that the security of the sanduq-i 
adȃlat was much weaker than meyasubako.  
 
Legal Appeals, Suggestions and Critiques 
Complaints 
In comparison with its Iranian counterpart, meyasubako had been in use much longer 
than sanduq-i adȃlat. The nature and characteristics of the crises that lead to the 
installation of the box, as well as the lords who implemented and administered the 
practice had an important impact on influencing the contrasting strong or weak usage of 
the system throughout Edo era. Consequently, a multiplicity of types of petitions and the 
way they were dealt with were different in the course of time. 
The presence of meyasubako in this period fluctuated as a result of the causes for its 
installation. Amid crisis situation or during the reign of a powerful ruler the usage of the 
box was due to remarkable responses within the society. When the situation changed, 
under the decline of the ruler, or his death, responses within the society were routinized 
and the petition box would lose its importance or disappear as a practice. But even 
within a stable society, crises would arise or strong leaders would want to make reforms 
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thus reviving remarkable responses like the petition box (Ȏhira 2003: 207).  
In an example of the routinized, Kagenori Omata, upon being interviewed about the 
number of petitions, responded that despite a mass of petitions, few of them and 
sometimes annually only one case would be confirmed (… 1994 (jȏ): 114). The lack of 
administrative attention to the box system refers to the practice within the reign of last 
shoguns of Tokugawa. It demonstrates that the causes for the box and its administration 
had certainly changed from prior periods.    
Dealing with the complaints against the government officials’ misbehavior was the 
common function of the petition boxes in both Edo and Qajar periods. Most of the 
petitions were about the officials’ mismanagement or cases complaining against heavy 
taxation and related justice matters.  
Ôhira categorizes the complaints submitted through the petition box in some groups 
as following: 
 Village officials (mura yakunin) increasing annual land tax and 
unjustly spending labor payments, 
 Village officials not issuing receipts and performing the duties well,  
 Town officials (machi yakunin) not performing their duties well (being 
late or absent), 
 The officials not disclosing the details and documents of annual tax  
 Local officials unjust treatment of the people, 
 Officials in Ôsaka town magistrate (machi Bugyȏ) demanding bribes, 
not performing their duties out of idleness and treating the people (Ôhira 2003: 
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155).  
According to the reports and the correspondence documents, most of the complaints 
deposited to sanduq-i adȃlat were against the officials’ cruelty and heavy taxes except 
those who begged for stipends and aid. Since it was impossible to cover all the petitions 
(complaints and suggestions) in the Edo era, some representative cases from various 
junctures in this period are presented below. Also in case of Qajar box, some cases and 
their results in official correspondence are studied here as well. 
The first three or four complaints deposited through shogun meyasubako by a group 
of complainants. Regarding the grievances were submitted at the end of Tokugawa era 
(bakumatsu), it is not referred to the results. In case of Qajar, most of the official reports 
referred to the punishment of the lawbreakers. But it cannot be concluded that it 
functioned effectively. Not sure what this means and I think you can leave out.   
In 1723 (8
th
 year of Kyȏhȏ period), the petitioners’ leaders from Kazusa (present 
Chiba prefecture) who had asked for the lifting of an unjust annual tax, were exiled as a 
punishment. The petitioners submitted another petition claiming their punishment was 
unjust. The administration of justice in this case was effective and there punishment was 
removed. 
In 1725 (10
th
 year of Kyȏhȏ period), several villages asked for a decrease in their 
annual taxation due to frequent famine. The petitioners were initially imprisoned 
without verifying their complaint, but were released shortly thereafter. However, when 
heavy annual taxes were levied one year later, the six representatives of ten villages 
made a trip to Edo and submitted a long petition through the petition box. Once again 
they were punished with no evidence that the punishment was rescinded. The levied 
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additional tax was based on Yoshimune’s policy                                    
(Kokushi daijiten, http://japanknowledge/body/display/ accessed 28 August 2013). 
In 1751, the governance of a region in present Niigata prefecture under the direct 
control of the shogunate was entrusted to the Nagaoka domain. Due to heavy taxation of 
this domain, the farmers of the region resisted the decree. In response, the farmers’ 
leader was exiled, but the entrustment was also cancelled (Nihon rekishi-chimei taikei. 
Heibonsha, http://www.Japanknowledge.com/body/display/ accessed 28 August 2013).  
In most of the aforementioned cases, the complainants were initially punished for 
their complaints against heavy annual taxation. But, in many of the cases, punishments 
against the petitioners were removed later. The reason for the initial punishment of the 
petitioners is not clear. One probable reason could be the resistance of the officials to 
the usage of meyasubako at the inception. Another possible reason was the officials 
were challenging whether taxation fell within the three main recognized 
reasons/categories for filing a petition.   
The official reports on complaints submitted to sanduq-i adȃlat suggest the 
punishment of offending officials. It is not easy to judge the effectiveness of the box 
based on the official reports to the Shȃh. 
After reading the submitted petitions from the cities of Mashad, Quchȃn and Torbat 
of Tabas, Nȃsir al-Din ordered Mushir al-Dawlah on a mission as a confidential 
investigator. According to the Shȃh’s order, Mushir al-Dawlah was missioned to bring 
Shujȃ al-Dawlah, the guilty governor of Quchȃn to Tehrȃn and detain him in his 
coffeehouse for life (Safȃyee 1347/1967: 39). 
Following the Shȃh’s order to investigate the petition of a group of people from Arȃk 
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province, Hȃjib al-Dawlah reported that according to his investigation, the people were 
requesting a substitute for Mirzȃ Asadullȃh, the bailiff of Arȃk. By Nonvvȃb Nusrat 
al-Dawlah’s order, Mirzȃ Asadullȃh was dismissed and his nephew was appointed 
temporarily as his replacement to administer the financial affairs (Folio No. 295/1868). 
Even if the complaints were not directly related to the high-ranking officials, these 
reports make evident that all complaints against officials were investigated and dealt 
with seriously. The box at least functioned as a central government monitoring device 
that held local officials accountable through the people’s input. 
Mirzȃ Husain Khȃn Sipahsȃlȃr reported to the Shȃh that he had been informed of 
plaintiffs’ complaints against Nizȃm al-Dawlah, the governor of Khurȃsȃn. Due to his 
knowledge of Nizȃm al-Dawlah’s governance, which he viewed as just, he wondered at 
the complaints (Folio No. 295/3601). 
In order to rejoin Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s order to dispose of a case regarding the holy 
shrine of Abdul-Azim Hassani’s endowments and its custodian, Mustawfi al-Mamȃlik, 
the respondent explained the custodian’s share of the offertory and how the revenue was 
expended (Folio No. 295/882). Also in a document, most of the submitted petitions in 
Qazvin justice box were reported were requests for investigations of financial 
complaints against officials and all were investigated and properly resolved (Folio No. 
296/1936).  
Another report documented the complaints filed by a group of people who included 
Saiyed-i Khȃnsȃri against officials for procrastination and negligence in filling the 
people’s requests. Saiyed-i Khȃnsȃri and the others were summoned to a hearing held 
by the officials. It was determined that except for Saiyed and his cousin, who had no 
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clear request and who had been involved in a mob’s disturbance in Khȃnsȃr city, the rest 
of plaintiffs’ complaints were dealt with. Saiyed was ordered to be punished financially 
for his false claim, although he possessed no property to be destroyed. After this 
judgment Saiyed submitted another petition unduly seeking compensation (Folio No. 
295/1892).   
It is difficult from reading these reports to analyze the effectiveness of the boxes in 
establishing the veracity of the claims made. But it is obvious that the topic of 
complaints does provide a glimpse into the general political situation of the time.   
The same can be said for the Edo Japan petition practice. Below are some of the topics 
from a collection of petitions in late Edo era (bakumatsu).  
From the collected petitions of 1858-1864 in “sojȏdome,” Mochizuki selects the 
petitions of 1858 for analysis (Mochizuki 2008: 70). According to his chart, among the 
total 225 petitions, 84 were new and 141 petitions were repeated. Among these 97 
petitions were filed in the central Edo city petition box. These petitions comprised 42 
petitioners from the territories under the control of bakufu, 25 petitions from the 
shoguns’ bannermen’s (hatamoto) territories, 8 from other domains, 22 anonymous 
petitioners. (Ibid., 71-72).  
If the peasants of various domains traveled to Edo or other domains under the control 
of the bakufu to submit their complaints against the local administrations through the 
box, their complaints would not be accepted. However those domains’ misgovernment 
was reported to them by the bakufu so that these rulers were held accountable and they 
reformed their ways (Ȏhira 2003: 207). Despite knowing this point, sometimes the 
petitioners from other domains deposited their petitions in the shogun box in Edo. 
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Although the petition box was installed in the Amagasaki domain in 1842, one of the 
submitted petitions to the Edo box was from this domain. Among the Edo petitions, the 
number of farmer petitioners was the highest percentage of complainants representing 
farmers from Mutsu in northeastern Japan through Buzen of Kyushu in southern Japan, 
(Mochizuki op. cit., 71). Some of the plaintiff’s reasons for petitioning in Edo seem to 
be understandable due to centrality of the Edo venue. 
Cases which involved female petitioners were rare. Among the three woman 
petitioners, there was a samurai widow from another domain (chart no. 35) who 
appealed for the investigation of her husband murder occurred in Edo. She appealed to 
the Edo city petition box. There were also some accepted petitions with no name and 
address (Ibid., 70). 
The British confidential agent reported objectively that sanduq-i adȃlat in Fȃrs 
province represented both futile and fruitful results of the Shȃh’s efforts to reform the 
local official’s administrations. The report said that the grievances were dealt with under 
the supervision of the provincial governor.   
His monthly report of 1291/1874 (December 18-January 17) indicated that the 
governor (Novvȃb-i Vȃlȃ) was present at dȋwȃn khȃnah (court) to attend the petitions 
every day from morning to the afternoon. The governor reserved Saturdays and 
Tuesdays to deal with the petitions and auditing the tradespeople who lodged an appeal 
against Qavȃm al-Mulk through the petition box (Saeedi Sirjȃni 1362/1983: 22). 
In his monthly report of 1292/1875 (August), he stated that after the announcement 
of tax allowances, the tradespeople of Shirȃz who were not included as recipients of the 
allowances, took sanctuary at sanduq-i adȃlat in Masjid-i Vakȋl (Vakȋl mosque) to 
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protest. Farmȃn-farmȃ [Yahyȃ Khȃn-i Mu’atamid al-Mulk], the new governor of the 
province assured them that he would investigate their case after consultation with 
Mushȋr al-Mulk, the councilor (Ibid., 37). 
A group people from Masjid Bardi who already had complained about unfair water 
apportionments for irrigation and heavy taxation came to Shirȃz and took sanctuary at 
sanduq-i adȃlat in Vakil mosque and expressed their complaints by sending a wire to 
the Shȃh. Following the Shȃh’s order to the governor of the province, Mirzȃ 
Muhammad, the councilor’s secretary who was to blame was imprisoned until the 
situation was rectified. The governor informed the Shȃh when it was, and asked for the 
secretary’s freedom (Ibid., 28-29). 
The petitions of “sojȏdome” collection consisted of complaints against various ranks 
of officials about taxation as well as issues related to social problems caused by official 
misbehavior. The poor villagers in the Izumi domain (current Saitama prefecture) 
complained through the box against their village headman’s (nanushi) unjust treatment 
and gambling. They urged the officials expel the corrupt official (table no. 2) and 
prevent his son from succeeding him as village headman (Mochizuki 2008: 73). 
People of a hatamoto territory (chart no. 65) complained against bribery and unjust 
treatment of officials due to appointment of a callow youth as the chief manager (Ibid., 
75). 
The interdiction of fish trading in Edo Fukugawa (under bakufu control), caused 
difficulties for the fishmongers (chart no. 91). Therefore they filed a petition asking for 
the reopening of the fish trading place (Ibid., 76) 
The poor farmers of bakufu territories in Yamanashi (chart no. 23) complained 
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against the rich farmers, accusing them of conniving to violate of the law and applying 
arbitrary rulings (Ibid., 73). 
The farmers of 36 villages controlled by the bakufu in Shizuoka (chart no. 65) 
complained against devolving their territory to a daimyȏ (regional military lord) (Ibid., 
75).  
The themes of the aforementioned box cases in both Japan and Iran denote a relative 
similarity of goals in establishing the boxes in order for people to have a direct appeal 
against unjust or corrupt officials. The reported cases indicate that if the corrupt officials 
thought they could get away with it, they tried to resist established laws and rules.   
But in part because of the direct appeal practices of the box, they were held in line and 
had to administer the laws with deference.    
The monthly report of 1291/1874 (February 27/March 27) suggested that Mushir 
al-Mulk, the governor’s councilor, was summoned to Tehrȃn due to the people’s 
complaints but he refused to go by offering various excuses. One of his relatives 
appointed by him to a position in Jahrum city was summoned to Tehrȃn following the 
complaints. In another case, due to some one’s grievance submitted through the box, the 
governor of Kȃzerȗn was dismissed by the Shȃh but he escaped to Shirȃz, the center of 
the province. Also a large number of complainants submitted petitions through the box 
against Mushir al-Mulk’s sternness on water apportionments for irrigation and taxes in 
Masjid Bardi village. The Shȃh reprimanded the governor (Novvȃb-i Vȃlȃ) for the high 
volume of cases, and inquired into the claims, which the governor’s councilor denied. 
Although the observers witnessed his explicit ill-treatment, the governor did not give a 
clear answer to the center finally (Saeedi Sirjȃni op. cit., 25-26) and no further action 
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was taken.  
In another case, Ardakȃn’s farmers of the Fȃrs province made complaints against the 
councilor to the governor and took sanctuary in Masjid-i Nȏw. When Mushȋr al-Mulk 
failed to win their consent to give up their cause, even by bribing them, he turned to 
some of Ardakȃn’s landlords and land agents, incentivizing them to praise him as a man 
of principle by sending a wire to the Shȃh (Ibid., 29). It is clear that the serious 
prosecution of the Shȃh and the central government sometimes incommoded the unjust 
officials and forced them to dispose of the problem by applying various measures. 
The themes of some of other Japanese complaints were often related to the social 
problems not official activities. It denotes that social problems were also matters of 
great importance. People of 32 villages in Toride (present Ibaraki prefecture) lodged a 
protest against the increase in immoral activity that was consequence of prostitutes 
working in the nearby inns which drew many young people to those regions (chart no. 
70). They asked for the severe control of the matter (Mochizuki op. cit., 76).  
The advancement of technology in Iran and in particular the establishment of the 
telegraph effected the administration of sanduq-i adȃlat. The plaintiffs’ goal was to 
convey their complaints to the Shȃh as soon as possible. The usage of telegraph was 
mentioned in some of the reports from the Fȃrs province. It was recognized as a way of 
petitioning however it was not mentioned as an officially sanctioned practice. As it was 
mentioned before, the petitioning system was a recognized institution in Iranian 
political culture and political system. Aware of this fact, Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh implemented 
various forms of the petitioning system, such as public audience, sanduq-i adȃlat, and 
majlis-i tahqȋq-i mazȃlim (the Council for the Investigation of Grievances). Using 
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telegrams as a form of direct appeal was never officially institutionalized rather it was 
incorporated in other existing official practices as a supplementary means for faster 
petitioning. 
The bimonthly report of 1292/1875 (March 17-May 12) did not mention that the 
complaints and petitions were submitted to the Shȃh through the justice box. These 
cases were from Istahbȃnȃt va Neiriz. Also the people of Bandar Abbȃs telegraphed 
their complaints directly to the Shȃh against their ruler who had not enforced the Shȃh’s 
order to abate the high taxes imposed by the governor (Novvȃb-i Vȃlȃ). The Shȃh’s 
investigation revealed that his orders had been ignored due to the close relations of the 
councilor with the governor. In another case, a report documents that Bȃseri tribe sent a 
wire to the Shȃh to complain about heavy taxes (Saeedi Sirjȃni op. cit., 28). 
Another report documents that a group of complainants from Firȗz Ȃbȃd, who were 
oppressed under the Ȋl-khȃn’s (chieftain) coercive rule, went to Shirȃz and took 
sanctuary to complain against him after he had seized their cash, properties and 
livestock by force and beat them. But in the investigation by the governor (Novvȃb-i 
Vȃlȃ), the corrupt chieftain denied the claims and the governor took no action. 
Therefore, the unhappy claimants sent a wire to the Shȃh to complain (Ibid., 30). By the 
Shȃh’s order, Mustawfi al-Mamȃlik wrote to the governor, “Why should such a person 
who impinged on other people’s rights be still alive? The remainder of the taxes and 
what the complainants claimed must be certainly repossessed and he should not be 
assigned to any positions otherwise you will be reprimanded hard” (Ibid., 32).  
In another case, Dȃrȃb Khȃn [a tribal chieftain] who had struggled with the governor 
(Novvȃb-iVȃlȃ) over the taxes he had to pay submitted a petition to the Shȃh through 
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the box, requesting exoneration, claiming he had been accused out of spite by the 
governor of the province, and requesting that he be granted safe travel to the capital city. 
Answering him by wire from Tehrȃn, Dȃrȃb Khȃn was assured that he would have an 
audience with the Shȃh and that Muhammad Khȃn, the royal musketeer and the box 
warden, would accompany him to Tehrȃn to ensure his safety (Ibid., 22). Plaintiffs from 
various statuses used the telegraph for petitioning even though sanduq-i adȃlat was still 
in use in Shirȃze when Farhȃd Mirzȃ Mu’atamid al-Dawlah was appointed as the next 
governor of the domain.  
One of the byproducts of meyasubako was the establishment of a system for legal 
appeals. Ȏhira alludes to this as a traditional experience which had a positive impact on 
administrative reform in modern era. The direct appeal which was recognized under 
meyasubako system, paved the way for the citizens to prefer charges against 
government officials such as audit requests, recalls or dismissals (Ȏhira 2003: 208).  
Petitioners under meyasubako also were accustomed to protest against disadvantages by 
requesting the disposal of administrative agencies that used illegal means or were unjust 
in their actions. These direct appeals under the meyasubako system became the 
foundation for the development of a special “litigation” system that utilized a particular 
petition called sogan.     
Thanks to "guaranteeing of complaints," sogan opened a route for addressing the 
deficiencies of corrupt administrations and for providing people with relief. The 
particular pre-modern development of sogan was a positive step of linking 
administrative reform with the people’s perceptions of fairness and justice. It eventually 
would influence the civil servant system in the Japanese Modern Age (Ibid., 208-209). 
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Chapter six: Suggestions, Critiques, and Establishment of Parliament 
 
Suggestions and Critiques 
Before the installation of meyasubako in the Early Modern Age (kinsei), general 
appeals including the settlement of civil disputes and prosecution of criminal complaints 
or requesting aid from government all could be litigated under the general "litigation" 
system through the magistrate office (bugyȏsho) in cities, or by regional field 
administrators (daikan) or relevant organizations. Theretofore, this "litigation" system 
guaranteed people's appeal as a basic system (Ȏhira 2003: 207). But in some cases such 
as offering one's opinion to their superiors or filing a lawsuit against government 
officials' expediency, "guaranteeing of complaints" or suggestions were not possible 
through the general "litigation" system. Also if a case received an unjust judgment there 
was no way for people to appeal. Therefore, meyasubako as a special "litigation" system 
opened the way in the form of direct appeal for these types of cases to be administered 
officially. Without the meyasubako reforms, the existing general litigation system would 
have continued to malfunction in addressing governing administrative malfeasance and 
the people’s need to have a sanctioned practice that allowed them to hold their officials 
accountable in the exercise of administrative responsibilities to their satisfaction.  
(Ibid., 208). Therefore, as it was mentioned the significance of meyasubako application 
as a device for direct appeals, a channel to receive people's opinions, criticisms and 
expectations under the term “epoch-making” event is underlined by scholars (Roberts 
1998: 132; Hirakawa 1996: 314 & 279-314; Harafuji 1992: 776).  
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The Japanese box included direct appeals regarding administrative malfeasance as a 
solution to the lack of creativity in policy making. Domain governments were unable to 
innovate and introduce new and efficient ideas. The demands by the commoners in their 
petitions often included criticisms and suggestions regarding domainal administrative 
policies even though these were rarely incorporated they were heeded by governing 
authorities (Hirakawa 2000: 113). The lord of the Okayama domain asserted his desire 
of reforming his government by “borrowing the wisdom of the whole country” (Roberts 
1998: 107-106).  
It is important to note that unlike the Japanese feudal lord who accepted the need for 
the wisdom of all people to properly run his administrative affairs, it was an 
unacceptable fact for the despot king of Qajar. In addition to Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s 
patrimonial characteristics - he treated the political administration as a personal affair 
and political power as his own personal property (Weber 1978, vol. 2, 1028–9) - poverty 
and illiteracy could be the other main reasons for the difference in how the people’s 
wisdom in administrative affairs were ignored as insignificant in Iran. Poverty and 
unemployment were two big problems at that time as demonstrated by the long list of 
petitioners who mainly looked for stipends or employment (Folio No. 295/1929).  
According to the previous examples, the Shȃh could rarely tolerate commoners’ 
intervention in politics though he claimed that all the subjects could freely submit their 
petitions (Ȃdamiat and Nȃtiq 1987/1356: 378).  
This was not the case in Japan during the meyasubako. Some of the various 
suggestions and critiques contained in the petitions boxes in Edo and Tosa domain are 
analyzed to prove this point. The submitted petitions were not limited to samurai. The 
frequency of poor peasant petitioners indicated their capability of reading and writing 
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(Fukaya 1999: 20). 
The limitation on samurai petitioners who were involved in administrative affairs in 
shogun territories unlike their counterparts in the Tosa domain culminated in two mainly 
different socio-political orientations. The commoners (peasants, townsmen, and 
masterless samurai “rȏnin”) unlike the shogunate samurai class offered their 
suggestions and criticisms mostly regarding issues that were pertinent to their own 
fields and social affairs. However, this does not mean that they did not have any 
suggestions on politics.  
Japanese organization during this time emphasized the value of group orientation 
over and above individual needs. One might assume that people are strongly limited 
within such an organization, but the members of the group are not obliged to submit to 
the leader’s demands. Individuals’ relative independence and participation in their 
related organizations was considered a way to strengthen it. This concept of group 
organization emphasized the duty of the individuals therefore to participate actively in 
order to keep the group healthy. These were the seeds that eventually would grow into a 
full-fledged civic understanding where the individual is responsible for the group. When 
such a method was practiced in smaller units and organizations, it led to encouraging 
the participation of most members on a larger scale in society through meyasubako.   
On the receiving side, the government accepted this participation because they 
lacked the new ideas needed to lessen the crises that were forming, therefore proper and 
practical suggestions regarding policy making were often adopted by the Japanese 
government. It seems that this is the distinctive characteristic between meyasubako and 
sanduq-i adȃlat. The Japanese lords and rulers’ reception of administrative suggestions 
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by the people were just one part of the equation. The key to the success of meyasubako 
lies actually in the second part of the equation. The social developments such as a high 
rate of general literacy and a notion of civic duty developed within the Japanese group 
orientation values were key in providing a steady supply of new ideas that generated 
reforms and allowed the Japanese government to adapt as they moved from a traditional 
forms of government to more modern forms. In Iran, however this was not the case, as 
key components both sides of the equation were not lacking.  
The Japanese people in their petitions focused their critiques and suggestions on 
shogunate economic policies, government administrative affairs and malfeasance, and 
on agricultural, social, and educational developments. Especially in the Tosa domain, 
the consequences of the people’s involvement were the most obvious. It was in this 
domain where the people’s ideas as incorporated into administrative reforms led to 
social mobility and the opening of the political sphere, which would pave the way for 
major modern reforms such as the establishment of a representative council. 
The positive response of the shogun and the lords of Tosa domain to the proper and 
practical critiques and suggestions of the people became the educational content for 
leaders to learn. Kȏnai Yamashita, a masterless samurai (rȏnin) from the Kishȗ domain 
lived in Edo Aoyama, criticized Yoshimune’s policy by submitting a petition in 
September 1721 (the 6
th
 year of Kyȏhȏ period). Kȏnai’s action became a matter of great 
importance in society and politics. Kyusȏ Muro, the Confucian scholar, in his “kenzan 
hisako”, records that in response to Kȏnai’s petition, Yoshimune summoned his high 
officials and stressed that proposing suggestions and criticisms was a matter of utmost 
significance. Yoshimune then ordered his three magistrates (san bugyȏ) to duplicate the 
pattern used in Kȏnai’s petition. Kȏnai had started his petition with praise for 
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Yoshimune’s administrative and public reforms; he then offered a criticism of 
Yoshimune’s austerity policy which had led to economic crisis. Kȏnai also criticized 
Yoshimune for not differentiating between his shogunal and domainal policies. He 
asked Yshimune to promote his policies to a nationwide scale (“Yamashita Kȏnai jȏsho,” 
in Kokushi dai jiten http://www.japanknowledge.com/body/display/ accessed 7 June 
2013).  
The instructive suggestions of commoners and peasants often interested their rulers 
and were promoted in various ways. Other times, the manner of the petitions offended 
rulers. Following the installation of meyasubako, Muro Kyusȏ a close staff member of 
Yoshimune informed him in a report of a very interesting petition. The submitted 
petition by “the educated son of a village headman from shogunate-owned territories in 
eastern Japan (kantȏ) could not be read by the overseer of finances (kanjȏ gashira) and 
others due to its eloquence and writing in Chinese classical literature form.” He 
continued that “It was not a normally phrased petition but a ponderous text so that the 
magistrate of finance (kanjȏ bugyȏ) personnel could not read it.” It seemed that only a 
well-trained Confucianist scholar would be able to read it. Tsuji Morisan who was “well 
educated” and working as inspector in the office was commissioned by Yoshimune to 
read it. 
The petition alleged that there was “inefficient policy of finance magistrate” or 
wrong civil policy of the central government toward the people under its dominion.  
Regardless of its being false or true, Yoshimune said: “This person has noticed our 
faults and reported it in a ponderous style… he dared to criticize the adopted policies by 
officials.” Upon the ordinance of Yoshimune, his criticism was precisely answered 
(Yokota 2005: 297-298). In addition to the content of the petition, the style and manner 
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this case suggests the high level of education among commoners.   
When a ruler was informed through submitted petitions of local officials their 
neglecting which was inexcusable, he would punished those who were found guilty.  
For instance, Yoshimune received information through petition box that a wide 
agricultural area in Kazusa and Shimofusa (current Chiba prefecture) suitable for a rice 
field had been left uncultivated. The development of new rice field was one of the most 
important policies for the central government. The investigation of the complaint 
revealed that the magistrate of finance (kanjȏ bugyȏ) officials were derelict in the 
performance of their duties. Therefore in a punitive measure, the officials were banned 
from their privilege to have an audience with the shogun (Ȏishi 1996: 35-36).  
Besides criticisms, constructive suggestions were also well received by the 
government. The establishment of a hospital and a fire-prevention program for Edo 
were based on the suggestions made through meyasubako. In seventh year of Kyȏhȏ 
period, based on a private physician, Ogawa Shȏsen’s suggestion, the shogunal hospital 
for medicine at was established Koishikawa (Harafuji 1992: 776; Yokota 2005: 298). A 
group of firefighters was also organized in Edo after the idea was suggested by local 
merchants and craftsmen (chȏnin) (Harafuji op. cit., 776). New rice fields were 
developed in Shimofusa located in Chiba at the request of the local masterless samurai 
(rȏnin) (Yokota op. cit., 298). 
In the case of sanduq-i adȃlat, which lacked such characteristics, the government 
officials’ misused the box as an instrument to benefit their fortunes, and to accuse other 
rival officials in order to promote their own interests. In contrast to the officials, the 
commoners took the sanduq-i adȃlat seriously as a reform. They often would submit 
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their petitions in the presence of the box warder and prayed for the Shȃh for his 
benevolence (Folio No. 295/5175). 
Hȃjib al-Dawlah, as the person in charge of the box affirmed the Shȃh’s intentions 
for implementing sanduq-i adȃlat as a way for the Shȃh to stay informed about the 
current affairs of the time, including the mishandling of the governors against the 
commoners or commanders against the soldiers (Folio No. 295/5303: 3). Fully knowing 
the Shȃh’s intentions for reform and for holding them accountable, the local officials 
and commanders tried to exert their influence on the box in various ways from the 
beginning. Officials attempted to subsume their names on the royal announcement for 
the establishment of the box or tried to convince the Shȃh that they should be appointed 
as the person in charge of the box. When this didn’t work they utilized other means to 
interfere in the functions of administering the box. 
In one case, the Shȃh ordered Sanȋ al-Mulk [served on the staff of the Dawlat-i 
Aliyeh-i Iran daily] to print and publish the royal announcement regarding the box in 
the evening paper. (Folio No. 295/5135). However, the Shȃh’s order was not heeded and 
although the publicity had been properly completed, its publication was postponed in 
order to clarify inquiries regarding an amendment made by Yahyȃ Khȃn [Mushir 
al-Dawlah] that had been affixed to the royal announcement (Folio No. 295/5136). The 
amendment stated that I’itidhȃd al-Saltanah must be present in the process of petitioning 
and in the implementation of the verdicts. The reporter for the paper, Sanȋ al-Mulk, 
questioned this. He reminded the Shȃh that other influences other than the Shȃh in the 
process would be a breach of the Shȃh’s motives for the box. He stressed that the 
content of some petitions might not be simply complaints and litigation to be dealt with 
the Court of Justice (diwȃn-i adȃlat). Some petitions, he argued, were perhaps intended 
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to report to the Shȃh on military, financial and other affairs and were submitted as 
warnings to the governors and officials not to commit illegality. If others were allowed 
to interfere and influence the box’s administration, there would be no difference 
between the petitions of sanduq-i adȃlat and other petitions submitted to the Shȃh or the 
Court of Justice (diwȃn-i adȃlat). Therefore, Sanȋ al-Mulk asserted it would be better to 
print the publication without its amendment (Folio No. 295/5140). 
In the case of meyasubako, shogun Yoshimune and the lord of the Tosa domain found 
that the critiques and suggestions helped keep them informed of the reality of the social 
situations of their people. Therefore, it was stressed to take them in to consideration and 
policy making. For instance, a peasant from Kȏme village located in Sumidagawa “who 
had already studied Shintȏ principles … compiled a three-volume book as a guideline 
for government officials on how to do their duties” and submitted it through the petition 
box. Yoshimune convened the overseer of finances (kanjȏ gashira) staff and told them: 
“either good or evil, the inferior’s complaints will not be acceptable if incapable of 
proof.” He warned them that “the adoption of emergent policies [such as a tax increase] 
will distress the lower classes” and urged them to beware of implementing austerely 
policies overbearingly. Admonishing the staff, Yoshimune ordered his administration to 
employ the content of proposal in their policy making (Yokota 2005: 298). 
Tanaka Kyȗgu compiled a book titled “minkan seiyȏ” and apprised Yoshimune of the 
popular opinion regarding Ȏka Tadatsuke, the city magistrate (machi bugyȏ). Tanaka 
was the second son of a peasant from Tama-gouri Hirasawa village at Musashi no kuni, 
who worked as a silk goods peddler, and was later adopted by the manager of Kawasaki 
inn as his child and successor. Despite lacking a privileged position, Tanaka, in the 
preface wrote that the purpose of writing the book was to share the opinions of 
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“commoners” about the “political situation.” This mirrored the purpose of petition box 
installation in collecting information (Ibid., 298-299). The book, written by a lowly 
peasant, also demonstrates that commoners had awareness and knowledge about politics 
and felt that they had a right to express their opinions about political matters. 
While the installation of meyasubako was a good opportunity for sharing new 
suggestions and opinions by commoners and in case of the Tosa domain all classes of 
society with the government, allowing all to participate in policy making, Iranian 
officials used the box as an instrument to win power against their rivals. The commoner 
and his opinion about political matters had nothing to do with the box. With the 
commoners out of the picture, the box became source of conflict of who would control 
the box’s administration in order to secure power.    
In a series of correspondence on sanduq-i adȃlat, Hȃjib al-Dawlah, in response to 
Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s order, detailed who should be in charge of the box. Hȃjib al-Dawlah 
first pointed out that it was essential that he would be the Shȃh’s right-hand man and his 
confidant for vigorous management of the box service and requested the Shȃh to entrust 
sanduq-i adȃlat to him as a Ministry of Justice administration. Indicating his 
background and glorifying the Shȃh, Hȃjib al-Dawlah referred to himself as being a 
tried and trusted servant of the Shȃh, and as being financially strong and enjoying 
privileges imbued to him by the Shȃh which met the Shȃh’s requirements for managing 
the service competently. He also recited people’s dissatisfaction with officials such as 
Sipahsȃlȃr, Mustawfi al-Mamȃlik and Amin al-Dawlah who abused the Shȃh’s trust by 
not performing their duties with thoroughness (Folio No. 295/5303). 
A correspondent urged the Shȃh to allow the Court of Justice (diwȃne adȃlat), as the 
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official legal institutionand affiliate of the Ministry of Justice, to prosecute and issue 
verdicts on the petitions. He added otherwise interfering of other people in the legal 
administration of the petitions would be tantamount to an unsuccessful attempt to 
establish a clear process of reform. The correspondent cited the confusion that would be 
caused if the minister of Justice is responsible for calling for an investigation and 
completing the case within a week, and then another person is charged with the duty of 
the investigation. He claimed that such a system would repudiate the functions of high 
court as well (Folio No. 295/5189). He also notified Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh of other officials’ 
envy, specifically some of the king’s relatives.  
In a report to the Shȃh on sanduq-i adȃlat, Hajib al-Dawalah reported that some 
people were jealous of the Shȃh’s potent and independent management of the box 
administration and sought to conspire to undermine the Shȃh’s authority. Hajib 
al-Dawalah specifically named Dabir al-Mulk who was prevented by him from 
distribution of 200 tumȃns among himself and other secretaries as box administrative 
stipends because of Hajib al-Dawlah’s actions then started to sabotage the box system. 
Hajib al-Dawalah requested the Shȃh to censor some of conspirators who were the 
king’s kin (Folio No. 295/5303: 2). 
In the meyasubako system, offering useful suggestions was not only due to the rulers’ 
recognition of the commoners’ right to have a voice in political and social affairs. The 
commoners themselves had to have the ability to understand political and social affairs 
and be able to comment on it. This required a high rate of literacy amongst all the 
people. The deliberate suggestions deposited through meyasubako on the establishment 
of private schools and good level of literate people were somehow two sides of the same 
coin. It both demonstrated existing high literacy rates as well as called for continued 
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strengthening and widening of the educational system in order to continue to make 
literacy available to more and more people. 
In an argument entitled as “the rise of rural school during Kyȏhȏ period” Manabu 
Ȏishi gives some examples of the development of public education. Citing “Tokugawa 
jikki” (The Official History of Tokugawa), he refers to the establishment of Kaihodȏ 
school in August 1723 in Fukagawa of Edo. Kenzan Sugano, a masterless samurai 
(rȏnin) who was a student of Naokata Satȏ, a Confucian scholar, suggested the 
establishment through the petition box. The city magistrate (machi bugyȏ) ordered to 
investigate Sugano’s suggestion and lent a parcel of land in Fukagawa and some amount 
of money to build the school since he loved to teach. Twenty eight students from the 
samurai class and ordinary people were taught by Sugano, who was a fair teacher and 
who tried to simplify and teach them “the Chinese Classic book” (shȏgaku) and 
principles of Confucianism. Chikuzan Nakai, the fourth schoolmaster of Kaitokudo in 
Ȏsaka described the Edo “Kaihodȏ” school in his book, “Sogakigen”, as “the first 
school where commoners could study” (Ȏishi 2003: 50-51). It seems that before 1723, 
studying at school established by the bakufu or other domains was devoted to just 
samurai but Kaihodȏ school which was built with bakufu support was a pioneering 
private school for the general public, as was the Ȏsaka school financed by some 
merchants.  
One of the unique characteristics of this kind of petitioning was its written form 
rather not an oral appeal. In other words, submitting direct petitions to the superiors 
implied rising peasants’ literacy and writing skills (Ibid. 11). Ieyasu Tokugawa had 
already permitted a limited verbal form of submitting direct petitions but not in the form 
of petition box (meyasubako) (Ibid. 14). Can we say that with the rise in literacy, a 
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system that incorporated written appeals through meyasubako could be implemented? It 
is not clear since meyasubako was in use even before Ieyasu. 
In his argument about situation before the establishment of meyasubako, Wakao 
argues that “the inferior” was successful in the acquisition of general knowledge and 
useful ideas about the political situation by reading books. Therefore they had the 
courage to write unsigned petitions left anonymously (sutebumi) though it was 
dangerous (Wakao 2003: 290-291). 
Under the title of “[political situation] in the discussion of peasant through petition 
box system,” Yokota also extracts some reports from the sixth volume of “Nihon keizai 
taiten” or “Important Law of Japanese Economy” in a chapter titled “Kenzan hisaku” or 
“The Secret Plan of Kenzan.” He excerpts two reports from Muro Kyusȏ, a 
Confucianist and close staff member of Yoshimune, who had already served Maeda – 
the lord of the Kaga domain – as an advisor before his appointment as Yoshimune’s 
attendant. Maeda needed to receive some information through Muro Kyusȏ about the 
shogun and his close attendant’s attitudes. Therefore, the collected information in the 
form of report is assessed reliable (Yokota 2005: 298). 
The documents studied by Roberts also proved the relatively high rate of literacy 
among the villagers in the Tosa domain. The large number of known petitions in the 
Tosa domain is ascribed to easy access to the box, literacy, and the townspeople and 
samurai’s familiarity with governmental affairs. But not all people shared the same 
levels of literacy and knowledge of political affairs. Townspeople who represented less 
than 10 percent of the Tosa population, made up 21 percent of the petitions and the 
villagers comprising 80 percent of the whole population, made up only 25 percent 
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(Roberts 1994: 442-444). It can makes sense that townspeople were more literate 
because they had easier access to schools, libraries, etc; whereas villagers in more 
remote locales did not share the same advantages, although this was beginning to 
change over time.  
The Iranian officials such as the magistrate of capital and the head of the Court of 
Justice were involved in intrigues against each other. Like other officials, they found 
sanduq-i adȃlat a good device to achieve their own goals to malign their rivals, 
notwithstanding that the system was originally meant for the benign purpose of 
attending to the common people’s grievances against cruel officials. 
Mirzȃ Musȃ [the magistrate of Tehrȃn] complained against I’itimȃd al-Saltanah [the 
head Court of Justice, diwȃn-khȃnah-i adȃlat] who had accused him of beating a royal 
handyman. I’itimȃd al-Saltanah alleged that he had received a petition submitted by 
some women of the Sangeladj neighborhood in Tehrȃn. These two officials apparently 
were divided over changing the mayor of this neighborhood. Mirzȃ Musȃ claimed that 
he could not oppose I’itimȃd al-Saltanah, who had authority in matters of the petition 
box. However, referring to his exemplary service record, Mirzȃ Musȃ complained that 
others were conspiring against him and accused them of obstructionism and collusion 
against his management. He then accused I’itimȃd al-Saltanah of attempting to annex 
Tehrȃn jurisdiction to the high court (Folio No. 295/1946). 
The dispute did not end there. I’itimȃd al-Saltanah reported to the Shȃh that some of 
the ministers such as Mustawfi al-Mamȃlik, Amin al-Dawlah, I’itidhȃd al-Saltanah and 
the minister of foreign affairs were prompt in responding to inquiries regarding petitions 
and for administering the verdicts punctually. I’itimȃd al-Saltanah then referred to Mirzȃ 
219 
 
Musȃ’s negligence even though he had been reminded to imitate the senior ministers 
and officials in conducting his administrative duties and had been told that the Shȃh’s 
emphasized the importance of implementing the verdicts related to the box. Mirzȃ Musȃ 
continued however vigilantism and that he, I’itimȃd al-Saltanah, personally had to hold 
him accountable (Folio No. 295/1971).  
In response, Mirzȃ Musȃ fired off a letter to the Shȃh, in which he bewailed the 
interferences in some of the mayors’ administrative and appointment duties. He alleged 
that rivals were encouraging common people to submit petitions of complaint against 
officials such as marshal (Kalȃntar) or encouraging the Armenians in Tehrȃn to 
complain against Abulqȃsim Khȃn, the mayor. At the end, he requested the Shȃh to 
dismiss him as the magistrate of Tehrȃn if he agrees with that the interferences were just 
(Folio No. 295/5341). The Shȃh did not dismiss the magistrate but the disputes between 
Mirzȃ Musȃ and I’itimȃd al-Saltanah continued over other subjects. 
Describing the Shȃh’s decree as an equally irrevocable decision throughout the 
country, Hȃjib al-Dawlah [I’itimȃd al-Saltanah] informed him of Mirzȃ Musȃ’s (the 
magistrate of Tehrȃn) discontent with some of the petitions. He explained that after 
entrusting the affairs of religious minorities, first the Zoroastrians and then the 
Armenians to the ministry of foreign affairs, the Jews residing in Tehrȃn also requested 
the same. Hȃjib al-Dawlah argued that since the Shȃh was the ultimate source to 
distinguish the merits of the Jews’ request, he suggested to them to deposit their petition 
in the box which led to Mirzȃ Musȃ’s disaffection. The deposition of Hȃji Kȃzim, mayor 
of a neighborhood in Tehrȃn, was ordered by the Shȃh, disturbed the other two mayors, 
Hȃji Mirzȃ Taqi and Hȃji Mirzȃ Ridhȃ. They worried that after the deposition many 
people would allege their mismanagement via the box, but they were assured that any 
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allegation would not be accepted in the Court of Justice.  
In another case involving Mirzȃ Musȃ, Hȃjib al-Dawlah stated that following the 
receipt of petitions against the Mayor Abulqȃsim Khȃn, the Shȃh issued an oral order 
summoning the magistrate of Tehrȃn to report on the status of the petitions. Both Mirzȃ 
Musȃ, the magistrate, and Abulqȃsim Khȃn, the mayor, ignored the request. Hȃjib 
al-Dawlah demanded the Shȃh’s formal order summoning the men, emphasizing the 
legal equality of all humans and stating sarcastically that “most of the rules are not 
acceptable for the high ranking officials, let alone the magistrate of Tehrȃn” (Folio No. 
295/5342: 1). 
Following the previous report, Hȃjib al-Dawlah explained to the Shȃh that he 
summoned the Mayor Abulqȃsim Khȃn once again to clear away any doubt about the 
rules. But the magistrate of Tehrȃn apparently decided to nullify the ministry of foreign 
affairs’ order and Mayor Ramidhȃn Khȃn’s measures during the Shȃh’s absence. 
Therefore, Hȃjib al-Dawlah argued the offenders must be held accountable according to 
the Shȃh’s emphasis on upholding of the authentic rules; and if they suffered ridicule by 
the people upon their return to Tehrȃn that is the punishment that they would have to 
suffer (Folio No. 295/5342: 2). 
Some people who failed to gain their favorite job by applying various tactics such as 
bribery or threats resorted to sanduq-i adȃlat to achieve their goals. In another decree by 
Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh to help a creditor who applied his lent money and employment as a 
secretary in Court of Justice (dȋwȃnkhȃnah) due to his application and being a penman, 
the person in charge reported the Shȃh that the abovementioned tried to bribe him to be 
appointed as the chief secretary. This person also could not be employed due to his 
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indecorum to foreign minister. The applicant got angry and started exclaiming and 
threatening and it was revealed that he was the person who submitted the petition, the 
son of Mirzȃ Muhammad Ali Khȃn, the late foreign minister (Folio No. 295/1888: 2).   
In Japan, the social status of the samurai as the dominant class was threatened by the 
spread of literacy among the rural people. Yoshimune began to worry about this matter 
and advised his samurai to be more careful about their children’s education. In a 
meeting with the bannermen’s (hatamoto) adolescent children, Yoshimune urged them 
“to study albeit not so deeply but to be able to read the four books-Confucian texts- 
(shisho) and memorize them.” Yoshimune’s reason for the advice was that he had 
noticed that “commoners” such as peasants with “knowledge” criticizing the 
government “policies” were dominating over the samurai class who were in charge of 
hereditary administrative positions (Yokota 2005: 299). 
In Japanese rural society during the Edo era, the village headmen (nanushi), old 
wealthy peasants and some people such as the village doctors, the teachers at the temple 
elementary schools (terakoya), lordless samurai (rȏnin), Buddhist and Shinto priests 
and village officials were the intellectuals. “The village children” studied under the 
aforementioned people and were expected to be able to read and understand the content 
of public laws and enjoy the reciting of Japanese poetry (haiku) and singing Noh (nȏ), a 
form of musical-dance drama as their leisure activity. Therefore the range of rural 
literate people was as wide as foothill and not limited to the peak or the outstanding 
personalities (Ibid., 300). 
It deserves to indicate here some previous points about Japanese bureaucratic system. 
The organization of shogun bureaucracy was based on the traditional status system 
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which was reformed in part so that people could obtain high level positions through 
other means. Reforms included the sale of rank as a retainer of shogun (gokenin kabu), 
the supplemental salary (tashidaka) system, and the samurai adoption organizations, all 
of which made for a much more dynamic system for promotion that gave priority to 
talent as a way for upward social mobility (Kasaya 2000: 172). 
Within these reforms, there was both a priority on increasing participation as well as 
attention to limiting corruption. Participation in decision making took the form of both 
circulating documents within a (ringi) system and empowering people to have a stake in 
the system (mochibun). Limiting corruption utilized the traditional customs of “forced 
retirement” or house arrest (oshikome) which was somehow a check and balance 
practice to prevent the leaderhip’s (daimyȏ) arbitrary tendencies.  
These practices can be divided into two main methods for organizational promotion 
and mobility and also participation in decision making. Both will happen within the 
organization but in case of the box, on a larger scale the whole society could take part.  
The survival of any organization necessitates the employment and promotion of 
talented and qualified people and the method and process of appointment and promotion 
are most significance (Ibid., 163).  
The petition box has been in use for a long period. From 1721 till 1873 when 
meyasubako was officially abolished, it was in service both during the long period of 
the Tokugawa shogunate and even some years after the formation of the modern state of 
Meiji. 
The long usage of the box during the Tokugawa period contributed to the 
institutionalization of the culture that promoted socio-political participation. Even 
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though the long usage of the box was not continuous during the entire time due to the 
nature of the rulers and crises as Ȏhira indicates (Ȏhira 2003: 207), its contribution was 
significant. 
The modern government of Meiji also at first installed meyasubako in front of head 
office in Saiwaibashi in Tokyo (Harafuji 1992: 776). 
In case of Qajar, sanduq-i adȃlat did not last as long as meyasubako. Due to the 
uncertainty of two different dates of establishment and no official date of its abolition it 
is impossible to estimate how long it has been in use. Unlike Curzon’s exaggeration and 
Hidayat’ argument about the abolition of sanduq-i adȃlat (Curzon 1892: 465; Hidȃyat 
1363/1984: 75), many complaints and petitions were attended according to the extant 
documents. Upon to the mentioned documents, the box was still functioning till Rajab 
of 1305/ December 1888 (Folio No. 16578 quoted in Talayee 1385/2004: 40). 
 Moreover, since the right for submitting the suggestions and critiques was not 
recognized in sanduq-i adȃlat, therefore the outcomes of the practice both short-term 
and long-term are not the same as its counterpart. As it will be referred to in next part, 
application of meyasubako in the Tosa domain with no restrictions on the participation 
by the samurai class opened the political sphere and consequently paved the way for the 
proposing of and reception of new reforms. 
Within the Tosa domain, the bureaucratic samurai familiar with political affairs 
thanks to serving in the administrative organization could deposit their suggestions and 
critiques. Doing so provided them with a good opportunity to present their capabilities 
to rulers which led often to their promotions based on talent. Therefore, the 
administrative system fostered social mobility of the low-level samurai. But excluding 
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samurai from the petitioners of the box in Edo and other territories under the direct 
control of the bakufu and confining them to the ringi system of administrative 
organization limited the samurai’s’ freedom to offering only suggestions and critiques 
related to social affairs. Therefore the opportunity to demonstrate their abilities to higher 
ranking officials and receive promotions was drastically restricted. There are certainly 
some exceptions such as the masterless samurai (rȏnin), and the cases where the rural 
and urban officials knew about the bureaucratic affairs or in some rare cases when 
commoners out of the samurai class whose useful suggestions helped them to obtain a 
rank in samurai class and get promoted. 
According to Roberts, applying the petition box in the Tosa domain paved the way 
for the advancement of educated samurai as opportunities rose for middle and low-level 
samurai to present their knowledge and capabilities. As an example, Kyȗtoku Daihachi, 
a low-rank retainer was highly praised for his petition and promoted to samurai status 
and appointed head of domain finances in 1787. Within the solidly hierarchical Japanese 
society of the time, the petition box was a channel for the flourishing of samurai talent 
that was able to circumvent the hierarchical structure. 
Samurai in their proposals mainly focused on topics such as corruption, education 
and appointment of qualified people for office which suggests their attention to and 
support of a meritocracy (Roberts 1998: 122-124). 
Petitions often contained social critiques of the government’s policies and the 
official’s behavior. Many petitioners used nicknames both for security reasons and for 
the prevention of the petition from burning. A pseudonymous petition under the name 
Miyata Bunsuke (Bunsuke means “the writer helper”) in the Tosa domain contained 
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various critiques such as the retainers gallivanting in Edo brothels which emptied the 
domain’s treasure house, the common townspeople should be privileged to use parasols 
which was limited to the samurai class, charging an entrée fee to non-Tosa people, lord 
should  quit hunting on prayer days, the dangerous dogs in castle town which were 
harmful to people, specifically to women and children should be controlled (Ibid., 
124-125).     
Applying the box had a two-sided benefit. The receivers of the petitions, in this case 
the rulers and lords, garnered information about what was happening in society. The 
writers of petitions gained the benefit of an opened political sphere for the discussion of 
common topics as well as a kind of general sympathy among various guilds. For 
instance, a petition written in 1759 by the representatives of this domain’s carpenter 
guild to protest the unfair payment was filed. The petition asserted that because of the 
unfair payment they would look for better jobs, which was akin to threatening to strike.   
After the carpenter petitioners were punished by the domain rulers, four petitions from 
non-carpenter guild were submitted to support them. For example, a village doctor 
criticized the immorality of the domain’s behavior toward them.  
Roberts argues that the petition box was originally created as a one-way channel for 
individuals to communicate with the lords which was in accordance with a political 
atomization strategy to ban political discussion. But it actually had the opposite effect.  
The ability to petition regarding common topics was an implicit recognition that such 
topics were now a part of the public and political arena.   
Some other common issues mentioned in other petitions were: limiting transportation 
corvée, stopping the merchant monopoly, prohibiting the lord’s concubine from 
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splurging, special tax reduction, promoting education especially for officials. These 
suggestions influenced various policies (Ibid., 127-129). 
The domain government encouraged petitioners to discuss various topics which at 
one point had been forbidden. Surviving documents suggest that many petitioners were 
officially appreciated by lord for their suggestions and comments. We have seen how 
suggestions and even criticisms were incorporated into policy-making. These actions 
promoted and expanded political discussions amongst the people.    
The contents of petitions also had an influential role in the education of Toyoteru, the 
next lord of the Tosa domain in 1830’s. As part of his homework he had to copy down a 
retainer’s petition and write an essay on the significance of the “path of communication” 
(Roberts 1988: 130-131).  
As it will be discussed in next part, one of the most remarkable suggestions in the 
Tosa domain was submitted by a samurai and was a matter of utmost significance in 
modern Japan.   
It was mentioned that the box was in use not only in Tokugawa era but also after 
Meiji Restoration due to various reasons. Perhaps the new rulers found it a useful device 
and sufficient countermeasure for crises. 
The majority of the suggestions and critiques deposited in meyasubako in the final 
years of Tokugawa era (bakumatsu) remained the same though some began to evidence   
differences, which reflected shifting political and social conditions that would take form 
in the Meiji period. For instance, after the central government official (bakufu) warned a 
group of farmers on their luxurious life; their headman retaliated by filing a petition 
criticizing the official’s high life and lavish expenditure of money. In 1850 (Kei 3), 
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Kanzȏ, the village headman of Ogushimura in Kȏzoku no kuni (Gunma Prefecture), 
deposited a detailed petition in Edo meyasubako (Kenjȏ 1979: 21- jȏ). In his petition he 
pointed out the bakufu’s warning to peasants about a luxurious life. Peasants however 
follow the officials’ life style, argued the headman. He cited Tȏshȏgȗ, Ieyasu 
Tokugawa’s tomb decorated with gold and silver as a comparison with the very simple 
grave of the Emperor. According to his petition, Ieyasu did not expect such a luxurious 
tomb in his mind, but this was commissioned by his successors. He continued his 
criticism by stating that during the repairing of the Edo castle, some logs were covered 
by cushions. He called it meaningless and attributed it to a wasteful attitude and to the 
bribery of officials by making it a business for their own (Kenjȏ 1979: 22-31- chȗ). 
Petitions during this time also critiqued the failure of the government to be prepared 
against natural disaster, ill-treatment and tyranny of the officials and an unfair 
prosecution process which was time-consuming and costly. In 1783 (Tenmei 3), Mount 
Asama erupted. Due to the consequent famine, the bakufu stepped in and prevented 
widespread starvation. In 1837 (Tenpȏ 8), however, there was no support from 
government when such a famine happened and many people died of hunger. A petitioner 
alleged not only had the bakufu’s insufficiently prepared against such disasters, but they 
also unacceptably put the responsibility to save the crops in the village silo as the 
peasants’ duty. He called it an objectionable policy which was the bakufu’s duty and 
emphasized that even the peasants had some knowledge and experiences on how to 
prepare against the disasters (Kenjȏ 1979: 44-50- ge no 2).   
The petitioner also reported that complaining against a robbery case took a long time 
and wasted a lot of money for the victim to be judged. He called it an injustice and a 
waste for the country (Kenjȏ 1979: 46-48- ge no 1). He indicated that the incumbent 
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officials had forgotten their duties and they were just enjoying themselves. Once again 
he alleged that the officials tried to blame the peasants for administrative financial 
deficits that slowed the prosecution of cases (Ibid., 42). 
Petitioners also made suggestions and critiques concerning the government’s 
agricultural and military policies. One of the townspeople of Edo Shitaya submitted a 
suggestion on coastal defense policy and repeated it two other times in the same year 
(Mochizuki 2008: 73). The former village headman of Kazusa, a region under the 
control of hatamoto, offered a plan to straighten the serpentine river of Yȏrȏ (table no. 
43), for flood prevention and for reclamation of new farm fields from the marshland 
along the river (Ibid., 74). 
As the petition box was still in use after Meiji Restoration, the flow of petitions 
continued. The topics of the petitions were about various subjects such as morals, 
various political, social, commercial, economic, and military affairs. For instance, a 
masterless samurai suggested financial aid for physicians and military personnel due to 
their poor economic situation. In June 1896 (Meiji 2), petition No. 194 propounded that 
Japanese lacquer trees (urushi no ki) as trading goods were increasing national income. 
The petitioner suggested that the government order physicians to preserve the trees and 
as recompense they should receive 25 percent of the value of the trees. The remaining 
half of the value of the trees should be allocated for the preservation of the trees, and the 
remaining quarter should be reserved for use in the physicians’ studies. 
The same petitioner suggested some measures to be taken for preparation of the army 
forces throughout Japan. He also suggested that an investigation was needed to 
determine the cause of the increased commodity prices and adoption of a proper 
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countermeasure (Ȏhira 1995 “238 (2)”: 128-9). 
The critiques of social affairs were the content of other petitions. It is unclear 
whether the petitioners were reacting to Japanese westernization or were continuing to 
critique normal and/or traditional social practices. For instance, in July 1869 (Meiji 2), a 
patriot in his petition (No. 307) requested for the prohibition of some immoral activities 
in Kyȏto such as mixed-bathing, women hairdresser job, lady entertainer as singer and 
musical storyteller (Ȏhira 1995 “238 (2)”: 187). It is unclear whether these practices 
were introduced by westernization or were a continuous problem from the past. 
Certainly the suggestions in a petition filed in July 1869 (Meiji 2), were a 
continuation of past issues. Petition No. 335 proposed: 
a. Strict control on sake-making,  
b. Banning of prostitution, and  
c. Selecting a village headman (sonchȏ) to control the village legal 
issues.  
The petitioner, a peasant from present Yamagata prefecture also requested checking 
all the village documents annually by the government (Ȏhira op. cit., 200). 
Petitions also reflected concerns about significant social changes, which were clearly 
introduced with westernization. These petitions often warned of personal calamity due 
to changes in the social structure and requested high level government intervention. 
Others expressed fear for social changes that seemed to threaten the Emperor’s safety.    
For instance, in August 1869 (Meiji 2), a petitioner [supposedly a merchant petitioner] 
from Takemaruya Kȏshichi complained that farmers were focused on trading products 
rather than cultivating; consequently, the farms were ruined and the small group 
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peasants faced crisis. He requested the immediate intervention to correct the problem 
(Ȏhira of 1995 “240 (3)”: 128-9). 
In 1869 (Meiji 2), petition No. 652 requested the following: Due to presence of many 
strange foreigners in Tokyo, the Emperor should return to Kyoto. Because of the 
invasion risk by foreign countries, the exclusion of foreigners (jȏi) policy should be 
adopted. Many monks should be punished because of their immoral acts and it is better 
to change the abandoned temples into farms (Ȏhira 1995 “242 (5)”: 154). The last case 
also contains some suggestion on political and economic fields. 
 
Petition No. 678 in 1869 (Meiji 2) dealt with the following issues on commerce.  
 The abandonment of various currencies in circulation throughout 
Japan, and its replacement to gold coins. 
 The division of the country into 68 states and the establishment of an 
official market for trading the products of each area. 
 The establishment of membership rules of main and small wholesalers 
and brokers in the aforementioned market. 
 The enforcement of allowing only surplus products for foreign trade, 
and  
 The ban on export of gold and silver should be prohibited (Ȏhira 1995 
“242 (5)”: 167).  
That commoners filed petitions on such a range of topics reflects their knowledge 
and high rate of literacy as well as a value by the government on receiving the collective 
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wisdom in order to make effective policies. It is noteworthy however that commoners 
concerned themselves with such complicated and high level national policy issues and 
felt that that their suggestions filed through the petition would be considered seriously 
and would be implemented.   
All in all, as Roberts argued it was not a democratic measure. Ȏhira also confirmed 
this point and presented some questions about the spread of meyasubako in early 
modern era Japan under a despotic regime which should be answered in a separate 
research project. 
He said it is not overstating if we call kinsei as “suggestion box period”. What was 
the reason for its widespread use in comparison with Japanese ancient and medieval 
periods? How petition box was instituted in “such a despotic government as a means of 
communication between the ruler and the ruled?”  
The proper answer might be deduced by analyzing and comparing the political 
structure, litigation system, bureaucratic mechanism, economic system, people’s 
proactive ability, the ruler’s capability and dominant ideology and thought in this period 
and ancient medieval periods (Ȏhira 2003: 211). 
Although meyasubako was an interesting institution in pre-modern Japan, it could 
not be called a democratic system implemented by a democrat ruler. Both Roberts and 
Ȏhira are cautious in this respect when it is stressed that it is not "a symptom of 
democratic ideology" but encouraged political discussion (Roberts 1998: 132). It was 
also described as a system established by patriarchic but kindhearted ruler in Edo era, 
primarily applied to rule the ruled as a benevolent ruler. Although the system per se was 
valuable, it should not be overestimated since the “guaranteeing of complain” was 
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subject to some limitations unlike its utmost significance. 
In fact, it was not people’s civil rights granted by the ruler and did not hold a 
democratic dimension but rather doing commoners a favor to express their opinions. 
On the other hand, it cannot be negated that such a pre-modern experience prepared 
the right background for formation of various political and legislative systems in 
Japanese Modern Age (Ȏhira op. cit., 210). In this respect, it seems Ȏhira the same as 
Roberts allude to indirect effects of applying meyasubako in modern Japan. However he 
does not assert the impact of meyasubako on “Freedom and Popular Rights Movement” 
as Roberts indicated. Ȏhira has some reservation about dual role of meyasubako in 
modern era and mainly the continuation of history. 
He believes that proper situation paved the way for transition of petition box system 
as a positive pre-modern experience and some of its other contemporary system to 
modern age but the emergence of modern institutions in this era caused contradiction 
between them and meyasubako system. Since the essence of this system had not 
changed, it could not only make a direct connection with modern institutions but also 
acted as an obstacle in the way of their formation. Emphasizing on the former part will 
show the continuity aspect of history and stressing on the latter part display the 
discontinuity aspect (Ibid., 210-211). 
 
Justice and Legitimacy 
Nasir al-Din Shȃh’s innovation to apply sanduq-i adȃlat as the symbolic fulfillment 
of his duty as the sole source of justice and the officials’ references to the ancient origin 
of this system as well as to the Islamic sources on justice in their correspondence clearly 
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suggests how the Shȃh, officials and even commoners were aware of justice and its 
important role in governing discourse. 
In his letter to the Shȃh, Hȃj Mullȃ Muhammad-Sȃdiq Qumi, an influentially 
redoubtable Islamic jurisprudent (faqih) and a cynosure clergyman to the Shȃh, 
acknowledged the Shȃh’s advocacy for the dissemination of justice and for the 
establishment of sanduq-i adȃlat. Qumi, in the same letter also criticized the Shȃh’s 
close associates and government officials’ injustice, writing: “All officials rather than 
Your Excellency are able to tyrannize but rather do nothing but oppress…” (Modarres 
Tabȃtabȃyee 1353/1974: 214-215). He also indicated that with all the corrupt associates 
surrounding the Shȃh, he was more just than Anȗshȋrvȃn, and needed to be the person to 
be appealed to by his subjects (Ibid., 217). Indicating the Shȃh’s advantage over the 
popular Iranian king in ancient time and acquitting the Shȃh of all charges of injustice 
and neglect are the main points in his letter. While he exonerated the king and held him 
up as the source of justice, he accused the officials around him. Comparing the box with 
the ancient practices helped emphasize the general awareness of this tradition and its 
purpose to fight corruption and to administer justice for the people. 
Sanduq-i adȃlat was characterized as the “justice belled chain” of the Just 
Anȗshȋrvȃn [Khosraw I, King of Sassanid Persians 531-579] (I’timȃd al-Saltanah n. d. 
70). After the installation of the box, some of the officials glorified the Shȃh’s measure 
by comparing it with historical Iranian and Islamic cases and documents. One official 
welcoming the Justice Box extolled Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s action and emphasized its 
significance comparing it historically to an ancient reform. In a letter the official 
claimed that throughout history no other king since Anȗshȋrvȃn who installed his 
“justice belled chain” to be rattled by anyone who would like to have an audience with 
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him had accomplished such a radical reform.  
The official was referencing the ancient Iranian king Anȗshȋrvȃn who historically has 
been described as a wise king, and is accredited with wide-sweeping reforms.  
Narrative accounts have the Prophet Muhammad stating gloriously that he was born 
during the reign of the Just Anȗshȋrvȃn. According to another tradition ascribed to Ali, 
the first Imam of Shiite, justice would guarantee the stability of kingdom.  
The official, drawing on these historical understandings, justifies the Shȃh’s reforms, 
including the sanduq-i adȃlat as a proper policy for the chaotic situation of the time 
(Folio No. 295/1789: 3). Lastly the correspondent requested that the Shȃh appoint him 
as the attendant of Justice Box [in Hamadȃn city] (Ibid., P. 4). Clearly the official used 
adulation in order to secure a privileged position, however his choice of comparison of 
the Shȃh to Anȗshȋrvȃn suggests that the correspondent knew the historical background 
of the Shȃh’s reforms.  
One of the officials in charge of sanduq-i adȃlat in Tehrȃn went one step further, and 
claimed that the Shȃh’s was better than Anȗshȋrvȃn’s “justice belled chain”. He argued 
that if the verdicts on petitions were not administered it would constitute paradoxical 
justice. In order to avoid this, he made changes to expedite and make the petition system 
efficient. He drafted a list of those petitioners who mainly were requesting stipends or 
employment, eliminating them from the requests submitted to the Shȃh. The official 
worried that the Shȃh might become bored with too many petitions of this type and 
would stop the petition box system. This action simplified the petition task, speed up 
adjudicating process, and prevented the Shȃh from being inconvenienced (Folio No. 
295/1929). 
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Citing the Islamic scholars’ famous expression that “as many as people, there are 
ways to reach God,” a reporter indicated that the Shȃh’s policy for the installation of the 
petition box was the best way for the Shȃh to stay in contact with different groups of 
common people. He expressed hope that numerous trite petitions would not bore and 
revolt the Shȃh (Folio No. 295/1969). 
Extolling Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s innovation in installing sanduq-i adȃlat, a 
correspondent claimed that no one else could convey the common people’s requests to 
the Shȃh except the people themselves. This advantage of direct appeal could be 
sabotaged due to various causes, including lack of enforcement of the verdicts by the 
governors (Folio No. 295/1926). In these reports corresponding related to the box or to 
the Ministry of Justice, correspondents paid him great compliments by describing the 
Shȃh’s distinct character as the source of justice.  
In a letter on the appointment of Adhid al-Mulk as the minister of Justice, the 
correspondent emphasizes that it is the justice seeking Shȃh’s special consideration that 
has allowed the implementation and dissemination of justice through the structural 
revision of the Ministry of Justice and through the permanent establishment of reforms.  
Furthermore the just Shȃh has recruited and appointed qualified people, such as Adhid 
al-Mulk to carry out Shȃh’s justice (Folio No. 296/4425). 
Sipahsȃlȃr in his report, documents the Shȃh holding a special council in each 
province to deal with the referred cases by the Ministry of Justice and the ruling about 
sanduq-i adȃlat cases. Sipahsȃlȃr attributes the Shȃh’s actions to his desire to seek 
justice and to provide comfort to his subject (Folio No. 296/6621). Another letter 
informs Adhid al-Dawlah of the same actions and grants similar justice based 
236 
 
attributions to the Shȃh as motivations (Folio No. 296/6043: 1). 
As previously stated, commoners and samurai had knowledge of about different 
forms meyasubako throughout their country’s history; it was this knowledge that formed 
the demands for its implementation by the people of the Tosa domain aware of its 
implementation in neighboring domains through shared communication (Roberts 1994: 
437). Samurai were also aware of the historical tradition of applying the box in ancient 
China and Japan and used this as a basis for their requests as well (Ibid., 110). But the 
knowledge of common Iranians on historical measures such as sanduq-i adȃlat neither 
necessarily underlaid their demands for reform nor their acceptance of the practice. 
While some officials referred to ancient kings and their just practices, and drew parallels 
with the Shȃh’s reforms in praise of his actions, these often were the Shȃh’s court 
supporters or applicants seeking positions within the new system. The majority of 
people, however did not draw the same conclusions about the reforms nor see them in 
this particular light.     
 
Petition Box and Parliament 
Various transitions of the meyasubako and the sanduq-i adȃlat systems occurred as 
the two countries transitioned from the pre-modern to modern eras. In both countries 
there were various degrees of continuation and discontinuation of the administering of 
the petition box and the receiving of direct appeals. In particular, indirect consequences 
of the box were a significant factor in how the two countries made this transition, which 
effects to this day how their governments operate. 
The continuation of applying meyasubako system in the throes of Boshin War 
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between Imperial and shogunate forces (1868-1869) was a matter of utmost significance 
for Meiji government. The young Meiji government had not yet been stabilized when 
war broke out. In order to stabilize its rule and develop effective government institutions, 
the new ruling elite needed to restore the people’s trust in and ensure their obedience to 
the Meiji regime. To accomplish this, they realized that they needed a mechanism that 
would convey the people’s thoughts, ideas and opinions to the rulers. This need paved 
the way for the transition of the petition box system as a positive pre-modern experience 
and some of its other contemporary systems to the modern age.   
There were, however, emerging modern institutions in the same era which 
contradicted the meyasubako system and resulted in conflict. The essence, both its 
purposes and practices, of the pre-modern system clashed with the modern institutions, 
not only failing to make a direct connection with the modern institutions but also 
becoming an obstacle in the way of their formation. Emphasis on the former issue will 
address the continuity aspect of history and analysis on the latter will demonstrate issues 
of discontinuity (Ȏhira 2003: 210-211). Ȏhira refers to this two part issue as the 
paradoxical presence of meyasubako in modern age. 
Sohrabi, in studying the sanduq-i adȃlat, argues that this pre-modern practice was a 
continuation of a dominant paradigm of justice into the modern age. The classic 
discourse on Islamic and Iranian kingship, which associated the King’s rule with justice, 
as evidenced in the many Islamic mirrors, was still a practical paradigm during the 
1323/1906 Iranian Constitutional Revolution. The discourse prevailed even through the 
revolution that the earthly the government and the ruler was seen as the “Shadow of 
God on earth”. Among the certain qualifications necessary for the ruler to reach to this 
status, justice was of great importance (Sohrabi 1999 quoted in Schneider 2006: 30-31). 
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In his argument, Sohrabi applies the classic idea of the “Circle of Justice” where 
according to the Islamic mirrors, the Shȃh was the summit of the circle which includes 
different classes of people as its constituents. Based on the Iranian mirrors traditions, 
which were still alive in Qajar era, the Shȃh was the source of justice whose duty was to 
preserve balance between various classes and ensure order. This duty required him to 
act justly and be in direct contact with his subjects. Failure to do so would break the 
circle and bring his rule in question (Sohrabi 1999: 255-257). This official ideology was 
applied by the Qajar state and Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s reforms and innovations which 
included the practice of reserving Sundays to deal with the cases of his aggrieved 
subjects, the establishment of Justice Box and majlis-i tahqȋq-i mazȃlim (the Council for 
the Investigation of Grievances) .   
The widespread usage of meyasubako in various domains, specifically by the Tosa 
domain, helped people protect their rights, express their opinions and promote political 
discussion. It was a pre-modern device that facilitated the condition for expressing 
opinions; the modern form of meyasubako is the council of representatives.   
The meyasubako system not only protected the interests and rights of the individuals 
but also guaranteed that the people had a voice in their government’s policies. Through 
the meyasubako system people could freely express their opinions about central and 
local governments' politics (baku-han) without hesitation. Opening the channels of 
communication and acceptance of people's opinions, criticisms and expectations was an 
epoch-making and enduring event. Collecting people's useful experiences and petitions 
for change, created a deep sympathy between the rulers and people, which caused 
people to trust the superiors. It should be noted that popular will took the form of 
lawsuits and suggestions. As Roberts has stressed it was not "a symptom of democratic 
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ideology" but encouraged political discussion (Roberts 1998: 132). 
But Ȏhira is more cautious than Roberts, arguing that the formation of public opinion 
and encouragement of political discussion can only be indirectly ascribed to the 
meyasubako system. Meyasubako paved the way for the establishment of various 
systems so that public opinion could influence politics. At the end of Edo era and after 
formation of Meiji modern state in other hand, meyasubako was a historical experience 
which prepared the society to both give and receive public opinion (Ȏhira 2003: 
209-210). Either viewpoint, demonstrates that the practice of offering suggestions 
through the box had an important impact on future events. 
The people of the Tosa domain, (present Kochi prefecture), known for being out 
spoken, were pioneers in the creation of a Japanese representative system of 
government from over century ago. Roberts argues that the usage of the petitions in 
democratic movements during the early Meiji period was somehow an adaptation of 
traditional behavior with new conditions and for new ends. The development of the 
petition box practice and its ideals of representative government which goes back over 
2000 years ago occurred independently from Western democratic practices and fit more 
with notions and ideals based on elite-bureaucratic rule (Roberts 1994: 427). 
The Shȃh’s failure in meeting the commoners’ demands for justice by applying 
various aforementioned institutions was an important factor for the socio-political 
orientation of the majority in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. It could be one of 
the indirect consequences of the applied institutions, specifically the sanduq-i adȃlat.   
Plagued by injustice and oppression of the government and rulers, the ruled’s main 
incentives at the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution was to advocate for justice 
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(Rouhani 2004/1383: 89). The majority (the guilds and clerics) primarily sought to 
establish adȃlat khȃnah (House of Justice) rather than majlis-i shawray-i milli (Iranian 
Parliament/ National Assembly) (Ettehadieh 1989: 51). 
Although the Iranian Constitutional Revolution was the result of growing social 
consciousness and discontent, the majority of the people demanded the grant of adȃlat 
khȃnah (House of Justice) as their primary goal and did not conceive a new institution 
such as a parliament (Kasravi 1383/2005: 67&110). While intellectuals tried to argue 
for the adoption of the latter, the majority were calling for the former as the proper 
reform of an existing institution, which had not yet been met been accomplished. 
As Roberts argues the incompetent practice of Japanese government in eighteenth 
century led to implementation of the petition box system, which allowed the official 
reception of commoner’s suggestions. A new institution to facilitate communication to 
the lord, suggested by Imakita Sakubei, was a kind of petition box in a live form 
(Roberts 1997: 588-589). According to Roberts, the idea of a modern representative 
system can trace its history back to the eighteenth century Japan related to the 
application of meyasubako. 
On the establishment of Iranian constitutional assembly, Sohrabi points to the 
different demands of the westernized elite as compared to the guilds and clerics who 
had a minimal understanding of Western concepts. The latter sought to revive an 
institution which would deal with public grievances based on the local discourse of 
kingship and justice. This primary demand was presented in their call for a House of 
Justice rather than a Western parliament (Sohrabi 1999: 253-254 and Kasravi 
1945/1324: 17-18). When a parliamentary system was established in Iran, it was not due 
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to the demands of the people nor to the established tradition, but a model that was 
adopted from the West. The Japanese parliamentary system, however, developed 
differently as an indigenous idea that was channeled through the traditional practice of 
the petition box into the modern system.   
The adaption of traditional practices arising out of indigenous ideas can be seen in 
Sakubei’s 1787 petition. Born into a Samurai family, Sakubei served the inherited jobs 
such as guard of the castle and the secret investigator (shinobi) for the lord of the Tosa 
domain (Roberts op. cit., 579-580). He submitted a petition in 1787, suggesting 
establishment of a new advisory council to discuss government policies. The council, he 
specified, should be constituted of best of the domain’s people regardless of their social 
status and class and elected by “all the people of the country [of Tosa]” not the lord. 
Although the proposed factors were not compatible with the political structure of the 
Edo period dominated by samurai class, the domain’s reformist samurai did not oppose 
the proposal. The substance of Sakubei’s suggestion demonstrates the indigenous nature, 
not a Western one, and an amalgamation of his experiences and samurai traditions (Ibid., 
575-576). 
Muzaffar al-Din Shȃh (1853-1907), Nȃsir al-Din Shȃh’s son and successor, opposed 
any reforms that would lead to a constitutional system. Most of people, however, 
assumed that he was a victim of his corrupt associates and ministers, and their unjust 
measures. Therefore, the people resorted to the political culture and indigenous 
discourse of kingship and justice to justify their rebellion against the government 
(Sohrabi 1999: 253-254). According to the circle of justice theory, people still conceived 
that the Shȃh’s duty as the source of justice was to preserve the balance between the 
classes and to ensure order. 
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Sakubei’s petition stressed choosing dutiful and faithful people who acted not out of 
self-interest but in the interest of the people. He also warned that corrupt officials would 
heckle the council and try to limit the people’s freedom. Despite Sakubei’s efforts and 
the support his petition received, his suggestion was not introduced finally and there 
was no other proposal until 1860 that establishment of an American version of the 
council was submitted (Roberts op. cit., 592-593). 
The Tosa samurai pioneered the “Freedom and Popular Rights Movement” a century 
later in 1870s to establish constitutional and representative institutions in the Japanese 
modern state based on Western systems.  Sakubei’s proposal suggests that the 
interpretations of Western political thought as the mainspring in this movement were 
facilitated by Japanese indigenous tradition. Nearly 100 years prior to the introduction 
of Western ideals of government, Sakubei’s proposal emphasized the central role of the 
emperor or lord, valued self-sacrifice and faithfulness in the official, and strove to 
improve communication in order to form an alliance between people and government.  
These same points were foundational in the “Freedom and Popular Rights Movement” 
(Ibid., 595-596).. 
Due to strong similarities between adȃlat khȃnah (House of Justice) and classic 
institutions such as majlis-i tahqȋq-i mazȃlim (the Council for the Investigation of 
Grievances) which replaced sanduq-i adȃlat, the protesters demanded its creation. 
When the National Assembly (parliament) was established instead, the majority 
regarded it as the House of Justice and a stream of complaints was submitted to the 
assembly. “The traditionalists’ primary form of action was to petition the assembly to 
come into direct contact with the “source of justice”… A modernist representative 
discouraged the public from sending their trivial petitions, for they wasted the 
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assembly’s precious time…” (Sohrabi 1999: 265-266). This led to an unintended 
consequence. After the Constitutional Revolution, “the parliament actually was 
downgraded to an office to deal with the petitions” (Shohȃni 1389/2010: 56). 
After the Constitutional Revolution, for the majority, the culture of politics and the 
content of the “mirrors” were the same (Sohrabi op. cit., 270). The Circle of Justice was 
a myth created by officials, not invented by the inferiors and the Shȃh’s subjects (Ibid., 
272). The Shȃh consciously adopted the official ideology to preserve his charismatic 
legitimacy to condemn his ministers for a crisis (Ibid., 258). By flooding the assembly, 
people challenged the Shȃh’s sovereignty. At last, the Shȃh as the “source of justice” 
was replaced with the assembly in the public’s mind, supported by the reproduction of 
cultural information (Ibid., 284). 
 
Conclusion 
The petition box system applied in the pre-modern societies of Edo Japan and Qajar 
Iran arose out of similar goals to cope with crises. However, they functioned quite 
differently with different consequences. The relative success of Japanese meyasubako in 
comparison with the Iranian Justice Box can be ascribed to various factors such as 
different political systems, rates of literacy, financial conditions, etc. Within the 
Japanese system, recognition of the petitioners’ suggestions and critiques were a 
distinctive characteristic of meyasubako.  
The patrimonial king of Qajar, constrained by a tribal system, could not receive 
critiques or accept suggestions. He inherited a tribal system where he was “despot 
without instruments of despotisms” who could not stop unjust behavior of powerful 
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officials; further he lacked political means to deal with the complaints against his 
corrupt officials. The Qajar king, in need of legitimization of his power and in need of 
subduing the increasing unrest by his subjects, implemented the Justice box, held open 
audiences and made other superficial reforms. However, he had no way to enforce these 
reforms or ensure that they were properly administered. Nepotism, not meritocracy, 
continued as the dominant culture substantiated by a corrupt governmental structure, 
and a disenfranchised, disinterested and frustrated public. 
The recognition of opinions and critiques of commoners by the bakufu and all classes 
including the low-ranking samurai in the Tosa domain provided a public space of 
political discussion and revealed the significance and merits of opening a “path of 
communication.” This open space paved the way for offering very important 
suggestions which were usually adopted in policy making and nurtured the idea for the 
establishment of parliament as modern institution one century later.  
The Petition Box in Iran was never meant to give people the right to voice their 
opinions, critiques or suggestions. It was meant to be a source of justice, where people 
could appeal directly to the Shȃh regarding the corrupt officials or decisions. The 
malfunction of the innovative institutions for prosecution, including the Petition Box, by 
the Shȃh who was assumed as the source of justice led to the division between the 
intellectuals who advocated for modern parliament as an assembly for legislation and 
the majority who were dissatisfied with the past injustices. For the latter group, any 
such reform seemed too similar to the former traditional institutions and took it as a 
substitution for the source of justice. Therefore they continually challenged its authority 
through various means.   
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Final Conclusion 
 
Societal structures, specifically organizational structures, and the resultant culture 
and relative practices varied significantly in pre-modern Qajar Iran and Edo Japan. This 
impacted their respective transitions into the modern era. Japan rapidly developed while 
Iran despite periods of reform continues to remain underdeveloped.    
There are many approaches social scientists have taken to examine these outcomes 
separately; however this is the first study to compare the two societies and their 
organizational structures and the consequent cultures. By applying Mill’s method of 
difference and based on the most recent Modernization School theories, I have argued 
that internal factors is the suitable choice to do this comparative-historical study of 
pre-modern Japan and Iran with a focus on level of development as the outcome.    
Past researches emphasized the following major influences: religious values in 
pre-modern Japan and after Meiji Restoration; economic growth; cultural environment; 
political structure; international systems and relationships; and education. Other factors 
studied were: the role of cheap labor; progressive opinions of samurai; advanced 
monetary system; rapid adoption of Western technology; mass culture; family system; 
the impact of foreign factors including dependency; socio-economic disruption;  
patrimonial system; geographical and political factors; global system; and rivalry of 
colonial power. None of these studies however are sufficient to explain the comparative 
nature of development between Japan and Iran.   
The focus of this study is on the comparative differences of organizational structures 
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of Edo Japan and Qajar Iran and their consequent cultures which had important roles in 
providing the necessary potential and preconditions in the process of modernization. 
The clan (uji) and household (ie) systems are the main social units throughout 
Japanese history. The former based on kinship and blood relation was relatively a 
general system in most societies with similar counterparts, including in tribal societies 
like Iran. The latter, however, is unique to Japan, with distinctive characteristics 
differentiating it from other social structures. Uji predominated originally in Japan, but 
with the development of the ie system soon disappeared after a period of co-existence.    
The Iranian tribal organization was representative of many tribal societies with 
shared commonalities including: assumed priority to members with bonds of 
consanguinity; patrimony; complex family systems; and horizontal structure. Societies 
that shared these structures like tribal and uji societies, however, struggled with the 
preservation of wealth and property. Whereas a more vertical linear system succession 
tended to maintain and even grow wealth as there was less diffusion amongst heirs.  
Despite the advantages of the ie system, Iranian society remained characterized by tribal 
structures. 
As the ie system matured, the goal of preserving the estate and the family business 
became a well-defined goal for families. In order to accomplish this goal, faced with 
obstacles, such as lacking a heir or not having a heir capable of managing the family 
holdings, families turned to non-blood relations, often adopting people to be their 
successor to continue the family business and name. 
While group feeling (asabiah) and patrilineal kinship are important principles in 
tribal and uji societies, functional service to the emperor and management were key 
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principles in ie society. The latter prioritized talent and ability so that families and 
businesses could preserve their holdings and their rights and status to serve. 
Preservation of wealth therefore became not about blood relations but maintaining and 
protecting the family as a functioning entity through adoption and other means.     
The ie socioety and cultural values created both a public and private meritocracy, 
which transferred into modern Japan. Pre-modern reforms strengthened ie’s meritocratic 
structure and culture; these reforms included the sale of status and rank (gokenin kabu), 
circulation of documents (ringi), the supplemental salary (tashidaka) system, and 
“forced retirement/house arrest” (oshikome). Publicly, ie in its formal public structure 
waned, however, its organization, practices and applied institution contributed to the 
success of the representative parliamentary system, to a bureaucracy which still values 
widespread consensus, and to a public civic identity and sense of responsibility.  
Privately, ie continues to flourish in the corporate world.   
Just as Japan’s ie transferred both organization and culture of meritocracy, Iran’s 
tribal (ashȋra) structures and culture transferred from pre-modern society to the modern 
era, particularly in the forms of nepotism that emphasizes kinship and blood relations, 
and suspicion and aggression towards non related people. Often pre-modern reforms 
such as sale of status only strengthened the tribal nepotism structure while modern day 
attempts to dilute tribalism, for example with forced relocation of tribes, have had only 
a minimal degree of success. Therefore, tribalism remains a dominate obstacle to 
development and modernization. 
Finally the institution of petition box in both societies which was studied in detail by 
reviewing historical cases shows fundamental differences in functional goals, practices, 
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mechanisms, petitioners, effectiveness and finally consequences. The Japanese petition 
box building on Japan’s high literacy rate and political awareness, and established a 
government supported system that encouraged and awarded talent and ability as well as 
incorporated ideas to improve government function. This led to social mobility, 
meritocracy and strong civic engagement which aligned well with modernization.    
In Iran, one might argue that the petition box had little to build on. It was a 
superficial reform meant mainly to legitimate the Shah’s authority and to diffuse the 
people’s dissent over the corrupt officials. Its underlying structure and functional 
practices did not promote social mobility, or reward talent and ability, or encourage 
civic engagement. Therefore, the same institution that allowed Japan and its people to 
adapt to modernization and transform its structures and culture so that development 
could prosper, rigidly remained unresponsive to modernization and even became an 
obstacle for development in Iran. One institution, two very different social organizations, 
practices and cultures, could guide Iran and Japan into the modern era with divergent 
development consequences. 
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